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I.  INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
handed down in 2001 by the Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court
of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska.  The summaries focus on
the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common
law principles interpreted and the essence of the primary holdings.
Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information contained
in this review without further reference to the cases cited.  Full
summaries of the cases in the Appendix are available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/19ALRYearinReview.
The opinions are grouped by general subject matter rather
than the nature of the underlying claims.  The summaries are pre-
sented alphabetically in the following eleven areas of the law: ad-
ministrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, em-
ployment, family, insurance, property, torts and trusts and estates.
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Akootchook v. United States,1 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a suit
brought by five Alaska Natives challenging denial of their applica-
tions for land allotments under the Alaska Native Allotment Act
(“ANAA”).2  The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal of
the decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”), rea-
soning that the claims were barred by the res judicata effect of ear-
lier class action suits challenging the IBLA’s denial of applications
based on ancestral use of land rather than personal use.  The court
of appeals found the application of res judicata improper because
the ancestral claims common to the classes were not identical to
1. 271 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. at 1162.
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these plaintiffs’ personal claims.3  However, the court affirmed the
district court’s ruling by deferring to the IBLA’s interpretation of
the ANAA and the IBLA’s requirement that use of the land ap-
plied for must be accomplished by an independent individual acting
in his own right and not by a minor.4  The court acknowledged the
plaintiffs’ interpretation that the ANAA focuses on communal
rather than personal use as reasonable, but held that “it is not the
only reasonable interpretation and does not compel us to strike
down the IBLA’s interpretation.”5
In Alaska v. EPA,6 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that it had jurisdiction to review three EPA orders which in-
validated air quality construction permits.7  The orders determined
that a new power generator at Conmico’s Red Dog Mine facility
did not comply with the Clean Air Act and prevented Conmico
from beginning any construction or modification activities associ-
ated with the generator.  The Alaska Department of Environ-
mental Conservation and Conmico petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
review of the orders.  The EPA argued that the court did not have
jurisdiction because the orders did not constitute the “final action
of the Administrator.”8  The Ninth Circuit held that jurisdiction
was proper because the orders (1) represented a final position as-
serted by the EPA on the factual circumstances upon which the or-
ders were predicated; (2) determined the “rights or obligations” of
the parties by preventing further construction or modification at
the facility; and (3) indicated that “legal consequences will flow” in
the form of penalties if Conmico chose to disregard the orders.9
However, the court declined to consider the merits of the case until
the EPA submitted a complete administrative record, withdrew the
orders in question or filed an enforcement action in the appropri-
ate district court.10
In Bullock v. State, Dep’t of Community and Regional Affairs,11
the supreme court held that when the value of all taxable property
of a municipality exceeds the 225% valuation cap on the total
property value that municipalities may tax under Alaska Statutes
(“A.S.”) 29.45.080, the municipality may reduce the value of all
3. Id. at 1164-65.
4. Id. at 1166-67.
5. Id. at 1167.
6. 244 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2001).
7. Id. at 749.
8. Id. at 750.
9. Id. (applying Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)).
10. Id. at 751.
11. 19 P.3d 1209 (Alaska 2001).
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taxable property on a pro-rata basis.12  The court also held that un-
der A.S. 29.45.100, the 225% limitation does not apply to the impo-
sition of taxes for debt service.13  Bullock asserted that section
29.45.080 requires the municipality to reduce the value of oil and
gas property taxes so that when added to the full value of all other
taxable property, the total amount does not exceed the cap.  The
State advocated the pro-rata reduction of the assessed value of all
the property in the municipality to arrive at the maximum value
under the cap, the method practiced since the introduction of the
statute.  Finding ambiguity in the statutory language and history,
the supreme court deferred to the State’s long-standing interpreta-
tion of the statute and upheld the pro-rata reduction.14  Bullock
also argued that municipalities must apply the valuation cap to
taxes for repaying bonded indebtedness, but the court held that the
valuation cap limitations do not apply to taxes levied to pay the
principal and interest on bonds.15
In In re Friedman,16 the supreme court reduced a sanction en-
tered by the Alaska Bar Association’s disciplinary board against an
attorney who drew on a settlement trust account to advance funds
to his client and to pay himself attorney’s fees that were not yet due
him.17  Friedman, the attorney for a plaintiff in a complex tort suit,
deposited an $81,000 settlement contribution in his client trust ac-
count.  Friedman drew on that account almost immediately, with-
out informing the other plaintiffs’ attorneys.  The supreme court
agreed with the disciplinary board’s finding that Friedman violated
disciplinary rules against conduct involving dishonesty, mishandling
of client funds and illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.18
However, the court disagreed with the finding that Friedman en-
gaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and
reduced Friedman’s suspension to three years.19  Friedman’s initial
denial of any wrong-doing was an aggravating factor, but his lack of
a prior disciplinary record, the absence of loss or injury to his cli-
ents, his commitment to pro bono and public service and the meas-
ures he took to remedy the problems caused by his misconduct
convinced the court that a three-year suspension was appropriate.20
12. Id. at 1214.
13. Id. at 1218.
14. Id. at 1215.
15. Id. at 1218.
16. 23 P.3d 620 (Alaska 2001).
17. Id. at 622.
18. Id. at 627-30.
19. Id. at 628-29, 634.
20. Id. at 634.
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In Interior Alaska Airboat Assoc., Inc. v. State,21 the supreme
court held that the Board of Game’s regulations establishing two
controlled use areas (“CUAs”) are constitutional, are within the
Board’s authority and are neither arbitrary nor capricious.22  The
Noatak and Nenana CUAs restrict hunter access by aircraft in cer-
tain areas to help reduce moose harvests, to prevent habitat altera-
tion and to resolve conflicts between hunters using planes and air-
boats for access and hunters using other transportation.  The
Interior Alaska Airboat Association challenged the regulations,
but the supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for
the Board.23  The court rejected the Association’s constitutional ar-
guments that the regulations deny equal access, finding that the
CUAs are open to any resident who wants to use them and that the
equipment limitations apply equally to all users.24  The court found
that the regulations are within the statutory authority of the Board
and are consistent with its conservation and development goals,
and that the record showed that the Board’s decisionmaking proc-
ess was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.25
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Repasky,26 the supreme court
reversed the superior court and held that the mayoral invocation of
the item veto power to reduce the annual budgets of a school dis-
trict and the local source appropriations for those budgets was a
valid exercise of the mayor’s veto power.27  In 1995 and 1997,
Mayor Mystrom reduced the budget and local source appropriation
as approved by the Anchorage Municipal Assembly.  Citizens
challenged his authority to veto the district’s budgets, claiming that
the mayor did not have line item veto authority over the school
budget and that state law impliedly prohibited his veto power.  The
supreme court interpreted subsection 5.02(c) of the Home Rule
Charter for the Municipality of Anchorage as granting the mayor
both general and line item veto power over the school district
budget and local appropriation ordinances.28  The court held that
Alaska law did not expressly prohibit the grant of veto power to
the mayor and that A.S. 14.14.060(c) did not impliedly prohibit the
municipality’s veto power, even though it is silent about the
21. 18 P.3d 686 (Alaska 2001).
22. Id. at 687.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 695.
25. Id. at 690-91, 694.
26. 34 P.3d 302 (Alaska 2001).
27. Id. at 304, 315.
28. Id. at 307-10.
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power.29  Citing the express prohibition of a mayoral veto of “ap-
propriation items in a school budget ordinance” in all locations
other than home rule municipalities, the court held that the silence
reflected the legislature’s intent to grant each home rule munici-
pality the freedom to decide whether to give its mayor the power to
veto a school district budget.30
In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt,31 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enjoined the National Park Serv-
ice (“NPS”) from implementing its plan to increase the number of
cruise ships entering Glacier Bay because the NPS had not com-
plied with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).32
NEPA requires a federal agency undertaking any major action to
take a “hard look” at the effects of its decision on the environ-
ment.33  The agency must first prepare an Environmental Assess-
ment (“EA”), followed by an Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) if the EA reveals an adverse environmental impact.34  The
NPS did not complete an EIS even though the EA showed that
there were many unknown effects on whales, Steller sea lions, bald
eagles and waterfowl, and that increased disturbance levels could
compromise the survival and reproduction of marine mammals.
The court determined that “unknown” effects of the increase in
cruise ships constituted grounds for the preparation of an EIS be-
cause uncertainty is the reason for the preparation of an EIS, not
an excuse to avoid its completion.35
In Newmont Alaska Ltd. v. McDowell,36 the supreme court
held that an original claimant had not abandoned mining claims
because a deficient yet timely payment of second year’s rent enti-
tled him to an opportunity to cure the deficiency.37  Miners who
stake claims to state lands must pay the first year’s rent within
ninety days and the second year’s rent within a set three-month pe-
riod or the claims will be considered abandoned.38  Clay, the prede-
cessor in interest to Newmont, was the original locator of most of
the 224 mining claims at issue.  The Department of Natural Re-
sources (“DNR”) applied Clay’s payment to his second year rent,
29. Id. at 311-12.
30. Id. at 310-12.
31. 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001).
32. Id. at 725.
33. Id. at 730.
34. Id.  (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2001)).
35. Id. at 729.
36. 22 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2001).
37. Id. at 885.
38. Id. at 882.
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determining that he had failed to pay year one and thus had aban-
doned his claim.  The DNR division director rejected this determi-
nation, finding Clay’s payment to be a deficient but timely partial
payment that is curable under A.S. 38.05.265.  The supreme court
agreed, finding that Clay had actually paid more than one year’s
rent because he paid $400 over his year one obligation.39  There-
fore, his year two payment was deficient, but timely and abandon-
ment did not result.40
In Snyder v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety,41 the supreme court
affirmed the revocation of Snyder’s driver’s license based on his re-
fusal to take a breath test.42  After his arrest for driving while in-
toxicated, Snyder made two requests for a blood alcohol content
test, which were refused.  Snyder attempted to take a breath test
several times, but never provided an adequate sample and was
charged with refusal to submit to a test.  Snyder’s driver’s license
was revoked, but he claimed that a chest injury had prevented him
from blowing sufficiently into the machine.  The hearing officer
found that Snyder was unwilling to perform the tests, not merely
physically incapable.  In affirming, the supreme court reasoned that
the revocation was based solely on Snyder’s refusal to take the
breath test, irrespective of what a blood test might have revealed.43
In Tlingit-Haida Regional Electric Authority v. State,44 the su-
preme court upheld the Alaska Public Utility Commission’s
(“Commission”) decision to eliminate overlap between two utili-
ties.45  Twenty-five years ago, the Commission created overlapping
service territory between the Tlingit-Haida Regional Electric
Authority (“THREA”) and the Alaska Power Company.  In 1993,
the Commission awarded the Klawock territory to Alaska Power,
eliminating the overlap.  THREA appealed the award to the supe-
rior court, which remanded the case to the Commission for further
factual determinations.  On remand, the Commission found, as be-
fore, that the public interest required that Alaska Power serve
Klawock exclusively and that this would not hinder the purposes of
the Rural Electrification Act.  THREA appealed, and the superior
court affirmed but found THREA’s loss of its Klawock facility to
be a compensable taking.  The supreme court affirmed, finding that
the Commission did not err when it chose to favor one expert’s tes-
39. Id. at 883-84.
40. Id.
41. 31 P.3d 770 (Alaska 2001).
42. Id. at 771-72.
43. Id. at 776.
44. 15 P.3d 754 (Alaska 2001).
45. Id. at 770.
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timony over that of another, that THREA was entitled to compen-
sation for the physical assets stranded by the Commission’s deci-
sion and that the Rural Electrification Act did not preempt the
Commission’s restriction of THREA’s territory.46
In Whitesides v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety,47 the supreme
court held that the Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) violated
Whitesides’ due process rights when it denied him an in-person li-
cense revocation hearing.48  Whitesides was arrested for driving
while intoxicated and had his driver’s license revoked for refusing
to take a breath test.  Whitesides claimed he had agreed to take the
test and sought review of the revocation.  The DMV scheduled a
telephone hearing over Whitesides’ objections, and the hearing of-
ficer found that Whitesides had refused the breath test and re-
voked his license for one year.  The supreme court found that a
driver’s license is an important property interest, that in-person tes-
timony is a valuable tool for evaluating the credibility of witnesses
and that the government’s interest in cost savings would not be
greatly prejudiced by granting in-person hearings where credibility
is at issue.49  The court held that there were material issues about
Whitesides’ credibility that needed to be resolved and, therefore,
an in-person revocation hearing should have been held.50
In In re Wiederholt,51 the supreme court held that a disbarred
attorney petitioning for reinstatement must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that he or she has acknowledged wrongdoing, re-
habilitated past conduct and is fit to practice law.52  Wiederholt was
disbarred in 1994 for knowingly filing a false pleading and affidavit
and for forging his client’s signature to endorse a check.  Wieder-
holt petitioned for reinstatement after five years, but the Bar Asso-
ciation Disciplinary Board denied his request.  In a matter of first
impression, the supreme court held that under the Alaska Bar
Rules, a presumption against reinstatement exists to protect the
public and the petitioning attorney must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that he or she has met the competency and
knowledge requirements under Alaska Bar Rule 29.53  The court
affirmed, holding that the Board appropriately considered Wieder-
46. Id. at 764-67.
47. 20 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2001).
48. Id. at 1132.
49. Id. at 1132-38 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
50. Id. at 1139.
51. 24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001).
52. Id. at 1225-26.
53. Id. at 1223, 1226.
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holt’s past conduct, remorse and acknowledgment of wrongdoing
and the length of his disbarment when considering reinstatement.54
III.  BUSINESS LAW
In Alderman v. Iditarod Properties, Inc.,55 the supreme court
held that where a trade name has acquired secondary meaning
prior to use by another business, it is infringed when confusion re-
sults from another’s use of it.56  The court also held that A.S.
10.35.040 requires prior use of a business name for its valid regis-
tration.57  Iditarod Properties, Inc. (“Iditarod”) restored the historic
Fourth Avenue Theatre and ran several businesses from the prem-
ises.  The Aldermans ran a trolley from the theater.  After a dis-
agreement resulted in severance of the oral agreement between
Iditarod and the Aldermans, the Aldermans registered the business
name “Fourth Avenue Theater Trolley Tours.”  Iditarod later ran a
trolley tour business under the same name, and filed suit for trade
name infringement against the Aldermans.  Because the evidence
supported the jury’s finding that the trade name “Fourth Avenue
Theater” had acquired secondary meaning, the supreme court
found that the Aldermans’ use was infringing.58  The court also af-
firmed the interpretation of section 10.35.040 to require prior use
for registration of a trade name.59
In Hartung v. State, Dep’t of Labor,60 the supreme court held
that when bankruptcy intervenes, a corporate officer is not liable
for tax payments that become due during the post-petition period
during which bankruptcy prevents the officer from making pay-
ments.61  Hartung was the chief financial officer of MarkAir, which
filed for bankruptcy in April 1995.  The Department of Labor de-
termined that Hartung was responsible for paying $135,026 in un-
employment taxes owed by MarkAir for the first quarter of 1995.
The superior court affirmed the Department’s decision on appeal.
However, the supreme court reversed, finding that Hartung was
not a party against whom tax liability for unemployment contribu-
tions could be assessed because the bankruptcy order prevented
him from compelling payment and because he was not in a position
to ensure that MarkAir paid employer contributions due in the
54. Id. at 1227-28.
55. 32 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2001).
56. Id. at 390.
57. Id. at 392-94.
58. Id. at 387-89.
59. Id. at 392-94.
60. 22 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).
61. Id. at 4.
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post-petition period.62  The court noted that Hartung might be held
liable for the employee contribution portion of the taxes but that
the issue was not adequately addressed by the parties.63
In Hoffman Construction Co. of Alaska v. U.S. Fabrication &
Erection, Inc.,64 the supreme court held that the duty to defend in
an indemnity clause is triggered by claims of injury falling within
the scope of the clause, while the duty to indemnify is not triggered
until the indemnitee is liable for damages.65  Four U.S. Fabrication
& Erection, Inc. (“USF&E”) employees brought suit alleging that
they had been exposed to asbestos while working at a construction
project at Providence Hospital in Anchorage.  Hoffman settled the
suit and sought indemnity from subcontractor USF&E under a
contractual indemnity provision.  USF&E simultaneously sought
indemnity and defense from Hoffman under an implied contractual
theory, and Providence sought indemnity and defense costs from
Hoffman under a contractual indemnity provision.  Because the
workers’ claims were within the scope of the Providence/Hoffman
contract, the supreme court held that Hoffman owed Providence
the duty to defend, but not to indemnify, since Hoffman had settled
with the workers.66  The court reversed the ruling that USF&E did
not owe Hoffman a duty to defend because the employees’ claims
were within the scope of the Hoffman/USF&E indemnity clause
and because A.S. 45.45.900, the public duty exception, the policy of
nondelegable duties and the doctrine of unclean hands did not pre-
vent enforcement of the indemnity clause.67  Lastly, the court re-
versed the grant of summary judgment for USF&E on the issue of
implied contractual indemnity because the indemnitor, Hoffman,
was receiving rather than performing the contractual service and,
as a result, the Kandik Construction68 model for implied contractual
indemnity did not apply.69
In Long v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc.,70 the supreme
court reversed a grant of summary judgment because it found a
limitations clause in Holland America’s contract unenforceable.71
62. Id.
63. Id. at 5.
64. 32 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2001).
65. Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 355-56.
67. Id. at 360.
68. Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Kandik Const., Inc., 823 P.2d 632
(Alaska 1991).
69. Hoffman, 32 P.3d at 361-62.
70. 26 P.3d 430 (Alaska 2001).
71. Id. at 437.
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Long sustained injuries during a Holland America tour of Alaska.
The tour contract contained a choice of law provision stating that
Washington state law would control and that notice of personal
injury claims must be provided within six months of the alleged in-
jury and suit filed within one year.  Long’s attorney gave Holland
America notice of Long’s claim after ten and one-half months and
filed suit after sixteen months.  The supreme court found that the
limitations provision in the contract was enforceable because
Alaska law was applicable under the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws,72 because applying Washington state law would
violate a fundamental policy of the State of Alaska,73 and because a
contractual limitations period is unenforceable in Alaska.74
In Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,75 the su-
preme court held that a waiver agreement with the IRS stays the
statute of limitations for Alaska state income taxes to the extent
that the tax issue is covered by the federal waiver.76  Louisiana-
Pacific received a refund of taxes paid to the State, but a subse-
quent audit revealed that the corporation did not request the re-
fund within the three-year period required.  Louisiana-Pacific
maintained that waiver agreements with the IRS stayed the statute
of limitations and refused to return the refund.  The supreme court
held that a waiver agreement between the IRS and a taxpayer stays
the statute of limitations for Alaska state taxes.77  The court rea-
soned that the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code by reference
under A.S. 43.20.021 includes the portion concerning extensions of
the statute of limitations.78  The court remanded to determine
whether the issues in the waiver agreements were related to Lou-
isiana-Pacific’s state tax liability and refund.79
In McCormick v. City of Dillingham,80 the supreme court held
that Dillingham’s business license fee and sales tax are valid, and
that McCormick was personally liable for his corporation’s failure
to pay them.81  Dillingham sued to collect its business license fee
and sales taxes from McCormick, who alleged that those ordi-
72. Id. at 432-33 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
187(2)(b) (1971)).
73. Id. at 432-34.
74. Id. at 435-37.
75. 26 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2001).
76. Id. at 429.
77. Id. at 427 (citing Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236, 238 (Alaska 1966)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 430.
80. 16 P.3d 735 (Alaska 2001).
81. Id. at 745.
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nances had never been legally enacted.  The superior court granted
summary judgment for Dillingham, finding the ordinances valid
and McCormick personally liable for his corporation’s debts.  On
appeal, the supreme court found that McCormick had failed to
overcome the presumption that “proceedings of the governing
body of a municipality have been conducted in accordance with the
law.”82  Although Dillingham’s sales tax ordinance included a ref-
erence to a lost exhibit and was mislabeled, the court held that
these “anomalies . . . [do] not [establish] that the city failed to com-
ply with the law.”83  The court also found that the business license
fee ordinance had been properly enacted and was not preempted
by the state business license law.84  Finally, the supreme court de-
termined that the trial court had not acted improperly in piercing
the corporate veil because the company was under McCormick’s
control and was incorporated by him, was inadequately capitalized
and used McCormick’s personal property without payment.85
In Magden v. Alaska USA Federal Credit Union,86 the supreme
court upheld the delayed execution of judgment against a creditor
because the credit union had no evidence that the creditor had any
assets upon which it could execute and it had been barred from
collecting against the creditor’s income.87  The Alaska USA Federal
Credit Union (“AUSA”) sought to execute a deficiency judgment
against Magden.  However, Magden successfully moved to exempt
her income and entered into a settlement in which AUSA agreed
not to execute against her permanent fund dividends.  After Mag-
den failed to adhere to the settlement, AUSA moved for execu-
tion.  Magden opposed the motion, arguing that execution was
barred by A.S. 09.35.020, which provides that no execution may be
entered when five years have elapsed after entry of judgment un-
less the creditor provides “just and sufficient reasons” for delay.
The court found that AUSA had “just and sufficient reasons” be-
cause it was barred from executing against Magden’s permanent
fund dividend and could not execute against her regular income
because she had successfully sought exemption.88
In Old Harbor Native Corp. v. Afognak Joint Venture,89 the su-
preme court reversed a grant of summary judgment because the
82. Id. at 738.
83. Id. at 738-39.
84. Id. at 739.
85. Id. at 742-45.
86. 36 P.3d 659 (Alaska 2001).
87. Id. at 662.
88. Id.
89. 30 P.3d 101 (Alaska 2001).
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Afognak Joint Venture had a fiduciary duty to disclose the status
of a contemporaneous lawsuit after the Old Harbor Native Corpo-
ration withdrew from the venture.90  In 1982, Old Harbor Native
Corporation (“Old Harbor”) and Akhiok-Kaguyak, Inc. (“Ak-
hiok”) entered into a joint venture agreement with other corpora-
tions to receive land from the federal government.  In 1989, Old
Harbor and Akhiok relinquished membership in the Joint Venture
after the Exxon Valdez spilled oil on the Joint Venture’s land.  In
July 1991, Old Harbor, Akhiok and the Joint Venture reached a
partition agreement and executed a release of claims.  Subse-
quently, the Joint Venture received $22 million in a settlement with
Exxon.  The supreme court held that the release of claims in 1991
did not bar the corporations’ claims to their part of the settlement
agreement.91  The court held that because members of a dissolving
joint venture continue to owe each other a fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure from the time of dissolution until the venture winds up its af-
fairs, the Joint Venture owed a duty to disclose the status of the
Exxon claim during the period following the corporations’ with-
drawal and prior to the completion of the partitioning process.92
In Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc.,93 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) authorizes Na-
tive corporations to issue shares to certain groups of Native elders
without consideration.94  The court was equally divided on whether
Goldbelt satisfied its disclosure duty in its proxy statement regard-
ing the elder benefit program.95  In 1997, a majority of Goldbelt
shareholders authorized issuance of one hundred shares to original
Goldbelt shareholders who reached the age of 65.  Sierra filed suit,
arguing that Goldbelt could not limit issuance of these new shares
to elders who were original shareholders or to elders who are no
longer shareholders.  Sierra appealed the grant of summary judg-
ment for Goldbelt.  The supreme court held that the ANCSA
clearly allows Native corporations to discriminate in favor of origi-
nal shareholders and does not limit the corporations’ ability to is-
sue elder stock only to those elders who still own the original
shares.96  The court also held that because the ANCSA expressly
preempts Alaska corporate law, Goldbelt was authorized to issue
90. Id. at 109.
91. Id. at 105-06.
92. Id. at 106-07.
93. 25 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2001).
94. Id. at 698.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 701-02.
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new stock to non-shareholders without consideration.97  The court
split on the question of the adequacy of Goldbelt’s proxy solicita-
tion, thereby affirming the lower court’s summary judgment on the
issue “without substantive discussion.”98
In Sprucewood Investment Corp. v. Alaska Housing Finance
Corp.,99 the supreme court affirmed the ruling that Sprucewood’s
appeal of a temporary restraining order was moot.100  Alaska
Housing Finance Corporation (“AHFC”) awarded a contract to
Northern Construction and Equipment for the demolition of vari-
ous buildings.  After the contract was awarded, Northern Construc-
tion learned that other bidders had intended to move the buildings
off site and salvage them.  Consequently, Northern Construction
abandoned its plans to raze the buildings and instead sold them to
Sprucewood.  Upon learning that the buildings had been sold,
AHFC obtained a temporary restraining order against Sprucewood
and was granted summary judgment on its breach of contract
claims against Northern Construction.  AHFC then sold the build-
ings to another investment company rather than demolish them.
On appeal, the supreme court held that Sprucewood’s appeal of the
restraining order was moot because a reversal of the order would
not enable Sprucewood to do anything with the buildings now
owned by another investment company.101  The court also found
that the superior court correctly granted summary judgment to
AHFC on its breach of contract claims because, since both parties
understood that the contract required demolition of the buildings,
it was enforceable in accordance with that meaning.102  The court
upheld dismissal of Sprucewood’s counterclaim for negligence in
drafting, finding that the contract was not ambiguous.103  Finally,
the court upheld dismissal of Sprucewood’s counterclaim for eco-
nomic waste because the waste claim was rendered moot when the
buildings were sold rather than demolished.104
97. Id. at 702.
98. Id. at 703.
99. 33 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2001).
100. Id. at 1165.
101. Id. at 1161.
102. Id. at 1163.
103. Id. at 1165.
104. Id.
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IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
In Falconer v. Adams,105 the supreme court held that a co-
defendant, Adams, was not entitled to draw his award of attorney’s
fees over a lien filed by Falconer’s attorney.106  In an auto collision
case, the jury found that defendant Taylor-Welch was negligent
and that co-defendant Adams was not negligent.  The attorney for
plaintiff Falconer filed a lien for $18,583, and the trial court
awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Adams against Falconer for
$10,623.25.  A judgment of $13,873 was entered against Taylor-
Welch in favor of Falconer.  Falconer argued that the attorney lien
had priority over Adams’ claim under A.S. 34.35.430(b).  The court
recognized that the language in that section seemed to refer to all
parties in a proceeding, but noted that the section has been inter-
preted narrowly to apply only to the rights of the party paying the
proceeds against which the lien is asserted.107  The court concluded
that section 34.35.430(b) refers only to each plaintiff’s rights vis-à-
vis each defendant’s rights and therefore held that the attorney’s
lien has priority.108
In Hodge v. Sorba,109 the supreme court affirmed the award of
attorney’s fees to Sorba.110  Sorba was granted attorney’s fees after
the superior court entered a divorce decree and adjudicated child
custody, support and property division.  Because she had no in-
come, Sorba’s attorneys agreed to represent her in exchange for
the attorney’s fees, if any, awarded by the superior court.  Hodge
argued that Sorba’s fee arrangement was a contingent fee ar-
rangement, which denied the court the authority to award attor-
ney’s fees under Alaska Bar Rule 35(d).  The supreme court held
that the superior court had the authority to award attorney’s fees
under A.S. 25.24.140.111  The underlying fee arrangement was not
“contingent” because the arrangement turned on the financial re-
sources of the parties rather than on successful prosecution of the
issues.112  The court also held that its decision in Coleman v. Cole-
man113 suggested that an attorney’s fee award in a domestic pro-
105. 20 P.3d 583 (Alaska 2001).
106. Id. at 584.
107. Id. at 585-86.
108. Id.
109. 31 P.3d 1273 (Alaska 2001).
110. Id. at 1273.
111. Hodge, 31 P.3d at 1275.
112. Id.
113. 968 P.2d 570, 573-74 (Alaska 1998).
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ceeding will not turn on whether the proceeding is one for a di-
vorce and, therefore, there was no prohibition against contingent
attorney fee agreements in domestic matters.114
In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Rewire The Board,115 the su-
preme court held that Rewire prevailed in the superior court as a
public interest litigant and upheld the attorney’s fee award and two
counts of contempt against the Matanuska Electric Association
(“MEA”).116  A group of MEA members called Rewire the Board
(“Rewire”) proposed a bylaw amendment and sued to recall all of
MEA’s directors.  Because Rewire’s allegations warranted a recall
election, the superior court held it to be a prevailing party.  The su-
preme court upheld Rewire’s status as the prevailing party and as a
public-interest litigant because “most of its members did not have a
substantial economic interest in the litigation.”117  The court found
that it was not “an abuse of discretion to award Rewire attorney’s
fees incurred in responding to MEA’s petitions for review” because
Rewire successfully opposed many of MEA’s arguments on two
appeals.118  The court also overturned findings of contempt against
MEA, for comments made in an unsolicited interview and for pho-
tographing picketers supporting Rewire, but affirmed contempt
findings for MEA’s publication of unofficial election results and a
letter critical of Rewire as willful violations of the court’s order.119
In Shearer v. Mundt,120 the supreme court held that lay pro se
litigants are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.121  Layper-
son Shearer successfully defended title to his land pro se and re-
quested attorney’s fees.  The superior court rejected his claim,
holding that “attorney’s fees may not be awarded to lay litigants.”122
The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that “the purpose of Rule
82 attorney’s fees is to compensate litigants for fees they incur
through legal representation, not to compensate litigants for the
economic detriment of litigating.”123  The court also rejected
Shearer’s claim that denying attorney’s fees to lay pro se litigants
violated his right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution
114. Hodge, 31 P.3d at 1275-76.
115. 36 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2001).
116. Id. at 687.
117. Id. at 695-97.
118. Id. at 699.
119. Id. at 701-03.
120. 36 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2001).
121. Id. at 1199.
122. Id. at 1197 (citing Alaska Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bernhardt, 794 P.2d
579, 581-82 (Alaska 1990)).
123. Id. at 1198.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
2002] YEAR IN REVIEW 217
because it treats attorneys and non-attorneys differently.124  The
court reasoned that attorneys and non-attorneys are not similarly
situated and, therefore, are not subject to equal protection.125
In United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Pruitt,126 the supreme
court held that separate awards of attorney’s fees in a bifurcated
case were appropriate but that the amounts awarded were not jus-
tified because the court did not explain why it deviated from
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(b)(1).127  During arbitration of
an insurance case, the case was split into the issues of coverage and
damages.  The trial court awarded attorney’s fees for each part of
the bifurcated case.  United Services Automobile Association
(“USAA”) argued that the fees should have been awarded only
with respect to coverage, in accordance with the memorializing or-
der.  The supreme court disagreed and reasoned that the trial court
did not err because the USAA’s attorney stated in oral argument
that “the idea was. . .to award attorney’s fees separately.”128  How-
ever, the supreme court held that the lower court erred in its devia-
tion from the Rule 82(b)(1) fee schedule because it did not calcu-
late the fees according to the schedule and did not adequately
describe its reasons for deviating as required by Rule 82(b)(3).129
B. Miscellaneous
In Baker v. Exxon Corp.,130 a case arising out of the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court’s order, finding that Exxon had standing
to appeal the decision of the district court, that the district court
erred in ruling that Exxon should not be allowed to share in the
punitive damages and that there is no material difference between
an assignment and a “cede back” agreement.131  In July 1999, the
district court granted final approval to the allocation plan for sea-
food processors included in the plaintiffs’ class.  The plan excluded
some processors because they had settled with Exxon before certi-
fication of the mandatory punitive damages class by assigning part
of their punitive damages claims to Exxon in exchange for money.
Exxon filed suit to recover a portion of the punitive damages pur-
suant to its assignments.  The district court held that Exxon should
124. Id. at 1199.
125. Id.
126. 38 P.3d 528 (Alaska 2001).
127. Id. at 530.
128. Id. at 532.
129. Id. at 533 (citing State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 440, 446 (Alaska 1998)).
130. 239 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2001).
131. Id. at 987.
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be prevented from sharing in the punitive damages.  The Ninth
Circuit found that Exxon had standing to appeal without interven-
ing because Exxon was already a party to the suit, thereby falling
within the rule that only parties can appeal adverse judgments.132
The court found that public policy supports settlement of disputes
and favors settlements where the plaintiffs assign their punitive
damages awards to the defendant.133  The court found that assign-
ments are not materially different from “cede backs,” which were
permitted in Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Baker,134 and that the settle-
ments should stand.135
In Botelho v. Griffin,136 the supreme court held that Attorney
General Botelho could pursue a claim on behalf of, and without
consent from, various charitable organizations against the Griffins
for violating state gaming laws.137  Botelho alleged that the Griffins
failed to turn over the statutory minimum percentage of gaming
proceeds to the charities and charged some charities excessive fees.
The supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment for
the Griffins, reasoning that statutory and common law give the at-
torney general standing to bring suit to uphold state gaming laws,
and that intervention by the attorney general is appropriate if the
charities’ trustees dismiss or compromise the charities’ claims for
less than the charities are due.138
In Bradley v. State,139 the court of appeals held that a former
law clerk may serve as an attorney in a case which was pending
during his clerkship if he did not personally or substantially partici-
pate in the case or if all parties consent.140  Plaintiff Bradley’s ap-
peal was pending during Maarten Vermaat’s clerkship in the 1999-
2000 term.  Bradley did not object to Vermaat serving as the State’s
lawyer in his case and Vermaat submitted an affidavit stating that
he had no contact with Bradley’s case during his clerkship. The
court decided that under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 104,
Vermaat should not serve as attorney for Alaska, but noted that
the more recently adopted Rule 1.12 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct is much narrower in its disqualification of law clerks.141
132. Id. at 987-88.
133. Id. at 988.
134. 229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. Baker, 239 F.3d at 988.
136. 25 P.3d 689 (Alaska 2001).
137. Id. at 691, 696.
138. Id. at 692-93.
139. 16 P.3d 187 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
140. Id. at 190.
141. Id. at 188-89.
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The court adopted the language of Rule 1.12 as it applies to law
clerks and established the procedure for former clerks to serve as
attorneys in such cases, which involves submitting a motion and af-
fidavit disclosing “all pertinent facts.”142
In Brown v. Lange,143 the supreme court held that pro se de-
fendant Brown was not entitled to notice of default judgment
against him and that Lange’s attorney owed no independent pro-
fessional duty to give such notice.144  Lange, a passenger in a boat
driven by Willis, sued Brown and Willis after their boats collided.
After receiving the complaint, Brown called Lange’s attorney and
left a recorded message asking for the court date.  The attorney’s
receptionist returned the call, informing Brown’s mother that no
court date had been set and that Brown needed to answer the
complaint.  Brown did not answer and default judgment was en-
tered against him.  Brown argued that the default judgment should
be set aside because he “appeared” and was therefore entitled to
service of the application for entry of default under Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 55.  The supreme court declined to find Brown’s
act of leaving the message as an “appearance” under the Rule.145
Without this appearance, the clerk of court was permitted to enter
a default judgment without requiring service of the application for
default on the defendant.146  The court also held that an attorney’s
professional obligation to contact known opposing counsel who
had requested an extension and to inquire of his or her intentions
before seeking default did not extend to a pro se defendant who
merely made a single telephone call inquiring about a court date.147
In Hallam v. Holland America Line, Inc.,148 the supreme court
held that the superior court did not err in denying class certification
to pro se litigant Hallam, but remanded the case for consideration
of Hallam’s conditional class certification motion.149  Hallam filed a
pro se complaint in superior court against Holland America for
claims involving his employment contract and the Alaska Wage
and Hour Act.  Hallam’s motion for class certification was denied
because Hallam lacked counsel.  Hallam’s subsequent motion
seeking certification of the class conditioned on Hallam’s hiring an
attorney was never decided.  The district court granted summary
142. Id. at 190.
143. 21 P.3d 822 (Alaska 2001).
144. Id. at 826, 828.
145. Id. at 826.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 828.
148. 27 P.3d 751 (Alaska 2001).
149. Id. at 754.
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judgment to Holland America.  The supreme court found that
while the denial of class certification with Hallam as a pro se liti-
gant was not erroneous, the issue of conditional class certification
must be considered on remand because the district court did not
give the motion due consideration.150
In Leisnoi v. United States,151 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction over an
action under the Quiet Title Act,152 because the United States
claimed an interest in the property at issue in the form of reserve
easements and because title between Leisnoi and the U.S. was dis-
puted.153  When a third party filed a lis pendens on behalf of the
U.S. against Leisnoi Inc., an Alaska Native Village Corporation
wishing to sell land, Leisnoi filed an action in district court to quiet
title.  The court of appeals found that the district court retained ju-
risdiction because the U.S. claimed reserved easements in Leisnoi’s
property and because the U.S.’s interests in title were asserted by a
third party, clouding Leisnoi’s title and resulting in a continuing
dispute between the interests of Leisnoi and the U.S.154
In Smith v. Cleary,155 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not exceed its approval authority by requiring an Arizona
private correctional facility to meet the standards outlined in a set-
tlement agreement between the State and a class of prisoners,
which addressed overcrowding in Alaska prisons.156  The State and
the prisoners’ class entered into a settlement, which enumerated
the rights of inmates, outlined population guidelines, detailed
prison standards, established mechanisms for compliance and des-
ignated a judge to enforce the agreement.  In response to superior
court sanctions for overcrowding, the State contracted with a pri-
vate detention facility in Arizona to house 206 Alaska inmates.
The superior court conditioned its approval of the contract on the
Arizona facility’s compliance with the settlement agreement.  The
supreme court first found that the settlement agreement did not di-
rectly apply to the Arizona facility because neither party intended
the provisions to cover such a facility.157  However, because the
agreement required the State to submit mitigation plans for court
approval if the State sought to limit overcrowding and because the
150. Id. at 754.
151. 267 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (1994).
153. Leisnoi, 267 F.3d at 1023.
154. Id.
155. 24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2001).
156. Id. at 1246.
157. Id. at 1249.
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Arizona detention facility plan was intended to limit overcrowding,
the court held that the superior court had discretion to require the
Arizona facility to comply with the settlement agreement.158
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles,159 the supreme court
held that the Governor’s item veto power only permits the deletion
or reduction of money appropriated and does not permit the Gov-
ernor to increase or divert funds or strike descriptive language.160
Governor Knowles invoked the Governor’s item veto power and
struck various parts of the 1997 appropriation bills passed by the
Alaska legislature.  The Alaska Legislative Council challenged five
of these vetoes, arguing that they were invalid because they did not
eliminate “items” and that Knowles had failed to adequately ex-
plain the vetoes.  Knowles countered that the vetoed provisions
were invalid because they violated the Alaska Constitution’s con-
finement clause requiring that appropriation bills be confined to
appropriations.161  For purposes of the item veto power, the su-
preme court defined “item” as “a sum of money dedicated to a par-
ticular purpose.”162  The court held that although Knowles suffi-
ciently explained each veto, all five were invalid because the vetoed
provisions were not “items” subject to the Governor’s item veto
power.163  In holding that three of the vetoed provisions violated the
confinement clause,164 the court approved a five-part non-exclusive
test requiring that an appropriation not administer a program of
expenditures, enact or amend law, or extend beyond the life of the
appropriation and that the language be germane to the bill and be
the minimum necessary to explain the legislature’s intent.165
In Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of
Anchorage,166 the court held that Anchorage’s random drug testing
program for police and fire department employees in safety-
sensitive situations violated the Alaska Constitution.167  Anchorage
adopted a policy which provided for urinalysis of employees in the
following circumstances: job application, after a traffic accident,
158. Id. at 1250-51.
159. 21 P.3d 367 (Alaska 2001).
160. Id. at 372-73.
161. Id. at 369; see ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 13.
162. Id. at 372.
163. Id. at 374-76.
164. Id. at 384.
165. Id. at 377.
166. 24 P.3d. 547 (Alaska 2001).
167. Id. at 549.
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promotion, transfer, demotion and at random.  Only employees in
positions of “public safety” are subject to random testing and to
promotion, demotion and transfer testing.  The police and fire-
fighters filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that sus-
picionless testing violated their constitutional rights.  The superior
court held that the policy was valid.  On appeal, the supreme court
concluded that urinalysis constitutes a search,168 and that Anchor-
age’s interest in ensuring public safety is sufficiently compelling to
outweigh the intrusions on privacy when firefighters and police
employees are subjected to suspicionless urine testing upon appli-
cation for employment, promotion, demotion or transfer, or after a
traffic accident.169  However, the court held that the State’s interest
in public safety did not outweigh privacy interests in the case of in-
definite random testing because random testing: (1) places in-
creased demands on employees’ reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy; (2) is more intrusive; and (3) has no logical nexus to any job-
related occurrence.170  In holding that the random testing program
violated the Alaska Constitution, the court noted that there was no
documented history of substance abuse problems by firefighters
and police employees.171
In Doe v. Otte,172 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution bars ap-
plication of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
(“ASORA”) to people who committed sex crimes before the Act
was enacted.173  The plaintiffs in Doe were convicted sex offenders
who had completed their sentences.  The ASORA “requires sex of-
fender registration, with criminal penalties for failure to register,
and it authorizes full disclosure of information about all offenders
to the public.”174  In evaluating the plaintiffs’ claim, the court noted
that the ex post facto clause prohibits enactment of a law that in-
flicts a greater punishment than was available when the crime was
committed.175  The court examined first whether the legislature in-
tended the statute to be punitive, and second, whether the statute is
so punitive in effect that it should be considered punishment.176
168. Id. at 551.
169. Id. at 556-57 (applying Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980)).
170. Id. at 558.
171. Id. at 559.
172. 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
173. Id. at 982.
174. Id. at 984.
175. Id. at 984-85 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798)).
176. Id. at 985 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
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The court found that the intent of the legislature was not punitive
by applying seven factors:
1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint; 2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment; 3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the behav-
ior to which it applies is already a crime; 6) whether an alterna-
tive purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assign-
able to it; and 7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.177
The court held that because four of the factors were met, the stat-
ute must be considered punitive for ex post facto purposes, and
remanded for further proceedings.178
In Jacobus v. State,179 the district court of Alaska held that the
State may constitutionally limit individual and corporate contribu-
tions to political parties for electing or nominating a candidate, but
it may not restrict donations to political parties for other purposes
or limit the volunteering of professional services.180  The court
found that while it is constitutional under A.S. 15.13.070(b)(2) for
the State to restrict the amount an individual can contribute to a
political party for the purpose of nominating or electing a candi-
date, the restriction of donations made for other purposes under
sections 15.13.070(b)(2) and 15.30.400(3) is unconstitutional be-
cause it interferes with “the protected rights of speech and associa-
tion.”181  The court found that restricting or limiting volunteer pro-
fessional services under section 15.13.400(3)(B)(i) is
unconstitutional because it is vague and overbearing, it impacts an
individual’s freedom of speech and association, and the State has
not provided a compelling interest.182  The court also found that
section 15.13.074(f), limiting corporate contributions to political
parties for nominating or electing a candidate, is constitutional.183
In Rollins v. Ulmer,184 the supreme court held that the registra-
tion requirements under Alaska’s medical marijuana law do not
violate an individual’s constitutional right to privacy.185  The medi-
cal marijuana law requires authorized users to register with the
177. Id. at 986-87 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)).
178. Id. at 993-94.
179. 182 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. Alaska 2001).
180. Id. at 893.
181. Id. at 888-90, 893.
182. Id. at 890-92.
183. Id. at 893.
184. 15 P.3d 749 (Alaska 2001).
185. Id. at 754.
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Department of Health and Social Services, which maintains a regis-
try of such users.  Rollins claimed that the registration require-
ments infringe upon the constitutional right to privacy, arguing that
there is no guarantee that the government will comply with the
law’s confidentiality requirements and that the mere existence of
the registry is burdensome because of the fear of stigmatization it
causes.  The supreme court found the law constitutional because
the confidentiality provisions barring public access to the registry
and limiting its use to authorized and narrowly specified purposes
sufficiently protect the privacy of the information.186  The court
held Rollins’ fear of mishandling of the registry to be unsubstanti-
ated and his fear of stigmatization to be too incidental in its deter-
rent effect to establish a constitutional violation.187
In Sampson v. State,188 two patients sought a declaratory judg-
ment that Alaska’s ban on assisted suicide violated their constitu-
tional rights to privacy, liberty and equal protection,189 but the su-
preme court upheld the statute.  The court looked at the history of
assisted suicide and determined that it was not a fundamental lib-
erty or privacy interest.190  Therefore, the State had to establish
merely a “legitimate interest and a close and substantial relation-
ship between its interest and the chosen means of advancing that
interest.”191  The court determined that legitimate state interests are
involved, such as protecting vulnerable Alaskans from undue influ-
ence.192  Furthermore, the court rejected the equal protection claim
using a sliding scale test based on the relative importance of the
state and individual interests and the degree of closeness of the
regulation to the interest.193  The court held that the distinction be-
tween the withdrawal of life sustaining care and the active partici-
pation in suicide does not result in over- or under-inclusiveness.194
The court also rejected the argument that the law violates equal
protection because those patients capable of committing suicide
unassisted are not subject to its chilling effect.195
186. Id. at 752-53 (citing Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 570 P.2d 469,
479 (Alaska 1977)).
187. Id. at 753.
188. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
189. Id. at 90.
190. Id. at 91-94.
191. Id. at 91.
192. Id. at 95-96.
193. Id. at 98.
194. Id. at 98-99.
195. Id. at 99.
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In Sands v. Living Word Fellowship,196 the supreme court held
that tort claims based on religious “shunning” are barred by the
free exercise clauses of the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.197  Sands
and his father, the pastor of Wasilla Ministries, assisted Jodi Hejl, a
member of Living Word Fellowship, in running away from home.
In response, Hejl’s parents alleged that Wasilla Ministries was a
cult, accused Sands of being a cult recruiter and obtained an injunc-
tion prohibiting Sands and Wasilla Ministries from having any fur-
ther contact with the Hejl family.  Living Word then sought to warn
the Christian community about the dangerous practices of Wasilla
Ministries and encouraged the community to “shun” its members.
Following his suicide attempt, Sands sued Living Word and the
Hejls for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and abuse of process.  The superior
court dismissed the entire case for failure to state a claim.  The su-
preme court affirmed dismissal of Sands’ abuse of process claims
for failure to state the requisite “willful acts”198 and held that Sands’
tort claims were barred by the free exercise clauses of the U.S. and
Alaska Constitutions because Living Word’s conduct involved re-
ligion, was sincere and did not pose a threat to public safety, peace
or order.199  However, the supreme court held that the superior
court erred in dismissing Sands’ tort claims against the Hejls be-
cause Sands alleged that their conduct was not motivated by relig-
ion but by a desire to suppress Jodi Hejl’s allegations of sexual
abuse by her stepfather.200
In State v. Planned Parenthood,201 the supreme court reversed
the summary judgment decision of the superior court holding A.S.
18.16.020 unconstitutional.202  Absent judicial waiver, section
18.16.020 requires parental consent for an abortion for any une-
mancipated, unmarried minor under the age of seventeen.203  The
court first determined that Planned Parenthood and two doctors
who provide abortion services had standing to challenge the stat-
ute’s constitutionality.204  The court also held that the privacy clause
of the Alaska Constitution creates a self-executing right to repro-
ductive privacy and that minors have the same right of privacy as
196. 34 P.3d 955 (Alaska 2001).
197. Id. at 959.
198. Id. at 961.
199. Id. at 958-60.
200. Id. at 962.
201. 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001).
202. Id. at 32.
203. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020 (Michie 2000).
204. Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d at 34.
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any other citizen; therefore “the state can constrain a minor’s pri-
vacy only when necessary to further a compelling state interest and
only if no less restrictive means exist.”205  Finally, the court held
that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for
Planned Parenthood without hearing evidence of the State’s as-
serted compelling interest.206  The court therefore remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.207
In State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services v. Planned Par-
enthood,208 the supreme court held that a Department of Health
and Social Services (“DHSS”) regulation that denied Medicaid as-
sistance for medically necessary abortions except where there is a
risk of dying or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest violated
equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.209  The court rec-
ognized the right to reproductive freedom as a constitutional right
and subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny.210  Under this stan-
dard, the court ruled that once the State establishes a health care
program for the poor, it may not selectively deny medical treat-
ment to a poor woman merely because her health risk arises from
pregnancy.211  The court held that the regulation did not advance
the State’s purported interest in either the medical and public wel-
fare interests in funding childbirth or the State’s interest in mini-
mizing health risks to the mother and child.212
In State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Andrade,213 the supreme court
held that A.S. 42.23.005(a), which restricts alien eligibility for a
permanent fund dividend (“PFD”) to those aliens who are lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States, is constitu-
tional.214  After being denied dividends, the Andrade family
brought suit, claiming that the denials violated both the U.S. and
Alaska Constitutions.  However, the supreme court held that under
state law, the relevant language of the statute means that “an alien
must be legally present in Alaska and be able to form the requisite
intent to remain in Alaska.”215  Therefore, the statute does not dis-
criminate between similarly situated aliens, but rather differenti-
205. Id. at 39-41.
206. Id. at 43-44.
207. Id. at 46.
208. 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001).
209. Id. at 913.
210. Id. at 909.
211. Id. at 908.
212. Id. at 912-13.
213. 23 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2001).
214. Id. at 61, 80.
215. Id. at 80-81.
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ates between restricted aliens who cannot form the necessary intent
to remain in Alaska, and nonrestricted aliens who can form the
necessary intent.216  The court also found that the statute does not
violate the supremacy clause because it is not a regulation of immi-
gration, Congress has not preempted state power to regulate PFD
eligibility, and the statute “does not stand as an obstacle . . . of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress in regulating immigra-
tion.”217  Finally, the court held that the statute does not constitute
national origin discrimination because eligibility stems from a per-
son’s status as a nonrestricted alien and is not based on “cultural
characteristics, ancestry, or country of origin.”218
VI.  CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure.  In Albers v. State,219 the court of ap-
peals held that “during an investigative stop. . . the police may or-
der or force the detained person to open his hand only if the police
have an articulable reason to suspect that the detained person is
holding something that could endanger the police.”220  A police of-
ficer suspected that Albers and another individual were engaged in
illegal drug activity and ordered both men to stand and put their
hands against the wall.  Albers did so, but kept his left hand closed.
The officer ordered Albers to unclench his hand and, when he
complied, a rock of crack cocaine dropped to the ground.  Albers
was indicted for possession of cocaine and asked the superior court
to suppress the evidence of the cocaine, arguing that the police had
conducted an illegal search.  The motion was denied and Albers
was convicted.  On appeal, the court analogized the search to a
“pat-down” search and held that it is “justified whenever the cir-
cumstances would warrant a reasonably prudent person in sus-
pecting the detainee was armed or otherwise posed a threat to the
officer.”221  Because the superior court did not expressly address the
question of whether the officer had such a belief, the case was re-
manded for reconsideration of the motion to suppress.222
216. Id. at 78.
217. Id. at 76.
218. Id. at 74.
219. 38 P.3d 540 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
220. Id. at 541.
221. Id. at 542-43.
222. Id. at 543.
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In Cowles v. State,223 the supreme court held that a videotape
showing Cowles, the University of Alaska box office manager,
stealing cash from the ticket office was not obtained in violation of
her constitutional rights and was admissible at trial.224  After re-
ceiving a tip from one of Cowles’s co-workers, University police in-
stalled a hidden video camera above her desk without obtaining a
warrant.  Cowles’ desk was in an area of high public traffic.  The
camera showed Cowles taking money from the University cash bag
and transferring it to her purse.  Cowles was convicted of second-
degree theft and, on appeal, argued that the surveillance was a
violation of her right to be free from unreasonable searches guar-
anteed by the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.  To determine
whether the monitoring was a search, the court employed the ex-
pectation of privacy test, which asks: (1) did the person harbor a
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) is that expectation one
that society recognizes as reasonable?225  The court found that
Cowles’ expectation of privacy was not reasonable considering the
public nature of Cowles’ office and that activities open to public
observation are not generally protected.226  The court rejected
Cowles’ argument that the location of the camera above her desk
rather than at eye-level placed it in an area where she would not
expect surveillance, stating that simply positioning the camera for
optimum surveillance did not create an expectation of privacy
where one did not previously exist.227  The court also reasoned that
the high-security nature of Cowles’ job made her expectation of
privacy less reasonable.228  The court therefore held that Cowles did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her office and af-
firmed the decision of the court of appeals.229
In Haskins v. Municipality of Anchorage,230 the court of ap-
peals held that the entry of police officers into the basement of the
Haskins’ home without consent or justification for a protective
search violated Haskins’ rights under the search and seizure clauses
223. 23 P.3d 1168 (Alaska 2001).
224. Id. at 1169.
225. Id. at 1170.  The expectation of privacy test under the Alaska Constitution
is substantially the same as under the U.S. Constitution.  See California v. Ciraola,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129
(Alaska 1984).
226. Cowles, 23 P.3d at 1171.
227. Id. at 1172.
228. Id. at 1173.
229. Id. at 1175.
230. 22 P.3d 31 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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of the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.231  Police officers knocked on
the door of the Haskins residence because Haskins’ vehicle was
suspected in a hit-and-run accident that had just occurred.  Mrs.
Haskins invited the officers inside but told them to go upstairs
while she went downstairs to get her husband.  The officers fol-
lowed her downstairs, arrested Haskins and, based on their obser-
vations of him and his vehicle, charged him with driving while in-
toxicated.  Haskins moved to suppress all evidence from the
officers’ entry into his home, claiming it exceeded the scope of con-
sent.  The court of appeals reversed the district court’s denial of
Haskins’ motion, finding that the officers’ entry into the basement
of the home could not be justified as a consensual search.232  Al-
though warrantless protective searches may sometimes be justified
in the most serious situations, the court found that the facts of this
case did not rise to such a level.233
In State v. Joubert,234 the supreme court held that a police
search of Joubert’s pocket was a valid search incident to arrest.235
After detaining Joubert on suspicion of auto theft, the police con-
ducted a pat-down search.  The officer felt something small and
hard in Joubert’s pocket, removed the item and found a rock of
crack cocaine.  Joubert was arrested for possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver.  At trial, Joubert moved to suppress the evidence
of the cocaine, arguing that it was the result of an illegal search.
The trial court allowed the evidence after determining that the of-
ficer could have reasonably believed that the unknown object was a
weapon, but the court of appeals reversed.  The supreme court re-
instated Joubert’s conviction, finding the search valid as a search
incident to arrest in which the crime “fell into the category of
crimes evidence of which can be concealed on the person.”236  Such
searches are valid when the arrest is supported by probable cause,
is not a pretext for the search, is for an offense for which evidence
could be concealed on the suspect and when the search is “roughly
contemporaneous” with the arrest.237
In United States v. Sparks,238 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling that a search of Sparks’ bag was
not rendered unreasonable merely because the search was per-
231. Id. at 34.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 20 P.3d 1115 (Alaska 2001).
235. Id. at 1120-21
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1118.
238. 265 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001).
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formed by the civilian owner of the loaded guns stolen by Sparks.239
The victim, Fox, suspected Sparks of stealing two of his handguns
after he saw him hitch a ride from the spot where footprints from
Fox’s broken window ended.  Fox and a police officer approached
Sparks at a gas station.  While searching Sparks, the officer told
Fox to see if his guns were inside the car Sparks was riding in.  Fox
found his guns inside Sparks’ bag.  On these facts, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Sparks and conduct a search.240  Further, the court concluded that
Fox’s role in the search did not render the search unreasonable
since Fox’s role was strictly aiding the officer’s efforts, the officer
was in need of assistance in finding the guns quickly and Fox was
limited to doing only what the police had authority to do.241
2. Miscellaneous.  In Bourdon v. State,242 the court of appeals
held that A.S. 12.30.040(b) violated the equal protection clause of
the Alaska Constitution.243  Section 12.30.040(b) denies post-
conviction bail to defendants convicted of class B or C felonies if
they had prior convictions for first-degree stalking, sexual assault
or sexual abuse of a minor.244  The court of appeals held that section
12.30.040(b)(2) violates the equal protection clause because it does
not deny bail in an “even-handed manner.”245  The statute treated
those with prior felony convictions for sexual assault differently
from those with current convictions.246  Thus, a defendant with a
prior conviction for a class B or C felony who was convicted of sex-
ual assault would not be denied post-conviction bail, while a defen-
dant with a prior conviction for sexual assault convicted of class B
or C felony would be denied bail.247
In Hertz v. State,248 the court of appeals held the transfer of an
inmate to an out-of-state private correctional facility to be constitu-
tional and within the authority of the Alaska Department of Cor-
rections (“DOC”).249  Hertz petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
while serving a term for murder at the privately-owned Central
239. Id. at 832.
240. Id. at 830.
241. Id. at 831-832.
242. 28 P.3d 319 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
243. Id. at 323.
244. Id. at 320-32; ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.040(b)(2) (Michie 2000).




248. 22 P.3d 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
249. Id. at 897.
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Arizona Detention Center (“CADC”). Hertz based his petition on
a number of grounds, including the DOC’s unconstitutional delega-
tion of its incarceration power and the agency’s waiver of jurisdic-
tion over Hertz by sending him to Arizona.  The court of appeals
held that Alaska’s delegation of the power of incarceration to a
private facility is constitutional because Alaska law permits trans-
fer of prisoners only when necessary to address prisoner health, se-
curity considerations or prison overcrowding, and the CADC must
follow comprehensive Alaska prison management laws and DOC
regulations.250  The court also found that Alaska retained jurisdic-
tion over Hertz because both the legislature and the DOC, in its
contract with the CADC, clearly intended to retain jurisdiction
over Alaska inmates serving sentences in out-of-state facilities.251
In Ragsdale v. State,252 the court of appeals affirmed Ragsdale’s
conviction of second-degree assault for engaging in sexual penetra-
tion of a woman so intoxicated that she was either incapacitated or
unaware of the penetration.253  The court held that the definition of
“incapacitated” under A.S. 11.41.420(a)(3) does not violate the
Alaska Constitution’s single subject clause because the statute
deals with domestic violence, bail and access to records of the
Violent Crimes Compensation Board, which have a common
thread.254 The court also held that the statutory definition of “inca-
pacitated” meets the constitutional standard for definiteness and
therefore rejected Ragsdale’s vagueness challenge.255  The court
held that the jury did not have to agree on one or both of the alter-
native statutory definitions of “intoxicated.”256 Because a jury does
not ordinarily have to agree on a single interpretation of the facts
of a particular criminal episode, the trial court properly refused to
instruct the jury that they must reach a unanimous conclusion
about whether Ragsdale knew the woman was incapacitated or
whether he knew she was unaware penetration was occurring.257
In Sanford v. State,258 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(n)(1) is constitutional and that a
majority of the grand jurors originally sworn in and charged with
250. Id. at 903-04.
251. Id. at 900-01.
252. 23 P.3d 653 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
253. Id. at 655; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3) (Michie 2000).
254. Id. at 656.
255. Id. at 658.
256. Id. at 655.
257. Id. at 658.
258. 24 P.3d 1263 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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instructions is required for indictment.259  Sanford was indicted by a
grand jury for robbery, coercion and assault.  The next day, with
only twelve of the original fifteen grand jurors present, the grand
jury voted to indict Sanford for attempted kidnapping.  Sanford
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Rule 6(n)(1) re-
quired a majority of the initially sworn grand jurors.  The State ar-
gued that Rule 6(n)(1) violated article I, § 8 of the Alaska Consti-
tution, which provides that the “grand jury shall consist of at least
twelve citizens, a majority of whom concurring may return an in-
dictment.”260  The court of appeals held that the constitution was
ambiguous on how many grand jurors must vote for indictment and
that the supreme court had the authority to promulgate Rule
6(n)(1) to resolve the issue.261  Therefore, the method specified in
Rule 6(n)(1) for determining the number of votes necessary was
constitutional, and the indictment against Sanford was dismissed.262
In Wolfe v. State,263 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s dis-
orderly conduct statute264 is not unconstitutionally overbroad.265
Wolfe, a high school teacher, was convicted of disorderly conduct
for shaking a student and pushing him against a desk.  Wolfe
claimed that the statute was overbroad and, therefore, unconstitu-
tional because it allowed the State to prosecute and punish teach-
ers for using “appropriate force to maintain discipline and protect
students and staff.”266  The court held that the statute is not over-
broad because it provides a defense of legal justification or excuse,
which allows teachers, pursuant to school regulations, to use rea-
sonable and appropriate non-deadly force to maintain order.267
B. General Criminal Law
1. Criminal Procedure.  In Evans v. State,268 the court of ap-
peals held that the trial judge improperly failed to redact the pre-
sentence report under Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Alaska Rules of
Criminal Procedure.269  At Evans’ sentencing hearing, he denied the
259. Id. at 1264.
260. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8; Id. 24 P.3d at 1265.
261. Sanford, 24 P.3d at 1266.
262. Id.
263. 24 P.3d 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
264. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(a)(6) (Michie 2000).
265. Wolfe, 24 P.3d at 1257-58.
266. Id. at 1257.
267. Id. at 1258.
268. 23 P.3d 650 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
269. Id. at 653.
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accounts of his sexual abuse of a child and requested that the al-
leged offenses be struck from the report.  The trial court judge re-
fused, but noted Evans’ denials on the report.  The court of appeals
held that the failure to remove the allegations in the pre-sentence
report violated Rule 32.2(a)(3).270  Upon Evans’ denial, Rule
32.2(a)(3) required the judge to either resolve the truth of the alle-
gations to preserve the pre-sentence report or to conclude that the
allegations made no difference to the sentencing decision and
strike them from the report.  Because the trial judge only anno-
tated the report after Evans denied the allegations, the court of ap-
peals remanded the case for the court to comply with the require-
ments of Rule 32.2(a)(3).271
In Fitts v. State,272 the court of appeals upheld Fitts’ conviction
for first-degree robbery.273  Fitts and Gonzalez were convicted for
robbing a cab driver at gunpoint.  On appeal, Fitts asserted that the
police had conducted an illegal search of his room at Gonzalez’s
house because Gonzalez’s mother did not have the authority to
consent to a search of a room for which he paid a monthly rent.
The court rejected this argument because Gonzalez’s mother did
not have to have actual authority to consent to the search as long as
the police reasonably believed she had the authority.274
In Galimba v. Municipality of Anchorage,275 the court of ap-
peals assumed, without deciding, that field sobriety tests were a
form of Terry276 search that require reasonable suspicion and that
the police had reasonable suspicion to administer such tests to
Galimba.277  The police stopped Galimba after witnessing him
making an illegal turn and driving erratically and arrested him for
driving while intoxicated.  Galimba moved to suppress the results
of field sobriety tests, arguing that the tests were intrusive enough
to constitute a search and were per se unreasonable when per-
formed without a warrant.  The court noted that breath tests are
generally considered searches for constitutional purposes, but field
sobriety tests are not, and that most courts that do consider field
sobriety tests as searches treat them as a form of Terry stop re-
quiring only reasonable suspicion.278  Without deciding the constitu-
270. Id. at 652.
271. Id. at 653.
272. 25 P.3d 1130 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
273. Id. at 1131.
274. Id. at 1132-33.
275. 19 P.3d 609 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
276. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
277. Galimba, 19 P.3d at 612.
278. Id. at 611-12.
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tional issue, the court of appeals held that the record supported a
finding of both probable cause and reasonable suspicion because
Galimba committed a moving violation, drove erratically and ad-
mitted to consuming several drinks.279
In Griffin v. State,280 the court of appeals upheld state criminal
procedures allowing a court-appointed attorney to withdraw from
frivolous post-conviction relief applications,281 but required that a
“no-merit certificate” include “a detailed explanation of why the
attorney has concluded that the petitioner has no colorable
grounds for post-conviction relief.”282  Griffin, an indigent, ap-
pealed dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief after
his attorney filed a no-merit certificate.  The court rejected Grif-
fin’s argument that it should adopt the rule in Hertz v. State,283
which prohibited counsel for an indigent petitioner from with-
drawing the petition for post-conviction relief even if the attorney
has concluded it was frivolous.284  The legislature had lawfully en-
acted the procedures, and the court argued it was “not at liberty to
substitute another procedure simply because we believe it might be
better.”285  However, the court remanded Griffin’s case because the
certification did not fully explain why the claims were frivolous.286
In John v. State,287 the court of appeals overturned its prior de-
cision in Wilson v. State288 and held that when an Alaskan villager is
charged with a felony, Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 re-
quires that the presumptive trial site be in the city or town identi-
fied by the supreme court venue map as the felony trial site for that
district.289  John was charged with committing felonies in the village
of Tetlin and his trial was scheduled in Fairbanks.  Criminal Rule
18 requires establishment of venue districts and a venue map that
identify a presumptive trial site where the jury pool represents a
fair cross-section of the defendant’s community.  The interpreta-
tion of Rule 18 in Wilson directed the superior court to set a felony
case for trial at the closest existing court with a resident superior
279. Id. at 612.
280. 18 P.3d 71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
281. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(e)-(f).
282. Griffin, 18 P.3d at 72.
283. 755 P.2d 406 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
284. Griffin, 18 P.3d at 75.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 77.
287. 35 P.3d 53 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
288. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 1893 (Alaska App., October 11,
1989).
289. John, 35 P.3d at 59.
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judge, either Fairbanks or Bethel.  Finding the Wilson interpreta-
tion of Rule 18 inconsistent with public policy, the court of appeals
overturned Wilson.290  Instead, the court held that when a felony is
committed within one of the twenty-five venue districts drawn by
the supreme court, the trial site is presumed to be in the city or
town identified as the felony trial site for that district.291
In Pitka v. State,292 the court of appeals held that under Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(c)(1) (the section of Alaska’s
speedy trial rule governing additional charges filed after the initial
complaint or indictment), separate offenses are considered part of
the “same criminal episode” only if there is some nexus between
the crimes more than their temporal proximity.293  A state trooper
responding to a domestic disturbance arrested Pitka and discov-
ered cocaine on his person.  Pitka was charged with criminal tres-
pass and criminal mischief the day after the arrest but was not in-
dicted for possession of cocaine until six months later.  Pitka
argued that all three offenses arose out of the “same criminal epi-
sode,” and, therefore, the speedy trial “clock” ran from the time of
the initial indictments, preventing the State from adding other
charges at a later time.  The court of appeals disagreed, finding that
cocaine possession was not an element of and had “virtually no
bearing” on the trespass and criminal mischief charges and, there-
fore, the charges could not be part of the “same criminal episode”
even though they occurred simultaneously.294
In Ritter v. State,295 the court of appeals found a Cooksey296 plea
invalid when the sole issue preserved for appeal was the sufficiency
of the evidence at grand jury, even if the prosecution stipulated
that it had no further evidence to present at trial.297  The court also
held that A.S. 11.41.420(a)(4), which prohibits a health care worker
from engaging in sexual contact with a person unaware that a sex-
ual act is being committed, applies when the patient fails to recog-
nize that the contact is sexual in nature rather than part of legiti-
mate treatment.298  Ritter was charged with six counts of sexual
290. Id. at 57-59.
291. Id. at 59.
292. 19 P.3d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
293. Id. at 607.
294. Id.
295. 16 P.3d 191 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
296. See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974) (holding that a
defendant need not go to trial to preserve an appellate issue that is dispositive of
the defendant’s case).
297. Ritter, 16 P.3d at 196.
298. Id. at 198.
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assault arising from sexual contact during massages given to female
clients.  Shortly before trial, Ritter entered a Cooksey plea,
whereby he pled no contest to one count, the remaining five were
dropped and the State agreed that Ritter could appeal.  After sen-
tencing and while his appeal was pending, Ritter filed a motion to
withdraw his plea, arguing that even if both of the State’s theories
of prosecution were dismissed, the State would still be able to re-
turn to the grand jury with additional evidence and seek new in-
dictments.  Despite the State’s assertions that it had no better evi-
dence, the court agreed with Ritter and stated that an issue is
dispositive for Cooksey pleas only if resolution of the issue in the
defendant’s favor would either legally preclude prosecution or
leave the government with insufficient evidence to survive a mo-
tion for acquittal.299  The plea was found invalid and Ritter was al-
lowed to go to trial on the original indictments.300
In State v. Euteneier,301 the court of appeals held that warrants
may be issued for a search for evidence of the “violation” of con-
sumption of alcohol by a minor.302  Juneau police responded to a
complaint of a loud party but were denied entry to the house.  The
police returned with a search warrant to look for evidence of con-
sumption of alcohol by minors.  Euteneier was charged with con-
suming alcohol as a minor, designated by the legislature as a “viola-
tion.”303  Euteneier asserted that the evidence seized should be
quashed because search warrants can only be issued to investigate
crimes, not violations.  The court disagreed, finding that violations,
like traffic infractions, were intended by the legislature to fall
within a class of “quasi-criminal offenses” enforced by traditional
criminal procedures, including search warrants.304
In Tyler v. State,305 the court of appeals dismissed Tyler’s ap-
peal from his felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) convic-
tion306 for lack of jurisdiction.307  Tyler asserted that his two prior
DWI convictions were invalid and, therefore, the charge in ques-
tion should have been a misdemeanor rather than a felony.  Tyler
299. Id. at 195.
300. Id. at 196.
301. 31 P.3d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
302. Id. at 112.
303. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (Michie 2000).
304. Euteneier, 31 P.3d at 113.
305. 24 P.3d 1260 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
306. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(n) (Michie 2000) (defining a felony driving
while intoxicated (“DWI”) as being convicted of DWI after having been twice
convicted of DWI and/or refusing a breath test within the preceding five years).
307. Tyler, 24 P.3d at 1263.
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entered a Cooksey plea, which he hoped would allow him to plead
no contest to the DWI charge while still preserving the issue of his
prior convictions on appeal.  The court of appeals pointed out two
potential defects in Tyler’s Cooksey plea.  First, valid Cooksey
pleas need the assent of the prosecution, lacking in this case.308
Second, the issue Tyler was attempting to preserve on appeal was
not dispositive of the felony charge against him.309  Even if Tyler
were successful in his challenge of his prior DWI convictions, the
State would be entitled to re-prosecute Tyler for those crimes.  If
he were again convicted of the earlier DWIs, the felony conviction
would still stand.  As a result, Tyler’s Cooksey plea was invalid and
the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.310
2. Evidence.  In David v. State,311 the court of appeals found
an impermissible inference under Alaska Rule of Evidence 512(a)
in the trial judge’s assertion that a defense expert’s answer was “in-
consistent” with his earlier assertion of a privilege to refuse to an-
swer the question.312  David was charged with sexually abusing his
stepdaughter and called a psychologist in support of his defense
that the police had encouraged his stepdaughter to invent false ac-
cusations.  During voir dire examination the psychologist was
asked about allegations of sexual abuse in his son’s sealed psychiat-
ric records.  He asserted the psychotherapist-patient privilege and
refused to answer.  In the presence of the jury, he denied knowl-
edge of any such records.  The trial judge ordered the psycholo-
gist’s answers during voir dire to be played for the jury as a prior
inconsistent statement.  The court of appeals held that the trial
judge could have found the psychologist’s answer inconsistent with
his earlier assertion of privilege only if the judge assumed that the
assertion of privilege essentially conceded that the answer to the
question was unfavorable to the witness.313  Alaska Rule of Evi-
dence 512(a) provides that no such inference can be drawn from an
assertion of privilege.314
In Hess v. State,315 the supreme court held that when the prose-
cution introduces evidence of a prior sexual assault, the defendant
may introduce evidence of acquittal to show reasonable doubt as to
308. Id. at 1262.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 28 P.3d 309 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
312. Id. at 315.
313. Id. at 313.
314. Id. at 313-14.
315. 20 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2001).
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his “propensity to disregard the new complainant’s lack of con-
sent.”316  Hess was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and kid-
napping of H.W.  At trial, Hess claimed consent, and the State of-
fered evidence that Hess had previously sexually assaulted A.R.
The trial court denied a limiting instruction to inform the jury that
Hess had been acquitted in the previous case.317  Alaska Rule of
Evidence 404(b)(3) allows the prosecution to admit evidence of
previous sexual assaults when a defendant raises the defense of
consent.  The supreme court found that evidence of the acquittal
was relevant to whether Hess recklessly disregarded a companion’s
lack of consent.318  The court found that this exclusion of probative
evidence constituted prejudicial error and ordered a new trial.319
In State v. Ward,320 the court of appeals held that when the
State destroys or loses evidence in good faith, the sanction imposed
depends on the degree of prejudice to the defendant.321  Ward was
charged with felony driving while intoxicated and taken in for a
breath test.  Ward chose to have his blood drawn for an independ-
ent test, and when he later sought the analysis, he was informed
that the sample had been destroyed.  The trial court found that this
destruction interfered with Ward’s rights and granted his motion to
suppress his breath test results.  The court of appeals vacated this
ruling and remanded the case, holding that the court must “care-
fully examine the circumstances surrounding the state’s violation of
its duty of preservation,” and that where the evidence has been de-
stroyed in good faith, the appropriate sanction will depend on the
degree of prejudice suffered.322  Further, the court stated that the
presumptive sanction is an “instruction telling the jury to assume
that the missing evidence would have been favorable to Ward.”323
3. Sentencing.  In Baker v. State,324 the court of appeals va-
cated Baker’s sentence after determining that Alaska’s breath test
refusal statute325 gave the trial judge discretion to impose a portion
of Baker’s sentence concurrently with a sentence for driving while
intoxicated (“DWI”).326  Baker was convicted of felony refusal to
316. Id. at 1124.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1125.
319. Id. at 1128-30.
320. 17 P.3d 87 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
321. Id. at 90.
322. Id. at 89-90.
323. Id. at 90.
324. 30 P.3d 118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
325. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032 (Michie 2000).
326. Baker, 30 P.3d at 120.
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submit to a breath test and felony DWI.  The trial judge sentenced
Baker to the three-year presumptive term for each offense.  The
breath test refusal statute states that “the sentence imposed . . . un-
der this subsection shall run consecutively with any other sentence
of imprisonment imposed.”327  The trial judge interpreted this pro-
vision to mean that Baker’s sentence for breath test refusal had to
run consecutively with his sentence for DWI.328  The appeals court
examined the legislative history and held that the phrase “this sub-
section” referred to the various mandatory minimum sentences set
out in a subsection, rather than to any sentence imposed on a de-
fendant convicted of felony breath test refusal.329  Accordingly, the
court of appeals concluded that after the 120-day mandatory mini-
mum imposed by A.S. 28.35.032(p)(5), the trial court had discre-
tion to impose all or a portion of Baker’s remaining sentence con-
currently with the DWI sentence.330
In Buckwalter v. State,331 the court of appeals held that under
Alaska’s aggregation statute,332 the State must prove a single course
of conduct linking criminal acts in order to aggregate them to de-
termine the degree of the offense.333  Buckwalter was convicted of
first-degree theft and scheme to defraud for stealing $26,000 of
goods in the course of a year.  The court of appeals held that in or-
der to aggregate the thefts to meet the $25,000 threshold for first-
degree theft, the jury must find a single course of conduct linking
the distinct offenses, essentially that the defendant had engaged in
a calculated series of thefts.334  However, the court found that the
failure to instruct the jury as such was harmless error because
Buckwalter’s conviction for engaging in a scheme to defraud neces-
sarily included a finding that the thefts were part of a single source
of conduct.335  The court did find error in the use of the fact that
Buckwalter knew his offense involved multiple victims to aggravate
his presumptive sentence because under A.S. 12.55.155(e), a factor
that is a necessary element of the present offense may not be used
in aggravation.336
327. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(p)(5).
328. Baker, 30 P.3d at 118.
329. Id. at 119-20.
330. Id. at 120.
331. 23 P.3d 81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
332. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.980(c) (Michie 2000).
333. Buckwalter, 23 P.3d at 85-86.
334. Id. at 85.
335. Id. at 86.
336. Id. at 88.
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In Hill v. State,337 the court of appeals held that a decision to
grant a limited driver’s license for work purposes under A.S.
28.15.201(a) does not constitute modification of a defendant’s sen-
tence within the meaning of Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
35(b).338  Hill was convicted of manslaughter and had his driver’s
license revoked for life.  Following his release, a three-judge panel
denied his request for a limited license, finding it an untimely mo-
tion for sentence modification.  The court of appeals vacated the
ruling and remanded the case, holding that the power to grant a
limited license was inherent in the original judgment revoking the
defendant’s license and that granting such a license would not con-
stitute a sentence modification under Rule 35(b).339
In Hill v. State,340 the court of appeals held that mandatory pa-
role was lawful, that the Parole Board has the authority to govern
the conduct of prisoners released on mandatory parole, and that a
parolee who violates conditions set by the Board can be required to
serve the time excused for good time credit.341  After being released
on mandatory parole, Hill’s parole was revoked and he was sent
back to prison to serve the days for which he had previously re-
ceived good time credit.  On appeal, Hill first argued that A.S.
33.20.040(a), allowing for mandatory parole for prisoners whose
composite sentence exceeded two years, contradicted sections
33.20.010 and 33.20.030.  The court of appeals disagreed because,
for prisoners whose composite sentence exceeded two years, good
time credit, while not leading to an unconditional discharge, still
hastened a prisoner’s release from prison by converting days in jail
to days on parole.342  Second, Hill argued that the Parole Board had
no authority to revoke a parolee’s good time credit because A.S.
33.20.050 only authorized forfeiture of a prisoner’s good time for an
offense committed in prison.  The court of appeals distinguished
section 33.20.050 as dealing only with the Department of Correc-
tions’ authority to take away good time credit before release and
found the Parole Board’s authority to revoke parole in section
33.16.220(i).343  Third, Hill argued that revocation of a parolee’s
good time credit was an illegal increase in sentence because it sub-
jected the parolee to state supervision for a longer period than con-
templated by the sentencing court.  The court held that although
337. 32 P.3d 10 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
338. Id. at 12.
339. Id.
340. 22 P.3d 24 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
341. Id. at 31.
342. Id. at 27.
343. Id.
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Hill may spend more total time under state supervision after hav-
ing his parole revoked, the possibility was inherent in any criminal
sentence exceeding two years by virtue of the statutes that created
mandatory parole and authorized the Parole Board to revoke it.344
In Jackson v. State,345 the court of appeals held that an inmate
serving more than one sentence, one of which is partially consecu-
tive, is entitled to good time credit and mandatory parole only after
serving two-thirds of the aggregate sentence.346  After Jackson’s
probation was revoked, he was ordered to serve his suspended time
both concurrently and consecutively with his sentence for other of-
fenses.  After being released on parole, Jackson claimed that his
sentence had been miscalculated and as a result, he served more
time in prison than required.  Jackson argued that the general rule
that mandatory parole release dates are based on the total length
of imprisonment rather than each sentence did not apply in his case
because his sentences were not entirely consecutive.347  The court
disagreed, finding no precedent or policy that would preclude ap-
plication of the rule to partially consecutive sentences like Jack-
son’s.348  Jackson also argued that A.S. 33.20.010 should allow for
good time credit for concurrent sentences.  Because the statute
provides that good time is calculated based on “term of imprison-
ment” rather than on the term of sentence and because concurrent
sentences do not increase the length of imprisonment, the court
held that concurrent sentences should not be included when com-
puting good time credit.349
In Smith v. State,350 the court of appeals held that a first-time
offender convicted of first-degree weapons misconduct is subject to
a five-year presumptive term.351  Smith pled no contest to dis-
charging a firearm from a vehicle while the vehicle is in motion.
The superior court concluded that the statutory seven-year pre-
sumptive term applied and sentenced Smith to a ten-year term with
three years suspended.  The court of appeals held that, despite the
statutory language, sentencing a defendant convicted of first-
degree weapons misconduct to seven years “would lead to unin-
tended results.”352  The court found that the overlap between the
344. Id. at 29.
345. 31 P.3d 105 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
346. Id. at 109.
347. Id. at 108.
348. Id. at 109.
349. Id.
350. 28 P.3d 323 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
351. Id. at 324-25.
352. Id at 325.
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first-degree weapons misconduct and manslaughter, which carries
only a five-year presumptive term, would result in lesser sentences
for defendants whose actions result in death.353  The court vacated
Smith’s sentence on the grounds that the legislature could not have
intended to create a system that imposes lesser sentences on indi-
viduals whose drive-by shootings result in death.354
4. Miscellaneous.  In Daniels v. State,355 the court of appeals
held that the trial judge abused his discretion in disqualifying Da-
niels’ attorney, Dieni, for a conflict of interest under Alaska Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.9.356  In Daniels’ trial for murder, Dieni
announced that in Daniels’ defense he would suggest that someone
else (Saganna) committed the murder.  Ten years earlier, Dieni
had represented Saganna in an assault charge.  Although Dieni
stated that he had no memory of the case, the State filed a motion
to have him disqualified for a conflict of interest.  Daniels waived
whatever conflict of interest Dieni might have with Saganna, and
Saganna stated upon consultation with independent counsel that
she did not see a conflict of interest.  The superior court disquali-
fied Dieni, but the court of appeals reversed, finding no conflict of
interest because the present and prior cases were not substantially
related and because Dieni, Saganna and Saganna’s attorney could
not see any relevant information about Saganna that could be used
by Dieni in violation of Rule 1.9.357
In Greinier v. State,358 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant can be lawfully convicted of first-degree hindering prosecu-
tion even when the person who committed the underlying felony is
not prosecuted, convicted of the felony, or convicted of a lesser of-
fense.359  Harris was living with Greinier despite court-imposed bail
conditions forbidding contact with her.  Harris committed felony
assault on Greinier’s daughter, and Greinier later lied to medical
personnel and police regarding how the injury occurred.  Greinier
appealed her conviction for hindering prosecution, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict and that her due
process rights were violated.  The court of appeals affirmed Gre-
inier’s conviction, holding that even though Harris was convicted of
only misdemeanor assault, Greinier could still be convicted of fel-
353. Id.
354. Id. at 326.
355. 17 P.3d 75 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
356. Id. at 86-87.
357. Id. at 85-87.
358. 23 P.3d 1192 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
359. Id. at 1195.
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ony-level hindering prosecution as long as Harris committed a
“crime punishable as a felony.”360  The court of appeals also held
that prosecuting Greinier did not violate her due process rights, de-
spite the fact that if she had told the truth, she would have divulged
information that could have led to her prosecution as an accom-
plice to Harris’s crime of violation of his bail conditions.361
In Hernandez v. State,362 the court of appeals remanded the
case to the superior court to determine whether Hernandez’s inter-
pretation of the arresting officer’s conduct was reasonable.363  Her-
nandez was arrested for driving while intoxicated in the middle of
the night and chose to exercise his right to an independent blood
test.  The arresting officer, Terland, informed him that only a hos-
pital was open to perform the test and took Hernandez there.
However, the receptionist incorrectly told Hernandez that the test
would not be admissible in court and incorrectly explained why.
Hernandez turned to Terland who shrugged his shoulders in re-
sponse.  Hernandez then decided to go to the police station for the
breath test.  If the State interferes with an arestee’s constitutional
right to obtain an independent blood test, the results of the breath
test will be suppressed.  The court of appeals held that although
Terland was not directly responsible for the misinformation re-
garding the blood test, if Hernandez acted reasonably in interpret-
ing Terland’s conduct as confirmation of the receptionist’s state-
ments, then Hernandez’s right to due process was violated, and the
breath test should be suppressed.364  The court of appeals remanded
to determine whether Hernandez’s interpretation of Terland’s
conduct was reasonable.365
In Hurd v. State,366 the court of appeals held that a defendant
may be convicted of kidnapping if “the defendant actually re-
strained the victim either temporally or spatially beyond what was
necessary to commit the target assault.”367  Hurd held Schlotfeldt
captive at his house for thirty to forty-five minutes and refused to
let him leave until he signed documents absolving Hurd of his debt
and conveying money and property to Hurd.  Hurd was convicted
of coercion, third-degree assault and kidnapping.  Hurd appealed
the kidnapping conviction, basing his argument on the court’s
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1196.
362. 28 P.3d 315 (Alaska Ct. App.  2001).
363. Id. at 319.
364. Id. at 318.
365. Id. at 319.
366. 22 P.3d 12 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
367. Id. at 15.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
244 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:1
holding in Alam v. State368 that “when a defendant restrains a victim
to facilitate the commission of another offense, [the] restraint will
not constitute a kidnapping if it is merely ‘incidental’ to the com-
mission of the other offense.”369 Hurd contended that he held
Schlotfeldt only long enough to commit the target crime of coer-
cion.  The court of appeals agreed with Hurd that the jury was not
properly instructed on the elements of the kidnapping charge and
reversed his conviction.370  However, the court concluded that the
State’s evidence, if believed, would support Hurd’s conviction for
kidnapping and upheld the kidnapping count of the indictment.371
The court noted that coercion is not a crime “that inevitably in-
volves restraint of the victim,” and a jury must decide if the re-
straint was more than “incidental,” thus constituting kidnapping.372
In Hutchison v. State,373 the court of appeals held that extreme
intoxication is a defense to a charge of “wilfully [sic] failing to ap-
pear” under the pre-September 2000 version of A.S. 12.30.060.374
Hutchison missed his scheduled court hearing because he drank so
much alcohol the night before that he passed out and did not wake
up until the next afternoon.  Although the pre-September 2000 ver-
sion of section 12.30.060 required willfulness in order for a defen-
dant to be convicted for failure to appear, the Alaska legislature
had not defined “willful.”  The court of appeals found that “willful”
conduct occurs when, “in the absence of some legally recognized
justification or excuse, the defendant makes a deliberate decision
to disobey a known obligation to appear in court.”375  In addition,
the court of appeals held that “intoxication that incapacitates a de-
fendant or that blots out a defendant’s memory of the required
court appearance” can be a defense to willfully failing to appear
under the pre-September 2000 version of section 12.30.060.376  Be-
cause the lower court found that Hutchison did not have the con-
scious goal to not appear in court, the court held that Hutchison
did not act willfully and reversed his conviction.377
368. 776 P.2d 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
369. Hurd, 22 P.3d at 14.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 20.
372. Id. at 15, 18.
373. 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
374. Id. at 782.
375. Id. at 778.
376. Id. at 782.
377. Id.
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In MacLeod v. State,378 the court of appeals reversed Mac-
Leod’s conviction for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).379  After
arresting MacLeod for DWI, the state trooper gave him the “off-
record” advice that if a blood test and a breath test are adminis-
tered contemporaneously, the blood test intoxication reading will
be higher.  The court of appeals held that a government officer
having custody of a motorist arrested for DWI should not attempt
to dissuade the motorist from invoking his or her right to an inde-
pendent blood test.380  As a result, MacLeod’s breath test result was
suppressed and his conviction reversed.381
In Nunley v. State,382 the court of appeals held that the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”) requires all sex of-
fenders physically present in the state, even those who had been
released from probation before the effective date of the ASORA,
to register, and any person who fails to comply with this require-
ment is subject to criminal penalty under A.S. 11.56.840.383  Former
section 12.63.010 set out three deadlines for registration based on
the sex offender’s date of release from prison, date of conviction if
not sentenced to prison or date of arrival within the state.384  The
defendants argued that because they were already present in the
state and had been convicted and released from probation before
the ASORA became effective in 1994, they did not fit into any of
the groups of offenders set out in former section 12.63.010 and that
even if the ASORA did apply to them, they were not provided with
adequate notice that they had a duty to register.  The court of ap-
peals found that the legislature intended to exempt only one group
of offenders from registration, those with only one sex offense con-
viction and who had been unconditionally discharged before July 1,
1984.385  The court of appeals held that because the defendants did
not fall into that group, they were criminally liable for their failure
to register as sex offenders and that the ASORA provided sex of-
fenders with sufficient notice of their duty to register.386
378. 28 P.3d 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
379. Id. at 945.
380. Id. at 944-45 (reiterating the holding from Lau v. State, 896 P.2d 825
(Alaska Ct. App. 1995)).
381. Id. at 945.
382. 26 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
383. Id. at 1115.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1114-15.
386. Id.
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In Pease v. State,387 the court of appeals reversed Pease’s con-
viction for possessing twenty-five or more marijuana plants in vio-
lation of A.S. 11.71.040(a)(3)(G).388  Police found nineteen mari-
juana plants growing in Pease’s home along with the remnants of
thirty-three dead marijuana plants.  At trial, the jury was instructed
that the thirty-three remnants constituted marijuana plants for the
purposes of assessing Pease’s guilt.  The court of appeals looked at
the legislative history of the statute and found that the State must
prove that a defendant simultaneously possessed twenty-five or
more living marijuana plants to be in violation of the statute.389
While the existence of marijuana remnants may provide circum-
stantial evidence that a defendant possessed twenty-five or more
plants at some point in time, that issue was never presented for the
jury to decide.390  Because the jury was incorrectly instructed on an
essential element of the crime, the court reversed the conviction.391
In State v. Bonham,392 the court of appeals held that neither
A.S. 12.20.10 nor the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Consti-
tution precluded Bonham’s state prosecution for perjury and sub-
mitting misleading security filings, even after she pled guilty to fed-
eral charges of mail fraud and money laundering based upon the
same criminal episode.393  Bonham pled guilty to the federal
charges after using the mail to further a pyramid scheme.  Follow-
ing this plea, an Alaska grand jury indicted her on the state
charges.  The court concluded the term “act” in section 12.20.10
meant something narrower than transaction or episode.394  The
court held that although the acts charged in the state indictment
were part of the criminal scheme, submitting a false affidavit and
misleading security filings were separate acts from those for which
she was prosecuted on federal charges.395  Finally, the court con-
cluded that because the offenses of mail fraud, perjury and submit-
ting misleading filings involve “significantly different societal inter-
ests,” the state prosecution was not barred by the double jeopardy
clause of the Alaska Constitution.396
387. 27 P.3d 788 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
388. Id. at 788.  This section makes it a felony to possess “25 or more plants of
the genus cannibus.” ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040 (a)(3)(G) (Michie 2000).
389. Id. at 791.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. 28 P.3d 303 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
393. Id. at 308-10.
394. Id. at 307.
395. Id. at 307-08.
396. Id. at 308-09.
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In State v. Martin,397 the court of appeals reversed the dismissal
of Martin’s charge for failing to register according to the provisions
of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”).398  Mar-
tin pleaded no contest to incest in 1982.  His conviction was set
aside in 1988, after he had served five years of probation.  The
ASORA, enacted in 1994, requires sex offenders residing in
Alaska, including those who were convicted in the ten years prior
to 1994, to register with their local police agency.  The court of ap-
peals held that the Department of Public Safety acted within its
lawful authority when it included persons whose convictions were
subsequently set aside as those who had to register.399  The court
rejected Martin’s arguments that the enforcement of the ASORA
in his case would violate the terms of his plea agreement because
plea agreements may be modified without violating due process.400
The court also rejected Martin’s argument that the Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it required only those sex offend-
ers who had been convicted in the ten years prior to 1994 to regis-
ter and not all sex offenders convicted prior to 1994.401
In State v. Saathoff,402 the supreme court held that the crime
“theft by receiving” was not a continuing offense and that the five-
year statute of limitations for such a crime prevented Saathoff from
being convicted.403  Saathoff purchased a rifle, apparently suspect-
ing it was stolen property, in the summer of 1988.  Nine years after
the purchase, police discovered the stolen rifle at Saathoff’s resi-
dence.  A.S. 12.10.010 provides a five-year statute of limitations for
theft by receiving.404  However, the statute of limitations would
have tolled if theft by receiving was a continuing offense.405  Under
A.S. 12.10.030, theft by receiving would be continuing only if a leg-
islative purpose to make it so “plainly appears” in the language,
structure or legislative history of sections 11.46.100 and
11.46.190(a).406  The supreme court held that those factors indicated
that theft by receiving is not a continuing offense, and therefore,
the statute of limitations prevented Saathoff’s conviction.407
397. 17 P.3d 72 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
398. Id. at 75.
399. Id. at 73 (citing State v. Otness, 986 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999)).
400. Id. at 74.
401. Id.
402. 29 P.3d 236 (Alaska 2001).
403. Id. at 242.
404. Id. at 238; ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.010(2) (Michie 2000).
405. Saathoff, 29 P.3d at 238.
406. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.030 (Michie 2000).
407. Saathoff, 29 P.3d at 242.
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In Strane v. State,408 the supreme court held that the mental
state required for conviction for violating a domestic violence pro-
tective order under A.S. 11.56.740(a) is “knowingly.”  As a result,
the lower court erred in holding that Strane’s good faith belief that
his conduct did not violate the protective order was irrelevant to
his guilt or innocence.409  The State argued that violation of a re-
straining order could not be excused because of the defendant’s ig-
norance of its terms or his misunderstanding of their meaning.
However, the court held the statute to be ambiguous and applied a
more narrow “knowingly” culpable mental state.410  Therefore, the
State needed to show that the defendant knew his conduct violated
the protection order or that the defendant was aware of a substan-
tial probability that his conduct violated the order.411  Additionally,
because the culpable mental state was “knowingly,” any honest
mistake would have been a good defense to the charge.412  The su-
preme court remanded the case and held that Strane could poten-
tially defend against the charge that he violated the terms of a pro-
tective order based on his good faith mistake about the terms, even
if that mistake was objectively unreasonable.413
In Tenison v. State,414 the court of appeals affirmed Tenison’s
conviction for driving with an expired license and held that the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles’ (“DMV”) wrongful refusal to renew
her license did not constitute a defense.415  Tenison’s license expired
in October 1998.  She applied for renewal and was asked to provide
her social security number in accordance with Alaska Statute sec-
tion 28.15.061(b).  For religious reasons, she refused, and her li-
cense was not renewed.  She was later convicted for driving with an
expired license and appealed, arguing that it was unconstitutional
to require driver’s license applicants to divulge their social security
number, particularly when a person has religious reasons for re-
fusing to do so.  The supreme court held that as a general rule,
people are not free to break the law by engaging in licensed activity
without a license and then later defending that the government
wrongfully refused to grant their earlier request for a license.416
Tenison was obliged to challenge the DMV’s refusal to renew her
408. 16 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2001).
409. Id. at 752.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 750-51.
412. Id. at 750.
413. Id. at 752.
414. 38 P.3d 535 (Alaska 2001).
415. Id. at 538.
416. Id.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
2002] YEAR IN REVIEW 249
license by pursuing an administrative appeal or a civil lawsuit.417
The court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face, reasoning that Alaska’s requirement of social se-
curity numbers was based on several valid state interests.418
VII.  EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Discrimination
In Grant v. Anchorage Police Department,419 the supreme court
held that although the superior court correctly found that Grant
could not proceed on his contract-based claims because he had not
exhausted his administrative remedies, it was error to apply collat-
eral estoppel to preclude him from pursuing a disability discrimina-
tion claim.420  Grant was terminated from the Anchorage Police
Department because a gunshot wound prevented him from doing
certain duties.  Because Grant was a union member, his employ-
ment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
After Grant was terminated, he did not file a grievance under his
CBA, but later filed suit against the police department alleging
breach of contract, wrongful termination and unlawful discrimina-
tion under A.S. 18.80.220(a)(1).  The supreme court found against
Grant on his contractually-based claims because the terms of the
CBA required employees to exhaust their administrative remedies
and file grievances before suing their employer.421  The court dis-
agreed that Grant was excused from filing a grievance because his
interpretation of the contract would render one clause completely
null, contravening the rule that all provisions of a contract should
be found meaningful if possible.422  Additionally, Grant had previ-
ously obtained disability benefits after showing that his injury pre-
vented him from performing his duties, and the superior court con-
cluded that this showing precluded his argument that he was
discriminated against under A.S. 18.80.220(a)(1).423  The supreme
court disagreed, holding that whether Grant could perform his du-
ties with reasonable accommodation by the police department had
not yet been determined.424
417. Id. at 540.
418. Id. at 539.
419. 20 P.3d 553 (Alaska 2001).
420. Id. at 554.
421. Id. at 555.
422. Id. at 556.
423. Id. at 559.
424. Id. at 558.
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B. Labor Law
In Carlson v. United Academics,425 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that United Academics did not
discriminate between individuals who merely objected to union
dues and those who objected and wished to challenge the fee cal-
culation.426  In addition, the court held that United Academics did
not violate the principles set forth in Chicago Teacher’s Union v.
Hudson427 by permitting an impartial decision maker to raise the
fee amount.428  Carlson was a non-union professor at the University
of Alaska represented by United Academics per the collective bar-
gaining agreement with the University.  Carlson brought suit fol-
lowing demands for dues, alleging that the demands violated Hud-
son’s notice and procedural safeguards.  The court ruled that the
distinction between “objectors” and “challengers,” which provided
immediate reimbursement to non-members who merely objected
to paying dues but placed the dues collected from those who ob-
jected and challenged the fee calculation into an escrow account,
met the Hudson standards.429  The court also validated the United
Academics procedure by which an independent arbitrator is given
the ability to increase or decrease the union fee, finding it safely
within the bounds of Hudson.430
In Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska,431 the supreme court
held that Whitesides could not be classified as an administrative
employee exempt from overtime pay under the Alaska Wage and
Hour Act.432  U-Haul assigned Whitesides to work under the direc-
tion of another employee with a set schedule of hours and re-
stricted business travel rights.  The next day, when Whitesides re-
ported to work fifteen minutes late, U-Haul suspended him for
three days without pay.  Whitesides was fired in July 1996 and sued
U-Haul for unpaid overtime wages.  U-Haul then decided to pay
Whitesides for the three suspended days, stating that the pay “was
inadvertently reduced.”433  Due to his suspension without pay,
Whitesides argued at summary judgment that he did not meet the
“paid on a salary or fee basis” requirement of the definition of an
administrative employee under Alaska Administrative Code sec-
425. 265 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001).
426. Id. at 783.
427. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
428. Carlson, 265 F.3d at 785.
429. Id. at 784-85.
430. Id. at 785.
431. 16 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2001).
432. Id. at 729-30.
433. Id. at 731.
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tion 15.910(a)(1) and, therefore, was not exempt from the require-
ment of overtime pay.  The supreme court held that U-Haul could
not retroactively take advantage of a statutory “window of correc-
tion” by correcting the withheld pay to meet the statutory defini-
tion of an administrative employee after the commencement of a
lawsuit.434  Additionally, the supreme court held that Whitesides
was subject to direct supervision and, therefore, did not meet the
“performs work only under general supervision” requirement of an
administrative employee.435  The supreme court vacated the judg-
ment for U-Haul and remanded the case for further proceedings.
C. Workers’ Compensation
In Nickles v. Napolilli,436 the supreme court held that where
breach of contract claims rely on duties created by the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Act, the Act provides an adequate rem-
edy for the breach of contract and does not permit a separate
suit.437  Nickles performed farm chores for the Napolillis in ex-
change for living in a cabin on their property.  During the course of
her chores, Nickles injured her arm, which later had to be ampu-
tated.  Before trial, Nickles changed her claims of negligence to
breach of contract, and the superior court granted the Napolillis’
motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to refer the case to the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board.  The supreme court held that this
was not error because provisions of the Alaska Workers’ Compen-
sation Act “support the interpretation that a common law action
under A.S. 23.30.055 is limited to tort claims for the underlying in-
jury.”438  Therefore, “when an employer breaches its duty to pro-
vide workers’ compensation benefits, the workers’ compensation
law only authorizes the employee to recover for personal injuries
through a tort action.”439  Since Nickles abandoned her tort claims,
the superior court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss.
However, the supreme court affirmed the finding that Nickles was
an employee of the Napolillis, and remanded the case to allow
Nickles to pursue her claims before the Board.440
In Parris-Eastlake v. State,441 the supreme court held that under
A.S. 23.30.235(2), an employee is not barred from claiming benefits
434. Id. at 733-34.
435. Id. at 735 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 15.910(a)(1) (2000)).
436. 29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).
437. Id. at 254.
438. Id. at 249.
439. Id. at 249-50.
440. Id. at 254.
441. 26 P.3d 1099 (Alaska 2001).
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if the claimed injury is addiction to drugs or alcohol.442  Parris-
Eastlake developed recurring headaches and neck and back pain
while working as an assistant district attorney and was prescribed
narcotic painkillers.  At trial, she testified that eventually she began
lying to her doctors to receive more drugs.  She began having diffi-
culty at work, resigned from her job and filed a workers’ compen-
sation claim.  The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied
her claim, and the superior court affirmed.  On appeal, the su-
preme court reversed, holding that section 23.30.235(2) barred re-
covery for injuries that were proximately caused by drug use, but
not if the injury claimed is the addiction itself.443  The court rea-
soned that legislative history indicated that the phrase “under the
influence” was akin to “intoxicated” and, therefore, Parris-
Eastlake’s claim was not barred because her actions were impaired
not by being under the influence of drugs but rather because of her
desire to use them.444  The court remanded to determine whether
her injuries were work-related.445
In State, Dep’t of Fish and Game v. Kacyon,446 the supreme
court held that simply because a settlement allocation was court-
approved did not mean it was not a “compromise with a third per-
son” as defined in A.S. 23.30.015(h).447  The court also held that sec-
tion 23.30.015 applies to the total proceeds of global settlements
reached by the deceased party’s beneficiaries, making any subse-
quent allocations between those beneficiaries irrelevant to the cal-
culation of the employer’s continued workers’ compensation liabil-
ity.448  Kacyon, the widow of a state-employed wildlife biologist
killed in a plane crash during a moose survey, reached a wrongful-
death settlement with the operator of the plane for the benefit of
herself and the minor son of the deceased.  The State argued that
the settlement was a compromise with a third person made without
the employer’s written approval and attempted to invoke the for-
feiture provision of section 23.30.015, which protects the employer
against unreasonably low settlements that result in continued li-
ability.  The supreme court agreed and remanded the case to the
Workers’ Compensation Board with instructions to vacate its rul-
ing that the State must continue to pay benefits to the son after the
442. Id. at 1101.
443. Id. at 1104.
444. Id. at 1103-04.
445. Id. at 1105.
446. 31 P.3d 1276 (Alaska 2001).
447. Id. at 1282.
448. Id. at 1283.
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sum allocated to him from the global settlement is exhausted.449
The court also held that for purposes of any calculations made un-
der section 23.30.015 with regard to the son, the total amount of the
global settlement, not merely the five percent allocated directly to
the son, should be used.450
In Temple v. Denali Princess Lodge,451 the supreme court held
that a restaurant was not liable for workers’ compensation for an
assault on a waiter because the restaurant’s failure to protect him
did not constitute facilitation.452  While waiting tables at the Denali
Princess Lodge, Temple was punched in the jaw by his girlfriend’s
former boyfriend, Callahan.  Callahan entered the Lodge, waited in
a restricted area, confirmed Temple’s identity with a Lodge em-
ployee and injured Temple.  Temple claimed he was entitled to
workers’ compensation because the employer facilitated the attack.
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied compensation,
and the superior court affirmed.  The supreme court held that
Temple did not prove his claim of a preliminary link between the
injury and his employment by a preponderance of the evidence.453
The court held that injuries resulting from an assault motivated by
personal reasons, where the sole role of the employment is pro-
viding a location for the assailant to find the victim, are not com-
pensable injuries arising out of employment.454
D. Miscellaneous
In Bruns v. Municipality of Anchorage,455 the supreme court
ruled that threats of retaliatory discharge may excuse the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial remedies,
even where required by statute.456  Bruns and Saathoff made sev-
eral claims against the Municipality for back overtime pay under
Anchorage Municipal Code section 3.30.129.  The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Municipality, ruling that
the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies as
required by section 3.30.129.  The supreme court had previously
held that a plaintiff who fails to exhaust administrative remedies
may still seek judicial relief if the failure is excused.457  The court
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. 21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).
452. Id. at 822.
453. Id. at 816.
454. Id. at 818.
455. 32 P.3d 362 (Alaska 2001).
456. Id. at 370.
457. Id. (citing Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 181 (Alaska 1982)).
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ruled that threats of retaliatory discharge can excuse an employee’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and held that Bruns’ and
Saathoff’s contention that threats of discharge prevented their
utilization of available administrative remedies raised a question of
material fact such that summary judgment was inappropriate.458
In Petranovich v. Matanuska Electric Ass’n,459 the supreme
court held that an employer was not liable for injuries incurred by
an independent contractor as a result of routine risks on which the
contract was silent.460  Petranovich, an electrician, was seriously in-
jured while working as an independent contractor for Matanuska
Electric Association (“MEA”).  The contract between the parties
was silent with respect to the manner of performance of the proce-
dure in the course of which the injury occurred.  The superior court
granted summary judgment for MEA because Petranovich was al-
lowed to choose his own methods and MEA did not retain enough
right of supervision over Petranovich; therefore, MEA was not re-
sponsible for Petranovich’s acts or injuries.461  In a per curiam
opinion, the supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment for MEA.462
VIII.  FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
In Beaudoin v. Beaudoin,463 the supreme court held that Mi-
chael Beaudoin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim
that Georgia Beaudoin was voluntarily underemployed.464  After
their divorce, the Beaudoins originally agreed on a child custody
agreement that gave Georgia sole custody of their children.  Geor-
gia did not look for employment outside the home during this time.
Four years later, the parties made Michael the primary custodian,
taking sole custody of one child and sharing custody of the other
two on an alternating-week schedule.  Michael sought an order to
re-establish Georgia’s child support obligation based on her earn-
ing capacity rather than her previous earnings history, claiming that
since Georgia’s obligations for child care had decreased, she should
either obtain employment or be treated by the court as voluntarily
458. Id at 370-71.
459. 22 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2001).
460. Id. at 454-55.
461. Id. at 451-52.
462. Id. at 451.
463. 24 P.3d 523 (Alaska 2001).
464. Id. at 524.
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underemployed.  On appeal, the supreme court held that Michael
had raised a material dispute regarding the issue of Georgia’s vol-
untary underemployment sufficient to require an evidentiary
hearing.465  The court held that neither Alaska Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 90.3 nor prior case law supported the superior court’s finding
that a “track record of employment and earnings” is a “critical
element” in the absence of which there is “no baseline from which
to measure the extent” to which Georgia was voluntarily underem-
ployed.466  The court vacated the superior court’s 1998 child support
order and remanded for entry of a modified order after an eviden-
tiary hearing on Michael’s case.467
In Murphy v. Newlynn,468 the supreme court held that the pre-
clusion provision contained in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure
90.3(h)(3) can apply where the obligor parent has custody of one,
but not all, of the children subject to a support order.469  Murphy,
obligated to pay child support for his two daughters, took custody
of one of his daughters during her final high school academic year
per an agreement with Newlynn, who did not seek child support
during this period.  When Newlynn again sought child support, the
Child Support Enforcement Division calculated Murphy’s arrears
assuming a full obligation for the academic year that he had cus-
tody of one of his daughters.  Murphy sought an exemption under
Rule 90.3(h)(3), which provides that an obligor parent does not ac-
crue child support obligations, when by agreement or acquiescence,
the obligor exercises primary physical custody of the children for a
period of nine months or more.  Newlynn argued that the text and
official commentary of the Rule both indicated the exemption only
applies when the obligor has custody of all children under the sup-
port order.  The supreme court held that Rule 90.03(h)(3) may ap-
ply in the situation where an obligor parent has custody of one, but
not all, of the children subject to a support order.470  Therefore,
Murphy was still liable for child support arrears related to his non-
custodial daughter, but requiring him to pay support for the custo-
dial daughter would provide her no benefit and would provide an
undeserved windfall for Newlynn.471
465. Id. at 527.
466. Id. at 528.
467. Id. at 530-31.
468. 34 P.3d 331 (Alaska 2001).
469. Id. at 336.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 335.
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In Spott v. Spott,472 the supreme court held that a parent may
be assessed retroactive child support for children not previously in-
cluded in support calculations and that such retroactive obligations
should be based on actual rather than previously determined pre-
dicted income.473  After Marvin and Cheryle Spott divorced in Sep-
tember 1995, their minor children, Ethan and Seth, resided with
Cheryle.  Marvin was ordered to pay child support but the master
in charge of the case erroneously concluded that only Ethan re-
sided with Cheryle and did not factor Seth into Marvin’s support
obligation.  Because Marvin was unemployed at the time, the mas-
ter based Marvin’s adjusted income on his 1995 earnings of
$39,252.33, which the master felt Marvin should be able to earn
again.  Marvin’s actual adjusted income was $20,115.48.  Cheryle
was later awarded an additional amount per month for Seth for the
time between December 1, 1995, and July 1, 1997.  Marvin ap-
pealed, arguing that the supplemental award was a retroactive
modification of child support in violation of Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 90.3(h)(2).  The supreme court ruled that the prohibi-
tion against retroactive modifications does not apply to cases where
there is a child such as Seth for whom no support was awarded.474
Marvin then argued that even if the award was valid, his support
obligation should be based on actual income rather than the pro-
spective income as determined by the master in 1995.  The supreme
court agreed and directed that child support for Seth be deter-
mined based on Marvin’s actual income for the relevant period.475
B. Child Custody
In B.B. v. D.D.,476 the supreme court held that the superior
court had subject matter jurisdiction and did not abuse its discre-
tion in modifying a custody order issued in Oregon.477  An Oregon
court granted B.B. custody in 1990.  After relocating to the North
Pole, B.B. and the children abruptly left in 1996, depriving D.D. of
his visitation rights.  D.D. found the children and B.B. in poor liv-
ing conditions in Kasilof, and the superior court granted legal and
primary custody of the children to D.D.  On appeal, B.B. argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify an Oregon court order
and that the court abused its discretion or made clearly erroneous
findings of fact.  The supreme court held that the superior court
472. 17 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
473. Id. at 56.
474. Id. at 55.
475. Id. at 56.
476. 18 P.3d 1210 (Alaska 2001).
477. Id. at 1212, 1214.
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had subject matter jurisdiction under both the state Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the federal Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act.478  Although federal law generally forbids state courts
from modifying other state court’s custody orders,479 the court con-
cluded the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction under the
state custody law and that Oregon had lost jurisdiction because nei-
ther B.B. nor the children had lived in Oregon since 1991.480
In In re C.R.H.,481 the supreme court held that section 1911(b)
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”)482 authorizes transfer of
jurisdiction to federally recognized tribes in Alaska tribal court re-
gardless of Public Law 280.483  The Department of Health and So-
cial Services assumed emergency custody of an Indian child.  The
question in subsequent litigation was whether the Nikolai tribe
could assume jurisdiction over the proceedings in light of the cases
concerning Public Law 280.  The supreme court held that tribal ju-
risdiction exists independently of Public Law 280 because section
1911(b) of the ICWA expressly approves the transfer of child cus-
tody proceedings to tribal courts,484 unless the parents object, the
tribe declines jurisdiction or good cause exists for denial of trans-
fer.485  Because the lower court did not inquire into good cause for
denial, the court remanded for “transfer to the Nikolai tribal court
unless the superior court finds good cause to deny transfer.”486
In John v. Baker,487 the supreme court reversed the determina-
tion that Baker was denied due process and remanded the case to
the Northway Tribal Court for further child custody proceedings.488
In a previous appeal,489 the supreme court found that the Northway
Tribal Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody dispute.
The case was remanded to the superior court to determine whether
the tribal court’s decision should be recognized under the comity
doctrine.  The record of the tribal court was lost, and the superior
478. Id. at 1212-13; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.300-.390
(Michie 2000).
479. B.B., 18 P.3d at 1212; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(1)-(2) (1994).
480. B.B., 18 P.3d at 1212.
481. 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001).
482. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
483. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 854; Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
255, 589 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360).
484. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 852.
485. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000).
486. C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 854.
487. 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska 2001).
488. Id. at 78-79.
489. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
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court held that Baker was denied due process and denied comity to
the tribal court’s order.  The supreme court found that loss of the
record was not itself a due process violation.490  However, Baker’s
claim that the mother’s family exercised undue influence over the
tribal court proceedings, if successful, would have been a violation,
and the absence of a record made it impossible for the supreme
court to judge the merits of that claim.491  Because Baker did not
allege or prove that the tribal court was incapable of fairly deciding
future issues in the case, the supreme court ordered the case re-
ferred to the tribal court to decide upon custody arrangements.492
In Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch,493 the supreme court held
that when determining custody, trial courts do not have the
authority to impose restrictions on the relocation of a parent.494  In
their divorce, Moeller-Prokosch and Prokosch both sought custody
of their son.  During the custody trial, Moeller-Prokosch requested
legal and physical custody of her son and permission to relocate to
Florida.  The superior court determined that relocating to Florida
would not be in the child’s best interests and conditioned Moeller-
Prokosch’s primary physical custody of her son upon her main-
taining a residence within sixty-five miles of Prokosch’s residence
in Alaska.  On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that the
trial court does not have the power to prevent a parent from mov-
ing or to restrict the region within which Moeller-Prokosch could
live with her son.495  When making a custody determination after
one parent expresses an intent to relocate, the court must presume
that the move will take place and then determine what custody ar-
rangement is in the child’s best interests under the criteria estab-
lished by A.S. 25.24.150(c), which includes an inquiry into whether
there are “legitimate reasons for the move.”496
In Ogden v. Ogden,497 the supreme court held that a court-
appointed child custody investigator is ordinarily subject to dis-
qualification upon a showing of either actual or apparent bias.498
Julie Ogden filed for divorce after Douglas Ogden absconded with
one of the couple’s two children.  Julie obtained an interim order
giving her custody of both children and appointing an attorney,
490. John, 30 P.3d at 74.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 78-79.
493. 27 P.3d 314 (Alaska 2001).
494. Id. at 317.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 316.
497. 39 P.3d 513 (Alaska 2001).
498. Id. at 517, 519.
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Bressers, to conduct a child custody investigation.  Douglas chal-
lenged Bressers’ ability to serve as custody investigator based on
specific allegations of bias and Bressers’ practice of advertising her
services as a “Voice for Women and Children.”  The superior court
found no evidence of actual bias warranting disqualification and
granted Julie sole custody of both children.  On appeal, the su-
preme court held that the Code of Judicial Conduct required that
officers of the court, such as custody investigators, “avoid impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety.”499  Because her adver-
tisements cast serious doubt on her impartiality, the court held that
the superior court erred in failing to disqualify Bressers.500  How-
ever, because the court found no reasonable possibility that a re-
port by a different custody investigator would have changed the
superior court’s custody decision, the superior court’s failure to
disqualify Bressers was deemed harmless error.501
In West v. West,502 the supreme court held that a custody award
cannot be based on the assumption that a divorced parent who re-
marries can provide a better home than an otherwise equally com-
petent parent who remains single.503  In deciding custody of Brian
and Marlene West’s son, Cody, the superior court found that both
parents would “provide positive environments and living arrange-
ments,” that neither one was necessarily better than the other and
that only physical distance and Cody’s need to attend one school
precluded shared physical custody.  The superior court then
awarded physical custody of Cody to Brian based on the high like-
lihood that he would remarry soon, providing the positive advan-
tages of a two-parent household.  Marlene appealed, arguing that it
was improper for the court to award Brian custody based on his an-
ticipated remarriage and that the court had failed to consider vari-
ous factors operating in her favor.  The supreme court agreed and
held that “a presumptive preference for the two-parent setting is
unwarranted.”504  Without case-specific evidence indicating that
Cody’s anticipated step-mother’s in-home care would be superior
to the care that Cody would receive from his extended family if
living with Marlene, custody should not have been determined by
an expressed preference for the advantages of a “two-parent
499. Id. at 516 (citing Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A)).
500. Id. at 516-17.
501. Id. at 517.
502. 21 P.3d 838 (Alaska 2001).
503. Id. at 839.
504. Id. at 843.
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household.”505  The supreme court vacated the order and remanded
for a redetermination of custody based on Cody’s best interests.
C. Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights
In B.F. v. D.M.,506 the supreme court held that a father need
not be convicted of sexual assault to lose his right to consent to
adoption of a child conceived as a result of sexual assault.507  B.F.
appealed after the superior court granted adoption of his daughter
without his consent.  The court held that sufficient evidence
showed that the child was conceived as a result of sexual assault.508
The court then concluded that neither the plain language nor the
legislative history of A.S. 25.23.180(c)(3) requires a parent to be
convicted of sexual assault to lose his or her right to consent to
adoption of a child, but only requires that the parent committed an
act that fits the definition of sexual assault.509  The court also held
that section 25.23.180(c)(3) is constitutional because adoption pro-
ceedings are brought by private parties, not the state, the act of
waiving parental rights is not a criminal penalty and the secrecy of
adoption proceedings precludes the possibility of a father facing a
criminal finding of the same charge.510
In C.L. v. P.C.S.,511 the supreme court upheld the adoption of
two children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”)512 de-
spite the objections of the children’s grandparents.513  After L.G.’s
parental rights to her daughters, J.G. and S.G., were terminated,
the superior court awarded adoption of J.G. to one individual and
adoption of S.G. to her second cousins.  The maternal grandparents
of the children had sought to adopt the girls and appealed the su-
perior court’s decision.  The supreme court held that when deter-
mining whether good cause exists to deviate from the ICWA
placement preferences, the three Bureau of Indian Affairs factors514
are not exclusively controlling and a court may consider a broad
505. Id.
506. 15 P.3d 258 (Alaska 2001).
507. Id. at 264.
508. Id. at 260-61.
509. Id. at 264-65.  In this case, the definition of sexual assault was supplied by
Washington law because the alleged conduct occurred in Washington.  See
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(3) (Michie 2000).
510. B.F., 15 P.3d at 266.
511. 17 P.3d 769 (Alaska 2001).
512. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
513. C.L., 17 P.3d at 779.
514. Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State Courts, Indian Child Cus-
tody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,594 § F.3 (1979).
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range of factors as long as the focus is on the child’s best interests.515
Regarding the adoption of S.G., the supreme court held that the
ICWA does not set forth any order of preference among “extended
family members”516 seeking to become prospective adoptive par-
ents; therefore, the court did not err by choosing the child’s second
cousins over her grandparents.517  The supreme court also held that
the decision not to grant the grandparents formal visitation rights
to J.G. was not an abuse of discretion because her adoptive parent
had demonstrated a willingness to maintain the relationship be-
tween J.G. and her grandparents and should have the discretion to
determine the circumstances and frequency of such contacts.518  The
supreme court also held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion by not consolidating the adoption proceedings and that
both adoptions were proper.519
In C.W. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services,520 the su-
preme court held that the statutory duty of the Department of
Health and Social Services (“DHSS”) to make “reasonable efforts
to provide family support services” was not available as a defense
for a parent whose parental rights were terminated on grounds of
abandonment.521  C.W.’s parental rights were terminated after he
had abandoned his son for three years and lost contact with all in-
dividuals involved in his son’s Children in Need of Aid (“CINA”)
proceeding.  C.W. argued that the State violated the CINA statute
by failing to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his son
and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by
failing to provide alcohol treatment services that reasonably ac-
commodated his allegedly substantial learning disability.  Assum-
ing that DHSS is required to make reasonable efforts to reunite a
biological family when the parent has abandoned the child, the su-
preme court reasoned that DHSS had met that duty by communi-
cating with the child’s mother and checking criminal records in an
attempt to locate C.W. during the three-year period of abandon-
ment.522  The supreme court also rejected C.W.’s ADA claim be-
cause the superior court terminated his parental rights based upon
515. C.L., 17 P.3d at 775-76.
516. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2000).
517. C.L., 17 P.3d at 777.
518. Id. at 777-78.
519. Id. at 772-77.
520. 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
521. Id. at 55 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086(a) (Michie 2000)).
522. Id.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
262 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:1
an independent finding of abandonment and not on the ground
that his drinking made him an unfit parent.523
In E.H. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,524
the supreme court upheld the denial of E.H.’s motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the termination of E.H.’s parental
rights.525  While the Department of Health and Social Services in-
vestigated reports of harm to E.H.’s two sons, E.H. took her sons
to Edmonton, Alberta.  The boys were returned to Alaska through
the efforts of a Canadian child protective worker and an Alaskan
social worker and placed in foster care.  At a Child in Need of Aid
(“CINA”) hearing, the superior court found both boys in need of
aid and sent them to live with their father.  The superior court de-
nied E.H.’s motions for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and termi-
nated E.H.’s parental rights.  On appeal, the supreme court held
that both former and current A.S. 47.10.010 establish that CINA
statutes govern proceedings concerning Alaska residents who are
minors regardless of whether the minor child is physically present
in Alaska.526  Under A.S. 01.10.055, the court determined that the
boys retained their Alaska residency as required by the CINA stat-
utes while they were in Canada because Alaska was their home
state, there was no evidence that another state had jurisdiction over
them and substantial evidence remained in Alaska as to the care,
custody and protection of the boys.527  The supreme court affirmed
termination of E.H.’s parental rights.
In N.A. v. State, Div. of Family and Youth Services,528 the su-
preme court held that the superior court did not violate N.A’s due
process rights by not holding a permanency hearing prior to the
termination of parental rights trial and that it did not err in con-
cluding that the State made active efforts to reunite N.A. with her
children.529  In April 1997, a social worker found N.A. intoxicated in
violation of her probation.  As a result, N.A. was placed in alcohol
treatment and all of her children were placed in state custody.  In
1998, N.A. was arrested again for intoxication in violation of her
probation and was placed in multiple rehabilitation programs.  Af-
ter a hearing in October 1998, the Division of Family and Youth
Services began implementing a permanency plan to terminate
N.A.’s parental rights.  N.A. relinquished parental rights to her two
523. Id. at 56.
524. 23 P.3d 1186 (Alaska 2001).
525. Id. at 1192.
526. E.H., 26 P.3d at 1188.
527. Id. at 1190-92.
528. 19 P.3d 597
529. Id. at 601-02.
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male children but not to her two female children.  N.A.’s motion
for a permanency hearing and continuation of the termination trial
was denied, and N.A’s parental rights to her daughters were termi-
nated.  On appeal, N.A. argued that the lack of an original perma-
nency hearing or an annual review violated her due process rights.
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the October 1998 hear-
ing satisfied the permanency hearing requirements and that the
failure to hold an annual review was not error because the fourteen
months between the permanency hearings and termination trial
was due to a continuance requested by N.A.530  The supreme court
also held that the State made active efforts to prevent breakup of
the family, pointing to the multiple treatment programs provided
to N.A.,531 and affirmed termination of N.A’s parental rights.
In T.F. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,532 the su-
preme court upheld the termination of S.M. and T.F.’s parental
rights under Alaska law and the Indian Child Welfare Act.533  S.M.
gave birth to premature Indian twins who were developmentally
damaged by prenatal cocaine exposure and may have been affected
by fetal alcohol syndrome.  The Department of Health and Social
Services (“DHSS”) immediately took custody of the twins.  S.M.
failed to enter drug rehabilitation until one month before trial and
the father, T.F., was incarcerated and escaped from custody before
DHSS could administer a paternity test.  T.F. eventually took the
paternity test, met with a social worker and visited with the twins.
However, DHSS had already initiated termination proceedings and
the superior court terminated parental rights before a case plan
was finalized.  The supreme court held that the superior court had
not erred in finding that the children were in need of aid and that
the parents had not remedied the conduct or conditions placing the
children at a substantial risk of harm.534  The court also held the
State did not owe T.F. active efforts to prevent the breakup of an
Indian family until paternity was established and that the State had
made such efforts in this case.535  The court concluded that the wel-
fare of the children and the “totality of the circumstances” sup-
ported the superior court’s termination of parental rights.536
530. Id.
531. Id. at 603.
532. 26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).
533. Id. at 1090.
534. Id. at 1093-94 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (Michie 2000)).
535. Id. at 1094 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)).
536. Id. at 1097.
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D. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property
In Brandal v. Shangin,537 the supreme court affirmed the classi-
fication of Brandal’s right to use property as marital property.538
The court also held that simple interest should be used in calculat-
ing Brandal’s equity in the marital property.539  During their mar-
riage, Brandal and Shangin acquired the right to use land in ex-
change for purchasing a mobile home for Brandal’s grandmother.
Brandal appealed the superior court’s classification of the right to
use his grandmother’s land as a marital asset and the application of
compound interest to Shangin’s interest in that right.  The supreme
court found that the land was marital property because it was pur-
chased during the marriage with marital money, the parties demon-
strated an intent to treat it as marital property by living on the land
during the fishing season and Brandal had not met his burden of
showing that the property was separate.540  However, the court held
that absent a specific finding that compound interest is necessary to
accurately measure the value of such an asset, simple interest
should have been used in determining the value of Shangin’s inter-
est in the right to use the land.541
In Leis v. Hustad,542 the supreme court held that the parties in-
tended an escrow account to be marital property, despite Hustad
being the sole title owner, and that the value of the 401(k) plan
should have been calculated at the time of the trial, not at the time
of separation.543  The court also held that a loan from Leis’ parents
was a marital liability.544  After Leis and Hustad began living to-
gether in 1981, Hustad kept the title to his previous residence
solely under his name, but rented out the residence.  After their
marriage in 1982, the couple sold the residence, producing cash
used for marital purposes and a receivable known as the “Muntean
Escrow.”  Hustad argued that the Muntean Escrow account was
separate property because it was the product of the sale of his
house.  The supreme court disagreed, finding that the parties in-
tended the property to be marital property because the account
was listed in both parties’ names and the money was transferred to
joint accounts.545  Additionally, the court held that it was improper
537. 36 P.3d 1188 (Alaska 2001).
538. Id. at 1192.
539. Id. at 1194.
540. Id. at 1192.
541. Id. at 1193-94.
542. 22 P.3d 885 (Alaska 2001).
543. Id. at 886.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 887-88.
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to value Hustad’s 401(k) account at the time of separation rather
than the time of trial because Hustad made no additional contribu-
tions to the account between the date of separation and the date of
trial and showed no justification for deviating from the time-of-trial
principle.546  Lastly, the court held that a loan from Leis’ parents
was a marital liability because both parties signed the promissory
note, demonstrating their intent to treat it as a marital obligation.547
In Tolan v. Kimball,548 the supreme court affirmed an award to
Kimball of one-half the net value of a home he shared with To-
lan.549  Kimball lived, unmarried, with Tolan from 1990 to 1997.
Despite Kimball’s weekly contributions of $200 and contribution to
the downpayment and closing costs of the house, Tolan refused to
put his name on the deed, explaining that she did not want his
name on any of her credit or financial obligations.  When Kimball
and Tolan separated, Kimball sued and was awarded one-half of
the home’s net value.  On appeal, the supreme court applied the
rule that property accumulated during a period of cohabitation
should be divided according to the parties’ intent.550  The court con-
cluded that the superior court reasonably determined the parties’
intent to share the house equally based on both parties’ contribu-
tions to the downpayment and upkeep of the house.551  Tolan’s ar-
gument that Kimball was merely paying rent was unconvincing be-
cause Tolan never claimed these rent payments on her tax
returns.552  Tolan also argued that her refusal to add Kimball’s
name to the title indicated her intent not to share the property.
The supreme court disagreed, citing Tolan’s statement to a disin-
terested witness that Kimball was stupid for paying in cash and for
having no proof that he was anything other than a tenant as proof
that Tolan’s refusal to put Kimball’s name on the deed was a cun-
ning, anticipatory design rather than an indicator of mutual in-
tent.553
IX.  INSURANCE LAW
In Curran v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co.,554 the su-
preme court held that a motorist must exhaust all underlying li-
546. Id. at 888-89.
547. Id. at 889.
548. 33 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2001).
549. Id. at 1156.
550. Id. at 1154.
551. Id. at 1155.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 1156.
554. 29 P.3d 829 (Alaska 2001).
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ability coverage before recovering under an Underinsured Motorist
(“UIM”) policy.555  Curran was injured in a single-vehicle accident
in which her husband was driving.  She did not sue her husband or
make a claim under his insurance policy, but instead offered the in-
surance company a credit in the amount of her husband’s coverage
while seeking recovery under both her and her husband’s UIM
coverage.  In a separate claim, Barnhill was injured in a two-car
collision.  He settled with the other driver’s insurance company for
an amount less than his coverage limit and then sought UIM bene-
fits from his insurance company.  In both cases, the claims for UIM
benefits were denied because the claimant had not exhausted the
underlying policy limits, and the superior court granted summary
judgment for the insurers.  The supreme court held that A.S.
28.20.445 requires a UIM claimant to exhaust all underlying liabil-
ity coverage before recovering under a UIM policy.556  The court
also held that a credit offered to a UIM insurer for the amount of
the underlying coverage did not amount to a settlement exhausting
the underlying coverage.557  Because neither Curran nor Barnhill
exhausted the underlying policy limits, the supreme court affirmed
the judgment of the superior court.558
In Farquhar v. Alaska Nat’l Insurance Co.,559 the supreme court
held that Alaska National Insurance Company (“ANIC”) was not
liable for prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limit.560  Far-
quhar was injured in a traffic accident with Industrial Boiler and
Controls.  Farquhar and Industrial’s insurer, ANIC, settled for the
policy limit of one million dollars, attorney’s fees and the release of
liability, and agreed to litigate the question of whether ANIC owed
Farquhar prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limit.  The su-
preme court established “two grounds for holding an insurer liable
for prejudgment interest: (1) if the insurer contractually assumes
liability by the terms of its policy with the insured, or (2) if public
policy requires liability despite the language of the contract.”561
The court held that neither of these grounds applied and that
ANIC was not liable for interest in excess of the policy limit.562
555. Id. at 838.
556. Id. at 831-34.
557. Id. at 835.
558. Id. at 838.
559. 20 P.3d 577 (Alaska 2001).
560. Id. at 578.
561. Id. (citing Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979)).
562. Id. at 579-82.
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In Holderness v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,563 the su-
preme court held that a personal umbrella policy qualifies as auto-
mobile liability insurance under Alaska’s insurance code, thereby
requiring the coverage to include prejudgment interest and attor-
ney’s fees.564  The court also held that a business liability policy
does not cover an executive officer on his commute to work.565
Holderness was hit by motorist while driving to Anchorage to per-
form surgery.  Holderness held both a personal automobile liability
policy and a personal liability umbrella policy with State Farm.  In
addition, the Alaska Podiatry Associates (“APA”), of which
Holderness was an executive officer, owned a State Farm business
liability policy that covered Holderness with respect to his duties as
an officer.  The superior court held that the umbrella policy did not
constitute automobile liability insurance and, therefore, State Farm
did not owe Holderness any prejudgment interest or attorney’s fees
beyond the policy limit.  The court further held that APA’s policy
did not cover Holderness’ accident because he was not performing
executive duties at the time.  The supreme court reversed the first
part of the ruling, finding that the umbrella policy qualified as
automobile liability insurance because it did not specifically ex-
clude coverage for liability stemming from the ownership or opera-
tion of an automobile.566  The court affirmed the ruling that
Holderness was not covered by the business liability policy because
commuting to work did not fall under his officer’s duties.567
In Peter v. Schumacher Enterprises,568 the supreme court held
that insurance agents have a common law duty to advise their cus-
tomers about insurance coverage if a “special relationship” exists
between the agent and the insured.569  The court also held that cus-
tomers can sue insurers who violate A.S. 21.89.020(c).570  Peter’s
son was seriously injured by a motorist whose insurance coverage
was much less than the Peters’ expected damages.  Peter had
minimum coverage, but sued both the insurance agency from
whom she purchased the insurance and the insurance carrier on
grounds that the agency had a duty to recommend higher limit cov-
erage and that the company had a duty to offer such coverage.  The
supreme court held that insurance agents do not have a general
563. 24 P.3d 1235 (Alaska 2001).
564. Id. at 1236.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 1239 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(a), (c) (Michie 2000)).
567. Id. at 1245.
568. 22 P.3d 481 (Alaska 2001).
569. Id. at 482-83.
570. Id.
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duty to advise their clients of appropriate coverage unless a “spe-
cial relationship” exists.571  Such a relationship exists if an agent
misrepresents the nature of the coverage, voluntarily assumes the
responsibility for choosing a particular insurance policy, fails to re-
spond appropriately to a request or inquiry about a particular type
of coverage, or has a duty to clarify an ambiguous request.572  The
court also held that an implied private right of action exists where
insurance companies violate Alaska law, which requires limits of
up to one million dollars for underinsured motorist coverage.573
Because issues of material fact existed as to both claims, the court
remanded for further proceedings.574
In Simmons v. Insurance Co. of North America,575 the supreme
court held that when a business owner acquires insurance under a
trade name, coverage under the policy extends to that individual as
well as to the business.576  Following a serious car accident, Sim-
mons sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits under a
policy issued to her father’s business, Happy Puppy Enterprises.
Because the policy did not specifically include her father as a
named insured, Simmons sought to have the policy reformed to in-
clude the father as a named insured and thereby derive coverage as
a family member.  The superior court granted summary judgment
for the insurance company, reasoning that because the policy ex-
tended coverage to insured individuals and their families, and
Happy Puppy was a business and not an individual, the coverage
would not extend to Simmons even if the policy were reformed to
include her father.  The supreme court distinguished the case from
an instance where a corporation is the named insured577 and held
that where a policy names a partnership as the insured, “coverage
extend[s] to the individuals comprising the partnership as well.”578
The court reversed the summary judgment order and remanded the
case to determine if the policy should be reformed to include the
father as a named insured and, if so, whether the policy should ex-
tend to Simmons as a family member.579
571. Id. at 485.
572. Id. at 486-87.
573. Id. at 489.
574. Id. at 483.
575. 17 P.3d 56 (Alaska 2001).
576. Id. at 58.
577. Id. at 62 n.30.
578. Id. at 61.
579. Id. at 64.
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In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lawrence,580 the su-
preme court affirmed summary judgment for a family whose son
was injured in an accident with an underinsured motorist.581  State
Farm appealed the ruling that the Lawrences’ claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress qualified for the policy limits under
their uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (“UM/UIM”) and
that their UM/UIM coverage covered them for the punitive dam-
ages of an underinsured motorist.  State Farm argued that the par-
ents did not qualify for separate policy limits because their emo-
tional distress claims were not bodily injury and were not suffered
in the “same accident” as their son’s accident.  The supreme court
held that State Farm waived both of these arguments because it
failed to adequately raise them in the lower court proceedings.582
The court also affirmed the ruling that the Lawrences’ UM/UIM
provision covers the punitive damages of an underinsured driver
because the Lawrences’ liability policies, which UM/UIM must
mirror, covered them for their own punitive damages, the policies
suggested that they cover such punitive damages and public policy
did not forbid the result.583
In Wing v. GEICO Ins. Co.,584 the supreme court upheld an ar-
bitrator’s award in an insurance dispute.585  Wing, injured by an
uninsured motorist, rejected GEICO’s initial settlement offer.  The
arbitrators reduced their preliminary award of $33,557 to a final
award of $14,987.70 after deducting expert fees and, presumably,
offsets claimed by GEICO.  The panel also declined to award at-
torney’s fees to either party.  On appeal, Wing argued that the arbi-
tration panel exceeded its authority when it reduced the prelimi-
nary award without giving a complete explanation, deducted expert
fees from the award and failed to award attorney’s fees.  The court
rejected Wing’s arguments because A.S. 09.43.120(a) does not
permit judicial review of an arbitrator’s award for failure to give a
complete explanation and because the insurance policy governing
the arbitration explicitly provided that each side would bear its
own attorney’s fees.586  In addition, the court rejected Wing’s argu-
ment with respect to expert fees because the argument relied on a
580. 26 P.3d 1074 (Alaska 2001).
581. Id. at 1075.
582. Id. at 1077.
583. Id. at 1079-81.
584. 17 P.3d 783 (Alaska 2001).
585. Id. at 785.
586. Id. at 786-87.
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provision of the insurance policy that conflicted with A.S.
21.89.020(f)(1).587
X.  PROPERTY LAW
In Foster v. State, Dep’t of Transportation,588 the supreme court
held that state courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the ownership
or right to possession of Native allotment land.589  In 1979, the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management granted Foster’s application for an
allotment to a tract of land based on her claim of seasonal use and
occupancy dating back to 1964.  A 1983 survey revealed that parts
of Foster’s allotment were subject to easements that pre-dated her
use and occupancy.  In 1998, the U.S. issued Foster a certificate
making her allotment subject to three separate rights-of-way.  Fos-
ter sued the State for inverse condemnation and trespass, which the
superior court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The supreme court affirmed, holding that federal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over questions involving the ownership or right
to possession of property held in trust by the United States or sub-
ject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States.590  The court also held that the superior court could award
costs and attorney’s fees under Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 79
and 82, even though it lacked jurisdiction over Foster’s claims.591
In R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,592 the supreme
court affirmed the denial of relief in an inverse condemnation pro-
ceeding, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding
that no compensable taking had occurred.593  The appeal concerned
R & Y’s economic loss from the Municipality of Anchorage’s
(“MOA”) 1990 decision to add a twenty-foot setback band to the
existing eighty-foot setback band surrounding Blueberry Lake.
The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the MOA’s le-
gitimate interest in protecting wetlands outweighed the minimal
frustration of R & Y’s investment-backed expectations for the
property as a whole.594  The supreme court rejected R & Y’s argu-
587. Id. at 787-88.  The statute provides, “an automobile liability insurance
policy must provide that all expenses and fees, not including counsel fees or ad-
juster fees, incurred because of arbitration or mediation shall be paid as deter-
mined by the arbitrator.”  ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(f)(1) (Michie 2000).
588. 34 P.3d 1288 (Alaska 2001).
589. Id. at 1289.
590. Id. at 1290 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1994)).
591. Id. at 1291-92.
592. 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001).
593. Id. at 300.
594. Id. at 296.
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ment that every economic loss due to government regulation must
be compensated, and reasoned that, in addition to the factors out-
lined in Anchorage v. Sandberg,595 courts must consider the princi-
ples of equitable distribution of public burden and benefit.596  The
court concluded that the setback restriction did not trigger com-
pensation because it was part of a local and national wetlands pres-
ervation scheme that applied broadly to all landowners and bene-
fited both the public generally and the landowners in particular.597
In Safeway, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Transportation,598 the su-
preme court held that a municipality cannot vacate the State’s in-
terest in a highway right-of-way.599  In 1959, owners of adjacent
pieces of land conveyed land along their common boundary “as a
permanent easement and right-of-way for use by the public as a
public road,” later called Becharof Street.600  Becharof Street was
included within the State’s right-of-way on both the Highway De-
partment’s right-of-way map and on maps recorded with the State’s
declarations of taking.  In 1983, over the objection of the Depart-
ment of Transportation, Anchorage relinquished interests in the
right-of-way covering Becharof Street.  In 1996, Safeway, a lessor
of one of the adjacent properties, filed suit to quiet title to Becha-
rof Street after the State concluded it still possessed an easement
over the property.  The supreme court held that the State main-
tained an easement over Becharof Street because the State may ac-
cept land dedicated to the public “through a formal official action,”
and that the inclusion of Becharof Street on the highway construc-
tion right-of-way map was a “formal official action.”601  Once the
State acquired the right in land for highway purposes, the right
could only be vacated by the Department of Transportation.602
XI.  TORT LAW
In Alpine Industries, Inc. v. Feyk,603 the supreme court held
that Feyk had absolute official immunity for allegedly defamatory
speech.604  Feyk had prepared a public health bulletin issued by the
595. 861 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993).
596. R & Y, 34 P.3d at 299-300.
597. Id. at 298.
598. 34 P.3d 336 (Alaska 2001).
599. Id. at 337.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 339-40 (quoting State v. Fairbanks Lodge No. 1392, 633 P.2d 1378,
1380 (Alaska 1981)).
602. Id. at 339 (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.070(a) (Michie 2000)).
603. 22 P.3d 445 (Alaska 2001).
604. Id. at 450.
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State Department of Health and Social Services warning against
using ozone-generating devices in occupied spaces, specifically
mentioning that a Minnesota court previously ruled that Alpine
Industries had made false claims about the safety of its generators.
Alpine sued Feyk for libel, tortious interference with business rela-
tionships and unfair trade practices.  The supreme court held that
absolute immunity was appropriate because of the importance of
public health bulletins and the potential for increased frequency of
lawsuits against authors of the bulletins.605  The court recognized
that Alpine had no other remedy, but determined that other factors
weighed more heavily in finding absolute immunity.606
In Angnabooguk v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,607 the su-
preme court held that when the State chooses to take over fire-
fighting operations, it assumes a duty to conduct those operations
non-negligently and that all firefighting decisions are not necessar-
ily discretionary planning decisions subject to immunity under the
Alaska Tort Claims Act.608  Landowners who suffered damage to
their homes and property as a result of the Miller’s Reach fire of
1996 sued the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division
of Forestry, (“Forestry”) claiming that the State’s firefighting ac-
tivities were conducted negligently.  The superior court dismissed
the suits on the basis of discretionary function immunity.  The su-
preme court reversed, holding that Forestry owed the plaintiffs an
actionable duty of care as a matter of public policy and that the
Alaska Tort Claims Act609 does not provide immunity for all fire-
fighting decisions.610  The court remanded the case to determine
which actions taken by Forestry were discretionary and subject to
immunity and which acts were operational and subject to liability.611
In Choi v. Anvil,612 the supreme court held that plaintiffs alleg-
edly injured in a car accident “were not required to present expert
testimony to establish their claims.”613  Choi rear-ended a pickup
truck driven by Anvil, with three passengers in each vehicle.  Six of
those involved filed suit against Choi, who admitted negligence in
causing the collision.  At trial on causation and damages, none of
the plaintiffs offered expert evidence regarding the “causation,
605. Id. at 449.
606. Id. at 450.
607. 26 P.3d 447 (Alaska 2001).
608. Id. at 453, 458.
609. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2000).
610. Angnabooguk, 26 P.3d at 453, 458-59.
611. Id. at 459.
612. 32 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).
613. Id. at 2.
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permanence, or extent of their alleged injuries.”614  On appeal, Choi
argued that the plaintiffs were required to present expert witnesses
to establish causation.  The supreme court disagreed, holding that
expert witness testimony is necessary “only when the nature or
character of a person’s injuries require the special skill of an expert
to help present the evidence to the trier of fact in a comprehensible
format.”615  The alleged injuries in the instant case and their causa-
tion were easily understandable by a jury given the lay testimony.616
In City of Seward v. Afognak Logging, 617 the supreme court af-
firmed Seward’s liability for damages to Afognak’s bulldozer.618
During a heavy rainfall, a City representative directed one of
Afognak’s bulldozer operators to cut a channel for floodwater but
failed to tell him that the pavement had collapsed, a condition that
the operator could not see.  As a result, the bulldozer was bogged
down and suffered extensive water damage.  The supreme court
found that Afognak presented sufficient evidence that the City
owed a duty to warn Afognak of dangerous conditions even though
Afognak, as an independent contractor, was not contractually
bound to follow the City’s instructions.619  In addition, the court re-
jected both of the City’s claims for immunity.620  It found that state
review of the City’s compliance plan did not transform it from a
statutory duty into “an agreement or contract” that would fall
within a provision for immunity to cities acting under agreement or
contract with the State to perform emergency response duties.621  It
also found that the City’s actions were not budgetary in nature and
did not qualify for immunity as protected planning decisions.622
In Dore v. City of Fairbanks,623 the supreme court held that
police did not have an actionable duty to arrest a suspect on an
outstanding warrant or otherwise prevent harm to a possible crime
victim.624  Seven days after an arrest warrant was issued charging
Dore with harassment of his ex-wife, Carmen, Dore killed Carmen
and committed suicide.  Three Dore children filed negligence ac-
tions against the City of Fairbanks.  The supreme court found no
614. Id.
615. Id. at 3.
616. Id. at 4.
617. 31 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2001).
618. Id. at 781.
619. Id. at 784.
620. Id. at 785-86.
621. Id. at 785.
622. Id. at 786.
623. 31 P.3d 788 (Alaska 2001).
624. Id. at 796.
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statutory duty to arrest and noted that later-enacted domestic vio-
lence laws suggest that public policy does not support such a duty.625
In addition, the court found no actionable duty under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts because the police would only have a duty
to exercise reasonable care to prevent a third person from doing
harm when the police took charge of a third person who they knew,
or should have known, to be likely to cause bodily harm to oth-
ers.626  Because the police never took charge of Dore, the court held
that the police had no tort duty to control him.627
In Estate of Himsel v. Alaska,628 the supreme court declined to
apply the doctrine of Feres v. United States629 and remanded be-
cause genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the
pilot was acting on behalf of the state as a “borrowed employee.”630
The plaintiffs brought suit against the State on behalf of family
members who died in the crash of an Alaska Army National Guard
plane.631  The State argued that the court should apply the Feres
doctrine, which provides sovereign immunity for tort claims in-
volving the military.  The court refused to apply the doctrine, rea-
soning that Alaska law was adequate to address the issue.632  The
court applied the planning/operational test to determine if the act
in question was “discretionary” and therefore entitled to sovereign
immunity.633  The court found that the negligence alleged by the
plaintiffs occurred during the execution, and not the planning of
the trip, and therefore, immunity did not exist.634  The court re-
versed and remanded the case because a question of material fact
remained regarding the pilot’s relationship to the State.635  While
the pilot was clearly a federal employee, evidence indicated that
Alaska might have retained some control over the pilot, thereby
making him a “borrowed employee” subject to liability.636
In In re the Exxon Valdez,637 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held a punitive damages award to be appropriate, but
625. Id. at 792 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.515(a)(1)-(4) (Michie 2000)).
626. Id. at 794 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-15, 319
(1965)).
627. Id. at 796.
628. 36 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2001).
629. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
630. Himsel, 36 P.3d at 43.
631. Id. at 37.
632. Id. at 39-40.
633. Id. at 40.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 43.
636. Id. at 42-43.
637. 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
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excessive.638  In consolidated actions against Exxon Corp. and Cap-
tain Hazelwood brought by plaintiffs affected by the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages
and $5 billion in punitive damages against Exxon and $5,000 in pu-
nitive damages against Hazelwood.  The defendants appealed, ar-
guing that punitive damages were not allowed in the present case,
that the award was excessive and that the compensatory damage
award was not supported by the evidence.  The plaintiffs cross-
appealed the grant of summary judgment against various claimants
who suffered purely economic injury.  The court of appeals held
that punitive damages were appropriate because (1) the prior civil
and criminal penalties imposed on Exxon did not preclude a puni-
tive damages award; (2) punitive damages are not disallowed in
admiralty law; (3) the prior consent decree did not bar a subse-
quent award of punitive damages for injury to economic and prop-
erty interests; and (4) neither the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act639 nor the Clean Water Act640 preempted a private right of
action for punitive or compensatory damages based on injuries to
private economic or quasi-economic interests.641  However, the
court found that the $5 billion punitive damage award against
Exxon was excessive and remanded for determination of a lower
amount.642  The plaintiffs argued that the district court erroneously
granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon on certain entities’
claims of economic injury unaccompanied by any physical injury to
their property or person.  The court of appeals found that federal
admiralty law does not preempt Alaska’s statute providing for
strict liability for hazardous substances.643  As a result, the court of
appeals remanded the claims of those entities with valid claims un-
der Alaska law, but not those with remote or speculative claims.644
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,645
the supreme court held that A.S. 46.03.822(a) creates a private
cause of action for the owners of private property damaged by a
release of hazardous substances; that a statute of limitations de-
fense is available for such an action; that a contribution action un-
der section 46.03.822(a) does not accrue for statute of limitations
purposes until the direct action concludes; and that contamination
638. Id. at 1242-47.
639. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (1994).
640. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
641. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225-31.
642. Id. at 1246-47.
643. Id. at 1252-53 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (Michie 2000)).
644. Id. at 1253.
645. 21 P.3d 344 (Alaska 2001).
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by a past owner or tenant cannot be characterized as a continuing
trespass or nuisance for statute of limitations purposes.646  As a re-
ceiver of a failed bank’s assets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (“FDIC”) acquired land contaminated by hazardous
waste.  To recover cleanup costs, the FDIC sued the former land-
owner and the owner’s tenants under A.S. 46.03.822, which im-
poses strict liability on a joint and several basis for release of haz-
ardous substances and allows responsible parties to sue for
contribution.  Finding several unresolved issues of Alaska law, the
district court certified four questions to the supreme court.  In
finding a private cause of action under section 46.03.822(a), the su-
preme court held that a private cause of action was in the nature of
the statute, was necessary to provide adequate remedies, did not
conflict with existing remedies, promoted the statute’s purpose, did
not depart from previous applications of the statute and did not
create an undue burden on the courts.647  The court also held that
the limiting language of section 46.03.822(a) does not preclude af-
firmative defenses such as the statute of limitations that have no
inherent relation to the imposition of joint and several liability for
release of hazardous substances.648
In Hibbits v. Sides,649 the supreme court found that it was error
to dismiss Hibbits’ claim against Sides for intentional third-party
spoliation.650  Hibbits was involved in a motor vehicle accident with
Vogus.  Hibbits claimed that Sides, the first state trooper to arrive
at the scene, knew that Vogus was under the influence of mari-
juana and knowingly removed him from the scene so that Vogus
would not be tested for marijuana use.  The supreme court held
that because it recently recognized intentional third-party spolia-
tion to be a tort, it was error to dismiss Hibbits’ claim.651  The court
found that the case should not proceed until the underlying dispute
between Hibbits and Vogus has been resolved and, therefore, Sides
could move to stay the proceeding until resolution occurred.652
In Joseph v. State,653 the supreme court held that the intention-
ality of a prisoner’s suicide is not a complete defense to a wrongful
646. Id. at 356-57.
647. Id. at 348-49. (applying Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch, 950 P.2d 98, 104-
05 (Alaska 1997)).
648. Id. at 354.
649. 34 P.3d 327 (Alaska 2001).
650. Id. at 328.
651. Id. at 328-29 (citing Nichols v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300
(Alaska 2000)).
652. Id. at 330.
653. 26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001).
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death claim alleging that the jailer negligently failed to prevent the
suicide.654  The court also ruled that the use of a blanket preemp-
tion to remove those persons criminally charged from the list of
prospective jurors did not constitute reversible error without evi-
dence that a particular person was excluded from service or that
using the blanket exemption led to an unrepresentative jury.655  Jo-
seph’s son hung himself in his jail cell after his arrest for assault.656
In Joseph’s wrongful death action, the special verdict required the
jury to return a verdict for the State if it found that Joseph’s son
died “as a result of his intentional actions.”657  On appeal, Joseph
assigned error to the jury instructions and use of the blanket ex-
emption.  The supreme court, reasoning that a “duty to prevent
someone from acting in a particular way logically cannot be de-
feated by the very action sought to be avoided,”658 held that the fact
that a prisoner’s suicide was intentional does not defeat a claim
that the jailer negligently failed to prevent the suicide.659  As a re-
sult, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
In Mitchell v. Heinrichs,660 the supreme court held that a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or an award
of punitive damages for the killing of another’s pet is proper only
when the challenged conduct was so outrageous and extreme “as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”661  The
court held that a pet’s actual value to the owner may sometimes be
the proper measure of its value.662  Heinrichs saw two dogs running
near her livestock pen and believed the dogs were threatening her
livestock.  The dogs then turned to Heinrichs, who shot Mitchell’s
dog out of fear for her personal safety.  The superior court con-
cluded that Heinrichs’ conduct did not “go beyond all bounds of
decency” and did not warrant imposition of liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress or punitive damages.  The supreme
court affirmed, and held that even though sentimental or compan-
ionship value may not be included in the award of damages for the
loss of a pet, the actual value of the pet to the owner, rather than
654. Id. at 477.
655. Id. at 465.
656. Id. at  462-63.
657. Id. at 465.
658. Id. at 476.
659. Id. at 477.
660. 27 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2001).
661. Id. at 311-12 (citing Hawks v. State, 908 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Alaska 1995)).
662. Id. at 313.
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the fair market value, may be the proper measure of damages.663
The case was remanded for determination of damages.
In Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc.,664 the supreme court held
that a liability release form that fails to unequivocally express in-
tent to release does not protect an individual or company from un-
necessary dangers or unreasonable risk.665  Moore signed a release
of liability before participating in an ATV safety class offered by
Hartley Motors Inc. (“Hartley”).  Moore was injured when her
ATV rolled over on the safety class course.  She sued Hartley, al-
leging that the liability release was invalid for lack of consideration
and void as against public policy, and that the course was inher-
ently unsafe.  The trial court granted summary judgment for Har-
tley.  On appeal, the supreme court held that the court did not err
in rejecting Moore’s claim on the basis of lack of consideration or
public policy,666 but found error in the trial court’s failure to con-
sider the scope of the release.  The court held that the release only
applied to those risks of operating an ATV that were “obvious and
necessary to the sport,” and not to risks from an unnecessarily dan-
gerous course.667  Finding that a genuine question of fact existed as
to whether Moore’s injuries resulted from an unnecessarily unsafe
course, the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate.668
In Pauley v. Anchorage School District,669 the supreme court
held that the school district and its official were entitled to quali-
fied immunity for the decision to release a child to his mother prior
to her court-scheduled visitation.670  Pauley sued his son’s school
and its principal for negligence and intentional interference with
custodial rights after his son was released into his mother’s custody
before her scheduled Christmas visitation, after which the mother
failed to return the boy.  The supreme court held that the princi-
pal’s actions were entitled to qualified immunity.671  The decision
was discretionary and not malicious, corrupt, or made in bad faith
because the principal contacted the father, examined the mother’s
court documents and the documents on file at the school, and dis-
cussed the legal ramifications with the police officer the mother
663. Id. at 312-13.
664. 36 P.3d 628 (Alaska 2001).
665. Id. at 633.
666. Id. at 631-32.
667. Id. at 633.
668. Id. at 634.
669. 31 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2001).
670. Id. at 1285.
671. Id. at 1286.
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brought with her.672  As a result, the claims against the principal and
school district were properly dismissed.
In Robles v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc.,673 the supreme court
found error in the exclusion of evidence of Shoreside’s knowledge
of unsafe propane tanks because the evidence supported a poten-
tially viable claim for failure to warn the victim of a propane tank
accident.674  Robles was injured while filling a Shoreside propane
tank when its corroded bottom gave way and the tank exploded.
Robles submitted evidence that Shoreside’s employees regularly
filled tanks that had not been inspected and recertified according
to federal regulations.  Based on this evidence, Robles claimed that
Shoreside was negligent for filling uncertified tanks and failing to
warn him that these tanks were in circulation.  However, the supe-
rior court excluded the evidence and dismissed this claim.  The su-
preme court reversed, holding that the evidence of Shoreside’s ille-
gal refilling practices should not have been excluded because a jury
may have found that Shoreside had constructive knowledge of its
dealers’ exposure to heightened risk; therefore, Shoreside had a
duty to alert Robles to the risk.675  The case was remanded for re-
trial on the issue of negligent failure to warn.
In Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co.,676 the su-
preme court held that “a corporation that purchases assets of the
manufacturer of a rifle sold in Alaska [can] be held liable for per-
sonal injury caused in Alaska by a defect in the rifle.”677  Savage In-
dustries, Inc. manufactured a defective rifle purchased by Western
Auto Supply Company.  The rifle was sold to a store in Maine and
later resold to Taylor in Alaska.  The defective rifle discharged and
caused injury to Taylor’s son.  Savage Arms, Inc. purchased assets
from Savage Industries in 1989.  In 1990, Taylor sued Savage Indus-
tries and Western Auto, which settled with Taylor and sought in-
demnity from Savage Arms.  The supreme court characterized suc-
cessor liability as an issue of tort law and held that Alaska tort law
applied.678  Faced with an issue of first impression, the court held
that the traditional “mere continuation” exception and the new
“continuity of enterprise” exception to the rule of successor non-
liability are available under Alaska law.679  In accepting the new ex-
672. Id.
673. 29 P.3d 838 (Alaska 2001).
674. Id. at 840, 844.
675. Id. at 843-44.
676. 18 P.3d 49 (Alaska 2001).
677. Id. at 51.
678. Id. at 53.
679. Id. at 55.
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ception, the court reasoned that “the posited negative effects on
the overall economy are too indeterminate and speculative to out-
weigh the policy of compensating persons injured by product de-
fects.”680  The court reversed summary judgment in favor of West-
ern Auto and remanded because material factual disputes existed
and because the uncertainty surrounding the successor liability is-
sue inhibited the parties from effectively preparing their cases.681
In Walden v. State, Dep’t of Transportation,682 the supreme
court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment for the
State.683  Shawn Walden incurred brain injuries as a result of an ac-
cident in which his father, Mel, lost control of the car on a highway
curve after hitting ice.  Individually and as Shawn’s legal represen-
tative, Shawn’s mother filed suit alleging that the State Department
of Transportation (“DOT”) should have posted a warning sign on
the curve and that DOT’s negligent maintenance of the highway
curve was a substantial factor in Mel’s loss of control.  The superior
court found that DOT had no duty to post a sign and granted DOT
partial summary judgment.  On appeal, the supreme court upheld
the grant of partial summary judgment because Shawn’s mother
failed to establish a duty on the part of DOT to place a warning
sign at the curve.684  The court relied on the Manual of Uniform
Traffic Control Devices, which states that DOT “may” place a
warning sign at such curves.685  The court reasoned that the use of
“may” does not rise to the level of a legal requirement to place a
warning sign and, therefore, DOT did not breach any legal duty.686
In Waldroup v. Lindman,687 the supreme court affirmed sum-
mary judgment for an insurer who was sued for tortious interfer-
ence with a contractual relationship after it offered to defend a pa-
tient against a chiropractor when the chiropractor sued her for
payment.688  After an auto accident, Lindman sought chiropractic
treatment from Dr. Waldroup.  Lindman’s insurer, Allstate, in-
formed Waldroup that it would deny payment for a portion of her
treatment received at Waldroup’s rehabilitation clinic unless he
submitted proof that the treatment was reasonable, necessary and
accident-related.  Allstate also informed Lindman that if her claim
680. Id. at 57.
681. Id. at 58.
682. 27 P.3d 297 (Alaska 2001).
683. Id. at 300.
684. Id. at 301.
685. Id. at 301-02.
686. Id. at 302.
687. 28 P.3d 293 (Alaska 2001).
688. Id. at 294-95.
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was denied and Waldroup pursued her for payment, Allstate would
defend her.  The superior court dismissed Waldroup’s interference
with contractual relations claim against Allstate because it found
that Allstate’s interference was privileged.  On appeal, the supreme
court agreed that Allstate had a direct financial interest in the con-
tractual relationship between Waldroup and Lindman.689  The court
rejected Waldroup’s argument that Allstate’s interference was not
privileged because Allstate was exposed to potential loss by its of-
fer to defend Lindman in any collection action filed against her.690
In Wongittilin v. State,691 the supreme court held that the police
did not owe a duty to arrest a man on an outstanding warrant and,
therefore, were not liable in a civil tort action for the death caused
by the man after issuance of the warrant.692  An arrest warrant was
issued for Jackson after he violated his probation.  A police officer
subsequently met with Jackson but did not arrest him because he
believed the return flight to Nome from Savoonga was full.  Three
months later, Jackson struck and killed Wongittilin with his four-
wheeler.  On appeal from summary judgment for the State, the su-
preme court determined that the police had no duty to arrest Jack-
son on the outstanding warrant under statutes or case law.693  The
court concluded that A.S. 18.65.080 does not create a duty to arrest
on an outstanding warrant and only imposes a duty on the police to
assist other governmental departments but not a general duty to
protect the public.694  The court concluded that prior case law sug-
gested that no duty existed without a special relationship, and that
no such relationship existed without the police taking charge of the
dangerous party.695  Finding that no duty was created in statutes,
case law or public policy, the court held that the police had no duty
to arrest Jackson.
XII.  TRUSTS AND ESTATES
In Enders v. Parker,696 the supreme court upheld denial of at-
torney’s fees to Enders under A.S. 13.16.435, and to Parker under
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 82(b) and 79(b).697  In an action
challenging admission of her stepfather’s will into probate, Enders
689. Id. at 297-98.
690. Id. at 298.
691. 36 P.3d 678 (Alaska 2001).
692. Id. at 685.
693. Id. at 681.
694. Id. at 681-82.
695. Id. at 683-84.
696. 28 P.3d 280 (Alaska 2001).
697. Id. at 281-82.
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was unsuccessful in establishing undue influence by Parker, her
stepfather’s companion.  Enders appealed the denial of her claim
for attorney’s fees under section 13.16.435, which provides that in
order to receive attorney’s fees, a litigant must show that the pro-
bate proceeding was filed in good faith.  The supreme court held
that although the superior court did not expressly find that Enders
acted in bad faith, the language and tone of the opinion clearly
supported that conclusion, and the court found that Enders “failed
to act in the estate’s interest.”698  In addition, the court held that
Parker could not recover attorney’s fees under Rules 82(b) or
79(b) because the rules do not apply where a specific statutory
scheme for attorney’s fees exists.699
In Helgason v. Merriman,700 the supreme court affirmed the
decision to retain Merriman as the personal representative of Hel-
gason’s estate.701  Helgason’s will named Merriman as personal rep-
resentative, but Helgason’s sons, as heirs, sought Merriman’s re-
moval under A.S. 13.16.295, which provides for removal in the
estate’s best interests.  Helgason’s sons claimed that removal would
be in the estate’s best interests because of hostility and a conflict of
interest between Merriman and the sons.  The supreme court up-
held the finding that there was no conflict of interest because
Hegalson’s sons failed to raise a “real issue” of a conflict of interest
such that the personal representative would be potentially liable to
the estate because of the existence of some cause of action against
him.702  The court likewise upheld the conclusion that no evidence
of hostility existed between Merriman and the plaintiffs.703
Heather M. Bell*
698. Id. at 284.
699. Id. at 286.
700. 36 P.3d 703 (Alaska 2001).
701. Id. at 710.
702. Id. at 706, 709-10.
703. Id. at 710.
* The Editor wishes to thank Jennifer Tomsen, Erin Foley, David Kim and
the authors of The 2001 Year in Review: Erin Abood, Jason Bliss, Joseph Davies,
Tillman Finley, Matthew Kane, Kurt Lunkenheimer, David Miscia, Jaclyn Moyer,
Leah Russin, Emily Schilling, Joshua Simko, Jacquelyn Sumer and Jason Veloso.
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APPENDIX
CASES OMITTED FROM 2001 YEAR IN REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,704 the supreme
court held that the Board of Equalization’s failure to make sub-
stantial factual findings was harmless error when the reasoning be-
hind the Board’s decision was apparent.705  Alvarez appealed the
assessments of three parcels of land to the Board of Equalization,
arguing that the assessment for two parcels should have been based
on the best offer that she was able to obtain when they were on the
market and that the third assessment was based on incorrect fac-
tual findings made by the borough assessor.  The Board upheld the
assessments and Alvarez appealed, arguing that the Board did not
make factual findings sufficient to allow it to conduct judicial re-
view.  The supreme court pointed out that the standard for suffi-
ciency of a board’s findings of fact is “whether the record suffi-
ciently reflects the basis for the [board’s] decision so as to enable
meaningful judicial review.”706  The supreme court upheld the
Board’s ruling and found that the failure of the Board to make
findings of fact was harmless because the decision made clear how
the Board resolved the conflicting theories of the case and ad-
dressed all issues in dispute.707
In Anderson v. State, Department of Revenue,708 the supreme
court affirmed the denial of Anderson’s application for a perma-
nent fund dividend, finding sufficient evidence that Anderson
failed to overcome the presumption of non-residency and that the
Department did not misinterpret its own regulations.709  Although
Anderson left Alaska in 1991, he remained registered to vote, held
an Alaska driver’s license, owned no real property in another state,
and paid no residence taxes in his new location.  Between 1991 and
1997, Anderson and his family made three trips to Alaska, spend-
ing a total of seven days in the state.  In that same period, Ander-
son accumulated 205 days of personal leave time.  Anderson filed
704. 28 P.3d 935 (Alaska 2001).
705. Id. at 940.
706. Id.
707. Id. at 942.
708. 26 P.3d 1106 (Alaska 2001).
709. Id. at 1108.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
284 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:1
for a permanent fund dividend for 1997 but the Department denied
his application, finding that Anderson had not established resi-
dency.  In affirming the superior court, the supreme court noted
Anderson’s infrequent and short trips to Alaska, his choice to use
only a small percentage of his leave to visit Alaska, his inability to
control his residency due to a military career, his choice to vote ab-
sentee in Alaska only once, his decision to accept a transfer know-
ing it would weaken his chances of an Alaskan assignment and the
short duration of his adult residency in comparison to his ab-
sence.710  Although the evidence could also support a finding that
Anderson overcame the presumption of non-residency, the court
held that it is obligated to affirm the decision of the Department
when it chooses between two alternatives which are both supported
by substantial evidence.711  The court also found that in giving some
regulatory factors more weight than others, the Department did
not arbitrarily interpret its own regulation.712
In Baker v. University of Alaska,713 the supreme court held that
Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 604(b)(1)(B)(iv) grants courts
broad discretion to grant relief to appellants from the requirement
that they prepay the costs of preparing an administrative transcript
and record for appeal upon a showing of good cause.714  Baker, a
non-tenured professor, brought suit after the University of Alaska,
Fairbanks (“UAF”) gave him notice of non-retention and rejected
his grievance.  Baker prevailed in his suit, which was remanded to
UAF for the determination of damages, and then appealed UAF’s
denial of damages beyond lost salary, retirement, benefits and ex-
penses.  Baker sought an indigency exception to the requirement
that he prepay the costs of preparing the administrative record for
the appeal.  The superior court denied his motion and dismissed his
appeal for lack of prosecution.  The supreme court first pointed out
that Appellate Rule 604(b)(1)(B)(iv) does not restrict the court
from relaxing the advance payment requirement, and allows the
court to deviate from ordinary procedure upon a showing of good
cause.715  The court then concluded that Baker showed substantial
hardship considering his illegal termination, the fact that UAF’s
conduct had increased his litigation costs and attorney’s fees, his
710. Id. at 1110.
711. Id. at 1111.
712. Id. at 1112.
713. 22 P.3d 440 (Alaska 2001).
714. Id. at 442-43.
715. Id. at 442.
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existing debt and UAF’s ability as an employer to recover prepara-
tion costs in the future.716
In Brown v. State,717 the supreme court held that a hearing offi-
cer may not deny an in-person hearing in driver’s license revoca-
tion proceedings that involve issues of the licensee’s credibility.718
Arrested after a breath test showed his blood-alcohol level to be
above the legal limit, Brown declined an independent chemical test
of his blood and the arresting officer revoked his driver’s license.
Brown claimed that he declined the independent test only because
the handcuffs in which he had been placed were hurting him and he
sought an administrative hearing to review the revocation.  The
hearing officer denied Brown’s request that the hearing be held in
person and conducted a telephone hearing instead, ultimately up-
holding the revocation of Brown’s license.  The supreme court
ruled that because the case involved issues of fact as to whether
Brown waived his right to an independent blood test, Brown’s
credibility was at issue.719  Following its decision in Whitesides v.
State,720 the court ruled that when the licensee’s credibility is at is-
sue, the hearing officer may not deny a request for an in-person
hearing.721
In Edwardsen v. Department of Interior,722 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Mineral Management
Services’ (“MMS”) Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for
the Northstar oil and gas development project had “reasonably
documented” the project’s environmental impacts.723  BP Explora-
tion acquired the rights to federal and state leases for the Northstar
project and sought approval to begin producing oil by expanding
an artificial gravel island, drilling wells on federal portions of the
reservoir and constructing pipelines.  The Army Corps of Engi-
neers determined that the issuance of construction permits consti-
tuted a “major Federal action” under the National Environmental
Protection Act and required an EIS.  The MMS adopted the EIS
and later approved the Northstar development plan.  Six Alaska
Natives and Greenpeace sued, challenging the adequacy of the fi-
nal EIS.  The court held that the MMS took the required “hard
look” in the EIS at both the direct and indirect impacts of the proj-
716. Id. at 443.
717. 20 P.3d 586 (Alaska 2001).
718. Id. at 588.
719. Id.
720. 20 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2001).
721. Brown, 20 P.3d at 588.
722. 268 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2001).
723. Id. at 791.
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ect,724 and that the EIS analysis adequately considered the cumula-
tive impacts of the project, including impacts on lakes, rivers, wild-
life, air quality and wetlands.725  Therefore, the court declined to re-
view the approval of the project.
In Estate of Basargin v. State,726 the supreme court affirmed the
decision of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
(“CFEC”), which denied Basargin a commercial fisheries entry
permit.727  Basargin’s estate argued that Barsargin was denied
meaningful hearings and that the CFEC improperly denied Basar-
gin points for “unavoidable circumstances,” his vessel and gear
claims, and his economic dependence claims.  The supreme court
concluded that Basargin was given a meaningful opportunity to
present his case consistent with due process concerns.728  The court
also concluded that cultural barriers and Basargin’s English lan-
guage limitations did not entitle him to “unavoidable circum-
stances” points.729  The court determined that even if Basargin had
been granted the points he sought for his vessel and gear invest-
ments, he would not have accumulated enough points, and there-
fore, any miscalculation by the CFEC for this category was harm-
less error.730  Finally, the court found that substantial evidence
showed that Basargin was not entitled to economic dependence
points.731
In Leuthe v. State,732 the supreme court held that the denial of a
tardy application for a commercial fisheries entry permit was
proper where the applicant was unable to show that he had been
misadvised.733  Leuthe filed an application for an entry permit after
the deadline had passed.  The superior court affirmed the Com-
mercial Fisheries Entry Commission’s decision to deny his applica-
tion.   For consideration after the deadline, an applicant must es-
tablish that he had been misadvised about his eligibility for an
entry permit and must prove that he spoke to a fisheries agent be-
fore the deadline, that he received bad advice from the agent, and
724. Id. at 786 (quoting Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d
468, 473 (9th Cir. 2000)).
725. Id. at 789-90.
726. 31 P.3d 796 (Alaska 2001).
727. Id. at 797-98.
728. Id. at 797-800.
729. Id. at 797-98.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. 20 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
733. Id. at 548.
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that the bad advice caused him to miss the deadline.734  The su-
preme court affirmed the denial of Leuthe’s application because
Leuthe was unable to show that the advice he received was errone-
ous.735
In Lopez v. Public Employees’ Retirement System,736 the su-
preme court held that the Public Employees’ Retirement Board
(“Board”) was correct in finding that Lopez had not established
that “a condition or hazard undergone in the course of her em-
ployment was a substantial factor in causing her disability.”737  Lo-
pez was a resident aide at the State’s Harborview Developmental
Center, where she injured her back while lifting a resident.  Fol-
lowing the injury, Lopez never returned to work and she later ap-
plied for occupational disability benefits.  The Board denied Lopez
occupational benefits but awarded her non-occupational disability
benefits due to her inability to work as a resident aide and the lack
of alternate employment opportunities with Harborview.  The su-
preme court affirmed, holding that the Board applied the correct
legal standard in concluding that the sole cause of Lopez’ disability
was an arthritic hip and that the occupational injury to her back
was not a substantial factor in her disability.738
In Yoon v. Alaska Real Estate Commission,739 the supreme
court affirmed the decision of the Real Estate Commission against
Yoon for promissory fraud.740  Moore sought to purchase commer-
cial real estate and retained Yoon as her agent.  To induce Moore
to buy a mall with serious roof problems, Yoon promised to take
care of the roofing repairs at his own expense.  When Yoon billed
Moore for repairs totaling more than $20,000, Moore filed a claim
with the Alaska Real Estate Commission.  The Commission found
that Yoon had committed promissory fraud and awarded Moore
$10,000.  On appeal, the supreme court found substantial evidence
of the elements of promissory fraud: (1) a promise; (2) intention
not to keep the promise; (3) intention to induce reliance; (4) justifi-
able reliance; and (5) damages.741  Moore’s testimony showed that
Yoon had made oral promises and did not intend to keep those
promises because he later claimed that he never made any guaran-
734. Id. at 549.
735. Id. at 550-51.
736. 20 P.3d 568 (Alaska 2001).
737. Id. at 570.
738. Id. at 573.
739. 17 P.3d 779 (Alaska 2001).
740. Id. at 783.
741. Id. at 782.
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tees in writing.742  The evidence also showed that Yoon intended to
induce reliance on his promises because he was also acting as the
agent for the mall, he recommended an inspector with whom he
had previously worked, and agreed to act as property manager
without compensation.743  The court found Moore’s reliance on
Yoon’s promises to be justifiable because Moore was inexperi-
enced, she testified that the promises “led her to close” and she re-
ceived other assistance from Yoon in the course of buying the
mall.744
BUSINESS LAW
In Bennett v. Artus,745 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s judgment for costs of remodeling a condominium in favor
of Bennett, a client with whom Artus, a lawyer, had a romantic re-
lationship.746  During their relationship, Bennett and Artus remod-
eled a condominium that Bennett bought on Artus’ behalf and Ar-
tus performed other legal services for Bennett.  Bennett later sued
Artus, claiming he had defaulted on loans and failed to pay her for
the remodeling.  Artus counterclaimed for amounts Bennett alleg-
edly owed him for legal services and the remodeling.  The supreme
court held that the superior court did not clearly err in applying the
principle of unjust enrichment to credit Artus for the value of the
benefits conferred on Bennett during the condominium remodel-
ing.747  The court also held that it was not error to find that pay-
ments Bennett made to Artus were reimbursements for legal serv-
ices, rather than loans Artus was obligated to repay,748 and that
Artus was entitled under unjust enrichment to keep these
amounts.749
In Garrison v. Dixon,750 the supreme court upheld an award of
attorney’s fees and costs after an unfair trade practice action was
prosecuted in bad faith in order to gain an advantage over a busi-
ness competitor.751  The Garrisons filed suit against Dixon, a real
estate agent working for a competitor, under the Alaska Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act in response to sev-
742. Id. at 782-83.
743. Id. at 783.
744. Id.
745. 20 P.3d 560 (Alaska 2001).
746. Id. at 561.
747. Id. at 563-65.
748. Id. at 566.
749. Id. at 566-67.
750. 19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001).
751. Id. at 1230.
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eral ads in which Dixon referred to herself as a “buyer’s agent” and
warned of the differences between a buyer’s agent and a buyer’s
agency.  The Garrisons moved to dismiss their individual claims af-
ter two and a half years of pretrial motions because they “were
never real parties in interest;” the trial court granted the motion,
awarding final judgment to Dixon, and later granted summary
judgment to Dixon on the remaining claims.  The supreme court
rejected the Garrisons’ argument that the trial court erred in en-
tering final judgment against them before the final resolution of the
other claims because their argument was moot.752  The court upheld
the award of attorney’s fees against the Garrisons, although it dis-
agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that an award of attorney’s
fees depends on the number of non-prevailing parties.753  However,
because the Garrisons filed their claim in bad faith and pursued it
for two and a half years before filing a motion to dismiss, and be-
cause an award of reasonable attorney’s fees was appropriate un-
der the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the court affirmed the decision
to enhance the attorney’s fees awarded against the Garrisons.754
In Krossa v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc.,755 the supreme court
held that an independent contractor ratified an invalid contract af-
ter he learned the meaning of the contractual terms, failed to act
thereafter, and signed onto a new term under the same agree-
ment.756  As part of an initial deal with a Russian company, All
Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. (“AAS”) developed an unusual and com-
plicated formula for paying its crab catcher vessel crews.  AAS ex-
plained its payment system verbally, but failed to ensure that all
individual contractors understood the formula.  Krossa was hired
later in the season and the compensation system was not ade-
quately explained to him.  However, after the first crab delivery,
Krossa learned the meaning of AAS’s terms, continued with the
trip and later signed on for a second term under the same contract.
Krossa later sued for breach of the first contract.  On appeal, the
supreme court held that although the written agreement Krossa
signed did not constitute a valid contract because the plain lan-
guage was ambiguous and the parties understood the agreement
differently, the parties formed a valid contract when Krossa
learned of and implicitly accepted the terms.757  The court reasoned
that if a party “knows or has reason to know” of the mistake, and
752. Id. at 1232.
753. Id. at 1233.
754. Id. at 1233-34.
755. 32 P.3d 398 (Alaska 2001).
756. Id. at 406.
757. Id. at 405-06.
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he manifests to the other party an intention to affirm, then the
party loses the ability to avoid the contract.758
In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc.,759 the supreme court held that
proxy solicitation statements made by candidates for Koniag’s
board of directors were materially false as a matter of law and af-
firmed summary judgment for Koniag.760  The Meidinger slate
sought election to Koniag’s board of directors and solicited proxies
urging voters to reject a proposition that would allegedly grant the
current board members “irrevocable delegation” and the ability to
appoint themselves as trustees to a new settlement trust.  Koniag
sued, alleging that the proxy statements were false and misleading.
The supreme court found the false statements of the proxy state-
ments to be material as a matter of law because the misrepresenta-
tions were so obviously important to an investor that reasonable
minds could not differ on the question of materiality.761
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Bartek v. State, Department of Natural Resources,762 the su-
preme court held that lower courts can determine that no eviden-
tiary hearing or discovery is required before deciding on class certi-
fication.763  A group of landowners brought suit against the State
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Forestry (“For-
estry”) for negligent firefighting after a fire caused damage to their
property.  The action was later converted into a class action.  The
supreme court held that the superior court has the discretion to de-
termine whether an evidentiary hearing or discovery is necessary to
resolve factual disputes before it grants class certification.764  How-
ever, the court remanded the case to determine whether the two
sets of requirements for certification were met.765
In Bradley v. Bradley,766 the supreme court reaffirmed the es-
tablished rule that executions may not issue on partial judgments
until they become final.767  Bradley appealed the issuance of writs of
execution on a money judgment entered against him because all
the claims and counterclaims had not yet been adjudicated.  The
758. Id.
759. 31 P.3d 77 (Alaska 2001).
760. Id. at 81.
761. Id. at 83-84.
762. 31 P.3d 100 (Alaska 2001).
763. Id. at 101.
764. Id. at 103.
765. Id. at 104; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23.
766. 32 P.3d 372 (Alaska 2001).
767. Id.
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court found that the judgment was not final and had not been certi-
fied pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and, there-
fore, execution could not ensue.768
In Gamble v. Northshore Partnership,769 the supreme court
held that because Northshore’s defense of an action to reform an
easement could be regarded as an enforcement action, the provi-
sion in the easement regarding attorney’s fees in enforcement ac-
tions was applicable.770  The Gambles requested reformation of a
recorded easement, which was denied by the trial court.  The
easement contained a provision that granted the prevailing party in
a suit to enforce the easement reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
The supreme court held that the fact that Northshore’s defense
could have been expressed as a counterclaim demonstrated that
there is slight difference between a suit and a defense to a suit.771
As a result, Northshore’s defense came within the easement
agreement provisions, and Northshore, as the prevailing party, was
entitled to full attorney’s fees.772
In Hebert v. Honest Bingo,773 the supreme court held that He-
bert’s pleadings in her personal injury lawsuit raised triable issues
of fact as to whether an amended complaint related back to a
timely initial complaint.774  Hebert was struck on the head by a fal-
ling bingo box at a bingo hall operated by Honest Bingo.  Hebert
filed suit against Honest Bingo one day before the applicable stat-
ute of limitations ran out and named four “John Doe” defendants
because she did not know the exact structure of the bingo opera-
tion.  Ten months later, Hebert learned that Fairbanks Drama As-
sociation (“FDA”) was one of the three business entities that com-
prise Honest Bingo and added FDA to the complaint. FDA
refused participate in settlement negotiations and ultimately filed a
successful motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that
Hebert’s amended complaint was barred by the statute of limita-
tions.  The court held that because factual questions existed as to
whether Hebert’s amended complaint related back to the initial
timely complaint filed against Honest Bingo, FDA was not entitled
to judgment on the pleadings.775
768. Id.
769. 28 P.3d 286 (Alaska 2001).
770. Id. at 289.
771. Id.
772. Id. at 289-90.
773. 18 P.3d 43 (Alaska 2001).
774. Id. at 45.
775. Id. at 49.
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In Johnson v. State,776 the court of appeals held that an attor-
ney representing an indigent defendant whose claims on appeal
were allegedly frivolous could not withdraw without providing
adequate arguments supporting his allegations.777  When the Office
of Public Advocacy filed an appeal on Johnson’s behalf, Johnson’s
attorney sought permission to withdraw due to the frivolous nature
of the issues on appeal.  The supreme court concluded that an at-
torney representing an indigent defendant may not withdraw un-
less there is a reasonable assurance that the appeal presents only
frivolous issues as determined by the both the attorney and the
court.778  Therefore, the court ordered the attorney to submit an
amended brief which adequately presented the frivolous issues
within forty-five days so that the court could discharge its duty of
verifying the arguments.779
In Kellis v. Crites,780 the supreme court held that an award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and
A.S. 09.30.065 applies only from the date when an offer of judge-
ment is made.781  After Crites, a defendant in a personal injury ac-
tion, made a $250 pretrial offer that was rejected by Kellis, the jury
returned a verdict in Crites’ favor.  The trial court subsequently
awarded Crites full attorney’s fees and costs, even though Crites
asked for only seventy five percent of attorney’s fees.  The supreme
court vacated the attorney’s fees award and remanded for recalcu-
lation because the award violated A.S. 09.30.065(a), which provides
that the offeree shall pay 75 percent of the offeror’s reasonable at-
torneys fees if the offer was made no later than 60 days after the
disclosures required by the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.782  In
addition, because the cost bill was ambiguous, the court vacated
and remanded the costs so that the cost bill and Kellis’ objections
to the bill could be considered by the clerk of court.783
In McDowell v. State,784 the supreme court upheld the dismissal
of an action against the State for trespass under the doctrine of res
judicata because the court had previously dismissed a trespass
claim arising from the same event.785  The McDowells sued the
776. 24 P.3d 1267 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
777. Id. at 1268.
778. Id. at 1267.
779. Id. at 1268.
780. 20 P.3d 1112 (Alaska 2001).
781. Id. at 1114.
782. Id. at 1115.
783. Id.
784. 23 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2001).
785. Id.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
2002] YEAR IN REVIEW 293
State in 1993, alleging trespass, negligence and nuisance resulting
from petroleum contamination on their property.  The superior
court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing
the negligence, nuisance and trespass claims under the doctrine of
discretionary immunity.  The McDowells filed a new complaint in
1998, alleging that the state had failed to clean up the contamina-
tion.  The second complaint was based on a theory of landowner
liability, which the McDowells had not advanced in their original
opposition to the State’s summary judgment motion because the
McDowells’ original complaint treated the State as a regulatory
agency rather than as a landowner.  The supreme court upheld the
lower court’s dismissal of the new complaint under the doctrine of
res judicata because the McDowells’ second complaint arose out of
the same set of operative facts as their first complaint, and that
theory should have been advanced as part of the first action.786
In MAPCO Express, Inc. v. Faulk,787 the supreme court af-
firmed the superior court’s finding of liability on a trespass claim,
but reversed and remanded the award of compensatory and puni-
tive damages because portions of the compensatory damages were
clearly erroneous and the award of punitive damages required fur-
ther consideration and findings.788  The superior court held
MAPCO liable for trespass for snow melt that ran onto and dam-
aged Faulk’s property and the supreme court affirmed.789  However,
because some of Faulk’s costs may have included double billing,
the court remanded the award of compensatory damages for fur-
ther clarification.790  Finally, because the trial court’s award of puni-
tive damages was not based on a finding supported by evidence in
the record, and because the trial court increased the amount of pu-
nitive damages without explanation, the supreme court reversed
and remanded the award of punitive damages for further consid-
eration and findings.791
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Anderson,792 the supreme
court held that an award of attorney’s fees was a non-final order
entered by an intermediate court of appeal and was not subject to
appeal under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 202.793  Ander-
son was injured on the job and did not attend an employer re-
786. Id. at 1166-67.
787. 24 P.3d 531 (Alaska 2001).
788. Id. at 547.
789. Id. at 537.
790. Id. at 544.
791. Id. at 547.
792. 37 P.3d 420 (Alaska 2001).
793. Id. at 420-21.
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quested physical capacity exam because he erroneously believed
that he was not required to attend the exam if it was not conducted
by a physician.  As a result, he was denied benefits by the Workers’
Compensation Board.  The superior court concluded that an em-
ployer can require an employee to take the examination with a
non-physician specialist, but that Anderson’s failure to comply did
not constitute a “refusal to submit” because the statute was am-
biguous as to the requirement.  Therefore, the superior court
awarded Anderson attorney’s fees and costs, and remanded the
matter for further proceedings.  The supreme court dismissed the
Municipality’s appeal as improper because the attorney’s fee award
was part of a case that was remanded to the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board and, therefore, was a non-final order that could not be
appealed.794
In Sengupta v. University of Alaska,795 the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err in granting summary judgment
for the University of Alaska.796  Sengupta, a professor at the Uni-
versity of Alaska, Fairbanks, was terminated after he brought
grievances against the University.  Sengupta filed a complaint
against the University alleging that his free speech, due process and
equal protection rights had been violated.  He also alleged that his
right to be free from employment discrimination had been violated.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the superior court had ap-
plied the proper standards of review and did not err in granting
summary judgment against Sengupta, denying Sengupta’s motion
for reconsideration, and awarding the University of Alaska, Fair-
banks attorney’s fees.797
In Ulmer v. Alaska Restaurant & Beverage Ass’n,798 the su-
preme court dismissed as moot lieutenant governor Ulmer’s appeal
from the superior court’s ruling that an initiative petition was de-
fective.799  In 1999, Ulmer certified and prepared an initiative peti-
tion to increase the statutory excise tax on various alcoholic bever-
ages.  The Alaska Restaurant & Beverage Association challenged
the petition, claiming it was unconstitutional and defective because
it did not include the amount of the tax increase and that it implied
that the tax increase covered a group not included in the statute.
The superior court ruled that the petition was constitutional, but
that the failure to include the amount of the increase made it defec-
794. Id. at 421.
795. 21 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2001).
796. Id. at 1248.
797. Id. at 1254-55, 1257, 1259, 1260, 1262.
798. 33 P.3d 773 (Alaska 2001).
799. Id. at 774.
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tive.  The sponsors of the initiative then failed to file the petition
with the lieutenant governor in a timely fashion, effectively killing
the initiative.  Nevertheless, Ulmer appealed the decision of the
superior court.  The supreme court determined that the question
presented on appeal was moot because the initiative was dead,
there was no further controversy and there was no relief available
to the State even if it prevailed.800  Although Ulmer argued that if
the State prevailed, it might be able to collect attorney’s fees, the
court pointed out that the State never asked for such fees so it
could not argue that it may have a right to such fees.801  The su-
preme court also declined to apply the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine, reasoning that a decision would not have
any doctrinal value and that any future similar questions could be
handled in a timely fashion so as to not hinder the election proc-
ess.802
In Zok v. Collins,803 the supreme court held that the superior
court improperly granted summary judgment against Zok as to his
malpractice claims which did not require the testimony of an expert
witness.804  Zok sued Collins, his former attorney, for malpractice.
The superior court denied Zok’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment because expert witnesses were required to prove malpractice
and Zok had not offered any expert testimony.  The supreme court
held that Collins was entitled to summary judgment only for those
claims that required expert testimony, but that some of Zok’s
claims were clear enough for the jury to understand and did not re-
quire expert testimony and, therefore, as to those claims, summary
judgment was inappropriate.805
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Brandon v. Corrections Corp. of America,806 the supreme
court held that the prisoner filing fee statute is constitutional and
that the superior court properly denied Brandon’s motion to waive
the filing fee, but erred in dismissing Brandon’s claim.807  Brandon,
a state prisoner, sued to recover surcharges applied to his commis-
sary purchases.  He requested a filing fee exemption and submitted
a motion to waive the filing fee.  Although it did not specifically
800. Id. at 776.
801. Id. at 777.
802. Id. at 777-79.
803. 18 P.3d 39 (Alaska 2001).
804. Id. at 40.
805. Id. at 42-43.
806. 28 P.3d 269 (Alaska 2001).
807. Id. at 271.
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rule on the motion to waive the fee, the superior court ordered
Brandon to pay a reduced fee.  After Brandon received an exten-
sion to pay the fee, his case was dismissed for failing to pay the fee
before the extension expired.  Brandon appealed, claiming that the
court erred in dismissing his case, that the filing fee should have
been waived entirely and that the prisoner filing fee statute is un-
constitutional.  The supreme court held that the prisoner filing fee
statute is constitutional, even though it sometimes requires indigent
prisoners to pay a filing fee, because indigent prisoners and indi-
gent non-prisoners are in fundamentally different situations be-
cause the State completely supports a prisoner’s basic needs.808  Al-
though the court held that Brandon’s case was prematurely
dismissed, it concluded that the reduction of the filing fee was an
implicit denial of Brandon’s motion to waive the filing fee entirely
and that the superior court did not err in denying the motion.809
In Brause v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,810
the supreme court held that a declaratory judgment claim by a
same-sex couple denied benefits available to married couples was
not ripe for adjudication.811  Brause and Dugan challenged the
State’s refusal to grant them a marriage license and the state and
federal constitutionality of A.S. 25.05.013(b), which provides that a
“same-sex-relationship may not be recognized by the state as being
entitled to the benefits of marriage.”812  The adoption of article I,
section 25 of the Alaska Constitution mooted the complaint with
respect to the State’s refusal to grant them a marriage license be-
cause as a matter of constitutional law “a marriage may exist only
between one man and one woman.”813  On appeal, the supreme
court held that Brause and Dugan failed to assert that they had
been, or will be, denied rights that are available to married part-
ners.814  The court noted that the claim was a case of first impres-
sion in Alaska and cautioned that ruling on the constitutionality of
a statute before the issues are concretely framed increases the risk
of erroneous decisions.815
808. Id. at 276.
809. Id. at 274.
810. 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001).
811. Id. at 357-58.
812. Id. at 358.
813. Id.
814. Id. at 360.
815. Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW
In Avila v. State,816 the court of appeals affirmed Avila’s con-
viction for attempted second-degree controlled substance miscon-
duct but vacated his conviction for solicitation of second-degree
controlled substance misconduct.817 Avila, a prisoner, was the target
of a police “sting” operation attempting to catch him distributing
heroin within the prison.  The police used another inmate who
owed Avila money as an informant in the operation.  The infor-
mant arranged for a police officer posing as his friend on the out-
side to provide Avila’s girlfriend with money in return for dis-
charging his debt, with the understanding that the girlfriend would
use the money to purchase heroin and deliver it to Avila.  The
“sting” operation ended when Avila’s girlfriend refused to deliver
the drugs to the prison, and Avila was arrested and convicted of the
charges in question.  The court of appeals found that there was
enough evidence to allow a reasonable person to believe that Avila
intended to deliver at least some portion of the heroin to another
person.818  Avila argued that he could not be convicted of the at-
tempt charge because his only actions were telephone calls, which
were nothing more than solicitations for the delivery of heroin for
personal use.  The court of appeals noted that Avila could be con-
victed of attempt if either he or his girlfriend took a “substantial
step” toward the commission of the intended crime.819  The court
then decided that the girlfriend’s search for a heroin supplier
amounted to such a “substantial step.”820  Finally, Avila argued that
his two convictions must merge because they are based on “con-
duct designed to . . . culminate in [the] commission of the same
crime.”821  The court of appeals agreed, and directed the superior
court to vacate his conviction for solicitation.822
In Baker v. State,823 the court of appeals held that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Baker of interference
with official proceedings and first-degree witness tampering and
that the trial judge did not commit plain error when he failed to in-
struct the jury on the meaning of the word “threaten.”824  Baker was
violating his probation by sitting in a car with a handgun inside
816. 22 P.3d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
817. Id. at 895.
818. Id. at 892.
819. Id. at 893.
820. Id. at 894.
821. Id.  (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.140(b) Michie (2000)).
822. Id.
823. 22 P.3d 493 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
824. Id. at 497-98.
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when a police officer drove by and noticed him.  Baker encouraged
his passenger, Nesmith, to tell the police that she had been driving
the car.  Instead, Nesmith told the police about Baker’s request and
the presence of the gun.  Following the incident, Baker repeatedly
telephoned Nesmith asking her what she had told the authorities
and what she was going to tell them, and urged her to say that he
had not been driving the car.  Baker also implied that he was sur-
veiling her home by telling her what she was doing at an exact mo-
ment.  The court of appeals upheld Baker’s conviction because
A.S. 11.81.900(b)(60) broadly defines “threat” to include any men-
ace, no matter how it may be communicated, and not merely ex-
press manifestations of intent to harm another.825  The court rea-
soned that a jury could reasonably find that Baker intended the
calls, surveillance and statement at the scene to communicate a
“threat” to Nesmith.826  The court found that the trial judge did not
commit clear error by not instructing the jury on the definition of
“threaten” because there was no reasonable probability that the
jury made its determination based on a faulty theory.827
In Baum v. State,828 the court of appeals held that the forfeiture
of an airplane worth $40,000 for a big-game guiding offense did not
violate the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.829  Baum was convicted of possessing and trans-
porting unlawfully taken game and, as part of his sentence, he was
forced to forfeit the plane used in the hunt.  The plane belonged to
Baum’s brother, Raymond, who asked the court for a remission of
the forfeiture because he had nothing to do with his brother’s viola-
tion.  Although Raymond valued the plane at $40,000, the court of
appeals found that the fine was not excessive because the amount
of the fine was within the penalty for a second or subsequent of-
fense under Alaska law.830  The court also upheld the denial of
Raymond’s request for remission of the forfeiture because the rec-
ord clearly supported the finding that Raymond was not an inno-
cent and negligent owner of the plane.831
In Brockway v. State,832 the court of appeals held that Brock-
way could not collaterally attack a prior conviction as part of the
sentencing proceedings in his present case but “must pursue a peti-
825. Id. at 497.
826. Id.
827. Id. at 498.
828. 24 P.3d 577 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
829. Id. at 582.
830. Id. at 579-80.
831. Id. at 580-81.
832. 37 P.3d 427 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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tion for post-conviction relief” because he did not claim he was
completely deprived of counsel. 833  Three years after Brockway
pled no contest to third-degree assault, he was arrested again and
pled no contest to third-degree weapons misconduct.  Brockway
reached a plea agreement for a composite sentence of no more
than three years and was sentenced to a term of thirty-two months.
On appeal, Brockway claimed that his prior convictions were erro-
neous because the trial court did not comply with Rule 11 of the
Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure and that his sentence was ex-
cessive.  The court of appeals held that a defendant can collaterally
attack a prior conviction only if he “was completely denied the
right to counsel in the prior proceeding.”834  Therefore, Brockway
could not challenge his prior convictions in the current proceeding
because he did not claim to be deprived of counsel.  In addition,
the court referred Brockway’s claim of excessiveness to the su-
preme court because the sentence imposed was consistent with the
plea agreement and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.835
In Edwards v. State,836 the court of appeals held that Edwards
did not violate his probation, which restricted him from living with
females under sixteen years of age, by spending time with eight-
year old daughter, and upheld a modification of the terms of his
probation.837  Evidence showed Edwards spent a substantial
amount of unsupervised time one evening with his daughter at his
ex-wife’s residence.  Edwards later lied and attempted to induce his
children to conceal his conduct.  The court of appeals held that
Edwards’ conduct did not constitute “living with” his ex-wife and
daughter at that residence and did not violate the probation or-
der.838  However, the court upheld the superior court’s modification
of Edwards’ probation, which imposed stricter limitations on his
contact with minors, because Edwards’ unsupervised contact with
his daughter, his perjury and his attempts to induce his children to
conceal his conduct were significant reasons to amend the condi-
tions of his probation.839
In Fine v. State,840 the court of appeals vacated Fine’s compos-
ite sentence of nine years imprisonment for criminally negligent
homicide, assault in the third degree and driving while intoxi-
833. Id. at 429-30.
834. Id.
835. Id. at 430-31.
836. 34 P.3d 962 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
837. Id. at 970.
838. Id. at 964.
839. Id. at 969.
840. 22 P.3d 20 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
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cated.841  The court also vacated the lower court’s decision to re-
voke Fine’s driver’s license for life.842  In order to impose a sentence
greater than the statutory maximum of five years and to revoke
Fine’s driver’s license for life, the lower court must have found that
the greater sentence and lifetime revocation of his driver’s license
were necessary to protect the public.843  The court of appeals con-
cluded that Fine’s sentence was not necessary to protect the public
and was therefore excessive because the record did not support the
trial judge’s conclusion that Fine was a chronic alcohol abuser and
because Fine did not have a prior history of driving while intoxi-
cated.844
In Haynes v. State,845 the court of appeals held that Alaska
courts have the authority to award restitution to the State for “drug
buy money” as part of Haynes’ sentence.846  The court held that the
State is a “victim or other person injured by the offense” within the
meaning of A.S. 12.55.015(a)(5) and 12.55.045(a) and, therefore,
may be awarded restitution for the money used by an undercover
officer to buy drugs.847  The court relied primarily on the Alaska
Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzales v. State,848 that the State was
an “aggrieved party” under A.S. 12.55.100(a)(2) and could be
awarded restitution for drug buy money as a condition of proba-
tion.849
In Heaps v. State,850 the court of appeals affirmed Heaps’ con-
victions of first-degree and fourth-degree assault.851  Heaps had as-
saulted Stevens, with whom he lived, while he was awaiting trial for
misdemeanor assault stemming from a previous altercation with
Stevens.  On appeal, Heaps argued that the trial court erred by ex-
cluding evidence showing Stevens’ propensity for violence, refusing
to instruct the jury on a potential justification for the previous as-
sault and failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on potential lesser
included offenses.  The court of appeals first held the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in restricting Heaps’ direct examination and
admitting only two photographs of a prior incident where Stevens
841. Id. at 24.
842. Id.
843. Id. at 22.
844. Id. at 23-24.
845. 15 P.3d 1088 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
846. Id. at 1091.
847. Id.
848. 608 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980).
849. Haynes, 15 P.3d at 1090-91.
850. 30 P.3d 109 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
851. Id. at 117.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
2002] YEAR IN REVIEW 301
had wrecked their house.852  The court of appeals reasoned that
even when evidence of a victim’s character or past bad acts is rele-
vant, the trial judge can limit the amount of evidence introduced as
long as the substance of the defendant’s claim is communicated to
the jury.853  Second, the court of appeals held the trial court rea-
sonably declined to include Heaps’ proposed jury instruction in-
forming the jury that although Heaps was not on trial for the pre-
vious assault, he had a potential justification of self-defense of
property for that assault.854  Lastly, the court of appeals held that
reasonable judges could differ on whether Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30(b) obligated judges to instruct the jury on lesser in-
cluded offenses in the absence of a request from either party and,
therefore, the trial court did not err in omitting such an instruc-
tion.855
In Hunt v. State,856 the court of appeals held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear a sentencing appeal unless the sentence ex-
ceeded two years.857  Hunt pled no contest to fourth-degree con-
trolled substance misconduct, a class C felony, and was sentenced
to a presumptive term of two years imprisonment because he had a
prior felony conviction.  Hunt appealed, arguing that the trial court
should have adjusted his sentence downward because the trial
judge found a mitigating factor in that Hunt’s offense involved a
small quantity of the controlled substance.  The court of appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because A.S.
12.55.120(a) allows felony offenders to appeal sentences only if the
sentence involved a term or aggregate terms exceeding two years
of unsuspended incarceration.858
In Lewandowski v. State,859 the court of appeals affirmed the
superior court’s finding that Lewandowski’s crime of first-degree
robbery did not qualify for a mitigating sentencing factor.860  Le-
wandowski was convicted of first-degree robbery for robbing a gro-
cery store with an accomplice while armed with a pellet gun.  For
first-time felons convicted of such a class A felony, there is a pre-
sumptive prison sentence of five years.  Lewandowski proposed as
a mitigating factor that his conduct was among the least serious
852. Id. at 111.
853. Id. at 112.
854. Id. at 113.
855. Id. at 116.
856. 18 P.3d 69 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
857. Id. at 70.
858. Id.
859. 18 P.3d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
860. Id. at 1223.
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conduct included in the offense, emphasizing his youth, the inoper-
ability of his gun and the fact that his accomplice was the only one
hurt in the offense.  The superior court judge rejected the mitigat-
ing factor, concluding Lewandowski’s offense was not among the
least serious offenses because he had acted with an accomplice
rather than alone, they had planned the robbery and armed them-
selves with the pellet gun and knives and there was a scuffle in the
course of the robbery.  The court of appeals found that the judge
did not clearly err in rejecting the mitigating factor and upheld the
ruling, because although the facts of the case could support a “least
serious finding,” the conclusions were supported by the record.861
In McGill v. State,862 the court of appeals affirmed McGill’s
conviction for first-degree sexual assault, holding that the lower
court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence showing
McGill’s prior bad acts and did not commit plain error when it gave
a jury instruction that consent to sexual penetration could be with-
drawn after initial penetration.863  At McGill’s trial, evidence relat-
ing to his prior sexual assault on his girlfriend was admitted.  The
court of appeals affirmed use of this evidence because Alaska Rule
of Evidence 404(b)(3) permits such evidence where the defendant’s
defense is that the alleged victim consented.864  Second, the court of
appeals upheld the jury instruction that even if consent was given
with respect to the initial sexual penetration, the victim could sub-
sequently withdraw consent.865  The court found that giving the in-
struction was not plain error because the three cases relied on by
McGill were not persuasive nor well-reasoned and because
Alaska’s first-degree sexual assault statute was broad in the con-
duct it proscribed.866
In Macsurak v. Municipality of Anchorage,867 the court of ap-
peals held that police officers properly relied on the statements of
an apartment manager that Macsurak was intoxicated and tres-
passing when they entered his apartment.868  The police were called
to an apartment complex to investigate a complaint of a drunk and
disorderly person.  When they arrived, the apartment manager in-
formed the police that Macsurak had been evicted and returned to
the apartment for unknown reasons.  Upon approaching the
861. Id.
862. 18 P.3d 77 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
863. Id. at 80.
864. Id.
865. Id. at 82.
866. Id. at 84 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (Michie 2000)).
867. 16 P.3d 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
868. Id. at 754.
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apartment, which was empty and had a pickup truck parked out
front packed with personal belongings, the officers heard noises
coming from inside.  The supreme court determined that the offi-
cers legally entered the apartment if they reasonably believed that
the defendant had no right to occupy the premises.869  The court
then held that the officers could rely on the statement of the
apartment manager that the defendant had been evicted, as well as
their observations about the apartment and truck, and therefore
they reasonably concluded that the defendant had been recently
evicted and was now trespassing.870
In Malutin v. State,871 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Rule of Appellate Procedure 209(b)(5) should be construed to
mean that “only defendants who succeed in having their convic-
tions reversed are exempt from paying attorney’s fees.”872  Malutin
was convicted of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.
Malutin did not challenge his conviction, but attacked the decision
requiring him to pay restitution to the victim.  He also argued that
all information relating to his prior court-ordered psychological
evaluation should have been excised from the pre-sentence report.
Malutin prevailed on both points and objected to the judgment
against him of attorney’s fees, arguing that Rule 209(b)(5) exempts
those who win an issue on appeal, even if the conviction is not re-
versed.  The court of appeals disagreed with Malutin, because the
plain language of Rule 209(b)(5) directs the clerk to enter judg-
ment for attorney’s fees “unless the defendant’s conviction was re-
versed by the appellate court” and “[d]espite Malutin’s victory on
appeal, he remain[ed] convicted.”873
In Miller v. State,874 the court of appeals held that Miller could
not be convicted on the basis of statements he made to the police
that were induced by an implied promise that he would not be
prosecuted for accidentally starting a fire.875  A vacant warehouse,
where Miller had been residing without permission, burned and
was extensively damaged, and a witness placed him there at the
time of the fire.  Although the police had questioned Miller freely
before, they did not inform him that he was free to go when they
questioned him a second time.  After being told that if he had
started the fire by accident it “was not that big a thing” and it
869. Id.
870. Id. at 755.
871. 27 P.3d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
872. Id. at 793.
873. Id.
874. 18 P.3d 696 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
875. Id. at 701.
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would be “an over and done deal,” Miller admitted that he had set
fire to a block of insulation but thought he had fully extinguished it.
Miller was then arrested for arson.  The statements Miller made
prior to his arrest were admitted at trial, and he was convicted.
The court of appeals held that the statements were involuntary and
therefore inadmissible because, due to the charges presented, a
jury could have reasonably found him to be at fault based on his
account.876  As a result, Miller’s conviction was overturned.877
In Moses v. State,878 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s ruling that A.S. 12.25.150(b) was not violated, that the State
was not collaterally estopped from asserting that it had complied
with the statute, that police are not required to videotape breath
test refusals and that Moses waived his right to an independent
test.879  An Alaska State trooper stopped Moses’ vehicle and ar-
rested him for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).  The trooper al-
lowed Moses to call his wife from the scene before transporting
him to the police station.  Upon his arrival at the police station,
Moses said he wanted to call his wife again but gave no indication
that he wanted his wife to call an attorney.  Moses then refused to
provide a breath sample, and his refusal was audiotaped but not
videotaped.  The court found that because Moses had an opportu-
nity to make a phone call to his wife after his arrest and prior to
taking the breath test, there was no violation of section
12.25.150(b), which allows a prisoner to call an attorney, relative or
friend.880  The court also held that collateral estoppel did not apply
in this case because the issue before the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles hearing officer—whether to revoke Moses’ license for re-
fusing a breath test—was not identical to the issue before the dis-
trict court—whether the statute had been violated.881  Furthermore,
the issue was never actually litigated at the license revocation
hearing, a requirement for collateral estoppel.882  The court held
that police have no duty to videotape DWI processing and that
Moses did not provide any concrete explanation as to how a video-
tape would have aided him.883  Finally, the court concluded that
876. Id.
877. Id.
878. 32 P.3d 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
879. Id. at 1081-82.
880. Id. at 1081 (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) (Michie 2000)).
881. Id. at 1082.
882. Id.
883. Id.
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Moses’ testimony proved that he made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his right to obtain an independent breath test.884
In Peters v. State,885 the court of appeals held that admitting
into evidence a DNA profile match absent “evidence that properly
interprets the significance” of the match was erroneous because it
was potentially misleading.886  While prosecuting Peters for sexual
assault, the State introduced evidence of a match between the
DNA profile of skin cells found under Peters’ fingernails and the
DNA profile of the victim.  However, there was no evidence of the
likelihood of the randomness of such a match.  Because the jury
might have been misled regarding the weight and significance of
the match, the court concluded that it was error to admit the match
into evidence, but that the error was harmless.887  First, the court
determined that the jury was properly instructed regarding the
weight of the DNA profile match absent interpretive evidence.888
Second, the court found that the match was not particularly proba-
tive in this case because the identity of the defendant was undis-
puted and the existence of the victim’s skin cells under Peters’ fin-
gernails could be explained through actions other than sexual
assault.889  Finally, the court noted that the State’s other evidence
was strong.890
In State v. Brueggeman,891 the court of appeals expressed its
disapproval of the lenient sentence given to Brueggeman by the
superior court.892  Brueggeman engaged in multiple acts of fraud
and perjury, including inducing a mentally challenged friend to
pose as him for a DNA test in order to avoid paying child support.
The superior court found Brueggeman guilty of the class B felony
of perjury, his first felonious offense, and sentenced him to only
500 hours of community service under the sentencing guidelines set
forth in State v. Jackson.893  The court of appeals disagreed with the
lower court’s application of these sentencing guidelines.894  Under
the Jackson guidelines, Brueggeman’s suspended sentence with no
jail time was a “probationary” sentence that can be imposed only if
884. Id.
885. 18 P.3d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
886. Id. at 1225, 1227.




891. 24 P.3d 583 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
892. Id. at 584.
893. 776 P.2d 320, 326-27 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
894. Brueggeman, 24 P.3d at 587.
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“Brueggeman’s case was ‘significantly mitigated in terms of both
the offender and the offense.’”895  Although reluctantly accepting
the lower court judge’s characterization of Brueggeman as a miti-
gated offender, the court of appeals found that the judge did not
find the offense to be significantly mitigated.896  The court of ap-
peals affirmed the sentencing guidelines of Jackson and found that
Brueggeman’s probationary sentence conflicted with those guide-
lines.897  However, because the defendant did not appeal the sen-
tence as too excessive, the court of appeals was not authorized to
increase the sentence.898
In State v. Martin,899 the court of appeals certified the question
to the Alaska Supreme Court: “What is the relationship between
the supreme court’s jurisdiction and the trial court’s jurisdiction
when an untimely petition for hearing is accepted for filing, or
when such a petition is later granted?”900  In 1982, Martin received
a suspended sentence for charges of incest, for which he later com-
pleted probation and had the conviction set aside.  In 1998, a regu-
lation was passed that redefined “sex offenders” to include those
whose convictions had been set aside, such as Martin.  Martin was
then charged with failure to register as a sex offender in two previ-
ous years.  The court of appeals reversed the district court’s dis-
missal and reinstated charges against Martin.  On July 20, 2001, the
supreme court agreed to hear Martin’s case.  The State appealed
the district court’s decision but then wished to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that the district court’s decision was void because, since the
supreme court granted hearing, the district court retroactively lost
its jurisdiction.901  The court certified the question to the supreme
court, reasoning that it probably did not have jurisdiction over the
matter and the issue was of  “substantial public interest.”902
In Tall v. State,903 the court of appeals held that the lower court
did not err by not giving advance notice of the court’s proposed
dismissal of Tall’s post-conviction relief application.904 Tall claimed
that under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.1, he was entitled
to advance notice of the judge’s decision to dismiss his post-
895. Id. (citing Jackson, 776 P.2d at 327).
896. Id. at 588.
897. Id. at 590-591.
898. Id. at 584 n.1.
899. 33 P.3d 495 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
900. Id. at 498.
901. Id.
902. Id.
903. 25 P.3d 704 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
904. Id. at 706.
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conviction relief application.  However, in this case, the State filed
the motion to dismiss and, therefore, Rule 35.1(f)(3) governed the
decision, not Rule 35.1(f)(2), the subsection upon which Tall re-
lied.905  Because the judge granted the State’s motion to dismiss and
did not summarily dismiss the case himself, Tall did not have to be
given advance notice in order to respond because the reasons for
dismissal were in the motion.906
In Wurthmann v. State,907 the court of appeals held that a live-
in boyfriend who had spent seven years as the primary caretaker of
his girlfriend’s child was in a “position of authority” over her for
purposes of third-degree sexual abuse as required under A.S.
11.41.438.908  Wurthmann moved in with the child’s mother when
the child was ten years old and “assumed the role of [the child’s]
stepfather.”909  Despite allegations of earlier abuse, Wurthmann
admitted to only a consensual sexual relationship after the child
turned seventeen, but he was convicted of first, second and third-
degree sexual abuse.  Wurthmann appealed the trial court’s refusal
to grant a judgment of acquittal on the third-degree sexual abuse
charge on the grounds that he did not occupy a “position of
authority” over the child as required by the statute.  On appeal, the
court affirmed Wurthmann’s conviction for third-degree sexual
abuse, holding that the legislature intended “position of authority”
to include adults who exercise undue influence over a child and
that “a live-in boyfriend who assumes the position of a stepfather
has additional influence by virtue of his status as a person of special
trust in the child’s life.”910
EMPLOYMENT LAW
In Barios v. Brooks Range Supply, Inc.,911 the supreme court
affirmed the denial of Barios’ claim for overtime pay and held that
the exclusion of one of Barios’ witnesses was not an abuse of dis-
cretion.912  Three months after Barios’ employment with Brooks
Range Supply ended, she sued the company claiming that she was
not compensated for overtime.  Where an employer does not keep
records of hours worked by employees, as in this case, the em-
ployee need only produce evidence to create a “just and reason-
905. Id. at 707.
906. Id.
907. 27 P.3d 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
908. Id. at 766.
909. Id. at 763.
910. Id. at 764-65.
911. 26 P.3d 1082 (Alaska 2001).
912. Id. at 1089.
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able” inference to support her claim for overtime pay.  Then, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to produce specific evi-
dence regarding the amount of work performed by the employee
or to negate the inference drawn from the employee’s evidence.
The superior court found that Barios had met her burden, but that
Brooks had subsequently met its higher burden by producing tes-
timony of witnesses that Barios continually arrived late to work,
that Barios missed several days of work to care for her husband,
that there was not enough work available to require anyone to
work overtime and that Barios usually went home early or on time.
The supreme court found that the lower court did not err in finding
that this was sufficient evidence to meet Brooks’ burden of proof.913
In addition, the court held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding Barios’ expert witness because the witness
was only going to testify as to what the end result of the case
should be and such testimony is inappropriate where the court is
required to make such a determination.914
In Collins v. Arctic Builders, Inc.,915 the supreme court vacated
the superior court’s decision to dismiss Collins’ claim for workers’
compensation benefits and remanded the case for factual determi-
nations.916  Collins was diagnosed with chronic asbestos pleuritis on
November 3, 1990, and filed for benefits with the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board on May 21, 1993.  The superior court dis-
missed Collins’ claim on the grounds that he failed to file a timely
notice of injury under A.S. 23.30.100(a) and that Collins was barred
by the two-year statute of limitations under A.S. 23.30.105(a),
which had begun to run on November 3, 1990.  Collins argued that
he attempted to file his claim before the statute of limitations had
run, but that the clerk at the state workers’ compensation office
told him he had to file with a federal agency, and Collins’ paper-
work was apparently lost.  If Collins had made this attempt within
two years of November 3, 1990, he would be allowed to argue that
he was excused from his failure to give timely notice of injury un-
der A.S. 23.30.100(d).917  Because the superior court made no de-
termination as to whether Collins attempted to file his claim in
1991, the supreme court vacated the dismissal and remanded the
case for factual determinations on his attempted filing.918
913. Id. at 1087.
914. Id. at 1088.
915. 31 P.3d 1286 (Alaska 2001).
916. Id. at 1287-88.
917. Id at 1290.
918. Id. at 1291.
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
2002] YEAR IN REVIEW 309
In Finch v. Greatland Foods, Inc.,919 the supreme court re-
versed summary judgment against Finch on his claims of construc-
tive discharge and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, but affirmed summary judgment against him on his claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.920  Finch brought a
claim against his employer, Bob’s Distribution Company, Inc.  Af-
ter the parties settled the suit, Finch claimed that Bob’s engaged in
a pattern of harassment and retaliation designed to force his resig-
nation and filed suit alleging breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, retaliation and constructive discharge, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.  The superior court granted
Bob’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.  The supreme
court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Bob’s constructively discharged Finch and breached the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.921  The supreme court also
found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or
not Bob’s actions were authorized under the parties’ settlement
agreement.922  However, the court affirmed the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Bob’s on the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim because the record revealed no
more than “insults, indignities, threats, annoyances [and] petty op-
pressions.”923
In Gillum v. L & J Enterprises, Inc.,924 the supreme court held
that the superior court did not err in finding that a falling door did
not cause Gillum’s disability, in finding Gillum comparatively neg-
ligent or in disregarding the testimony of his expert witness.925
Gillum suffered two separate industrial accidents when he was
struck on the head by a falling warehouse door and, fifteen days
later, suffered another head injury when he fell from his semi-
trailer.  The supreme court upheld the decision of the lower court,
finding that the special master simply rejected Gillum’s trial theory
that the initial accident caused the second fall and additional inju-
ries.926  The court also declined to find error in the special master’s
finding Gillum comparatively negligent and disregarding the testi-
mony of Gillum’s expert witness.927  Because the special master
919. 21 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2001).
920. Id. at 1283.
921. Id. at 1284.
922. Id. at 1287-89.
923. Id. at 1286.
924. 29 P.3d 266 (Alaska 2001).
925. Id. at 267.
926. Id. at 269.
927. Id. at 269-70.
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found that the testimony of Gillum’s expert witness was based on
assumptions that did not comport with the evidence on record, it
properly chose not to rely on the expert’s testimony.928
In Goodman v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dis-
trict,929 the supreme court found that the time at which Goodman
knew or should have known that his employer would not accom-
modate his disability was a question of material fact and reversed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district.930
Goodman sued Fairbanks North Star Borough and the school dis-
trict alleging discrimination based on disability under A.S.
18.80.220(a)(1).  The lower court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, holding that Goodman had failed to file his
claim within the two-year statute of limitations.  The supreme court
reversed, noting that the date when Goodman discovered or should
have discovered the school district would not accommodate his dis-
ability is a question of fact not ordinarily determined by the lower
court on a motion for summary judgment.931  The supreme court
found that the record supported the inference that Goodman did
not receive unequivocal notice that the school district was refusing
to accommodate him until his application for disability retirement
was accepted in late February 1996, placing his February 18, 1998
claim within the statute of limitations.932
In Lincoln v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,933 the su-
preme court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judg-
ment as to Lincoln’s claims against her former employer for vio-
lating the Alaska Whistleblower Act, breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.934  Lincoln was employed by the Interior Regional
Housing Authority (“Authority”), an organization established to
address housing shortages in interior Alaska.  Lincoln cooperated
with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment during an investigation of her employer, even though her
boss allegedly instructed her not to cooperate.  Shortly after her
cooperation, Lincoln was laid off, but was told that she would be
“recalled as soon as fiscally possible.”935  Lincoln was not recalled
when a position similar to her old job opened up and was not hired
928. Id. at 270.
929. 39 P.3d 1118 (Alaska 2001).
930. Id. at 1120-21.
931. Id. at 1120.
932. Id. at 1120-21.
933. 30 P.3d 582 (Alaska 2001).
934. Id. at 584.
935. Id.
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for another position that subsequently opened up.  The supreme
court found that Lincoln raised inferences showing that Authority’s
reasons for firing her were pretextual and that genuine issues of
material fact existed on this point and, therefore, the court re-
versed the grant of summary judgment as to Lincoln’s Whistle-
blower and covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.936  The
supreme court also determined that wrongful discharges can lead
to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and because
the superior court did not make a threshold decision as to whether
Authority’s conduct was sufficiently outrageous to support the
claim, the court reversed and remanded the claim to the superior
court.937
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Robertson,938 the supreme
court held that a municipal worker can claim workers’ compensa-
tion for an injury sustained while crossing the street between the
city parking lot and his actual place of work because the parking
garage was part of the Municipality of Anchorage’s premises.939
The court reasoned that because the Municipality provided the ga-
rage parking to Robertson, benefited from the parking and indi-
rectly owned the garage, Robertson had already reached his place
of work when he was injured.940  Therefore, the “going and coming”
rule did not apply, and he was erroneously denied benefits.941
In Rhines v. State,942 the supreme court held that Rhines was
not eligible for occupational disability benefits under A.S.
39.35.410(a) because she was not terminated because of her dis-
ability and her injuries were not serious enough to be considered a
total and permanent occupational disability.943  In February 1993,
Rhines filed an occupational injury report due to pain in her wrists
and hands resulting from computer use.  She did not return to work
after March 16, 1993.  In May 1993, Rhines was notified that her
department was being reorganized and her position would be
eliminated at the end of July 1993.  The Public Employees’ Re-
tirement Board denied Rhines’ claim for occupational disability
benefits and the superior court affirmed.  The supreme court con-
cluded that it was the reorganization of Rhines’ department, and
936. Id. at 586-88.
937. Id. at 589.
938. 35 P.3d 12 (Alaska 2001).
939. Id. at 12.
940. Id.
941. Id.
942. 30 P.3d 621 (Alaska 2001).
943. Id. at 630.
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not her injuries, that severed her ties with her employer.944  The
court also concluded that Rhines’ injury was not a total and per-
manent occupational disability as defined in A.S. 39.35.680(26) be-
cause she suffered from tendonitis, but not carpal tunnel syndrome
or other serious nerve damage.945  As a result, the court affirmed
the superior court’s decision denying Rhines’ claim for occupa-
tional disability benefits.
FAMILY LAW
In Barrett v. Alguire,946 the supreme court held that a custodial
parent’s move out-of-state constitutes a material change of circum-
stances as a matter of law, and that the superior court did not err in
holding a custody hearing and granting custody to Alguire.947  Bar-
rett was awarded primary physical custody of the couple’s two sons
after the dissolution of their marriage.  When Barrett moved his
sons to Washington, Alguire petitioned for custody modification.
The superior court ruled that Barrett’s move was a material change
of circumstances meriting a custody hearing, and ultimately
awarded custody to Alguire upon finding that such an award was in
the best interests of the children.  On appeal, the supreme court
held that the hearing was appropriate because Barrett’s move con-
stituted a material change of circumstances as a matter of law,948
and declined to find error in the best-interests determination be-
cause the superior court properly applied the applicable statutory
provisions of A.S. 25.24.150(c).949
In C.J. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,950 the
supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision under the In-
dian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), which terminated the parental
rights of a non-Indian father.951  C.J.’s biological children were
taken into state custody and placed in foster care after their Indian
mother was arrested and charged with child abuse and neglect.
The Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”) relied on
social workers in Florida, where C.J. was living, to determine
whether he was willing and able to care for his children.  At trial,
the superior court terminated C.J.’s parental rights based solely on
testimony of an expert who had never spoken with C.J. or the chil-
944. Id. at 626.
945. Id. at 628.
946. 35 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2001).
947. Id. at 11-12.
948. Id. at 11.
949. Id. at 15-16.
950. 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001).
951. C.J., 18 P.3d at 1220.
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dren and a DFYS social worker who testified only to second-hand
information from Florida placement officials as to C.J.’s inability to
care for the children.  The supreme court held that this evidence
did not meet the heightened requirements of the ICWA952 because
it did not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that placement with
C.J. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the children or that the State had engaged in active efforts to pre-
vent the breakup of the family.953
In D.D. v. L.A.H.,954 the supreme court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing
before entering an order in an opposed custody modification
hearing.955  When D.D. (Danielle) and L.A.H. (Leif) divorced in
September 1996, they negotiated a custody agreement giving Leif
custody of their son, Travis, for seven of the twelve months of the
year while Danielle went to school.  Danielle moved back to
Alaska in December 1996 and the parties agreed to split custody.
Subsequently, Danielle filed motions to modify child custody and
to appoint a child custody investigator.  The superior court denied
Danielle’s motion and granted Leif custody during the school year
without giving Danielle visitation rights.  The judge also denied
Danielle’s motion to appoint an investigator, finding that there was
sufficient information to make such a determination.  Danielle ap-
pealed, arguing that she had a constitutional due process right to be
heard prior to the issuance of a custody order.  The supreme court
agreed, holding that an evidentiary hearing is required before an
opposed motion to modify custody can be granted.956  Therefore,
the supreme court reversed the judgment of the superior court and
remanded the case.
In Elliott v. Settje,957 the supreme court held that the “stability
and continuity” factor is not decisive in child custody cases and that
courts are not required to follow a guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”)
recommendation.958  The superior court granted Elliott and Settje
joint physical custody of their child, Kessa.  Elliott appealed, argu-
ing that the stability and continuity offered by one primary care
giver should have compelled the superior court to award her pri-
mary physical custody.  The supreme court disagreed, holding that
trial courts should have substantial discretion to analyze the stabil-
952. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2000).
953. C.J., 18 P.3d at 1219.
954. 27 P.3d 757 (Alaska 2001).
955. Id. at 758.
956. Id. at 760.
957. 27 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2001).
958. Id. at 321-22 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(5) (Michie 2000)).
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ity and continuity factor, but are not required to give that factor
special weight when other factors are equal.959  Because the supe-
rior court considered Kessa’s young age and her strong interest in
establishing ties with each parent, the court did not abuse its discre-
tion in awarding joint physical custody.960  The supreme court also
held that courts are not required to follow a GAL’s recommenda-
tion, but that the superior court’s decision was consistent with the
GAL’s report and testimony in any event.961
In Goliver v. McAllister,962 the supreme court reversed the
grant of summary judgment for the McAllisters because a material
issue of fact existed as to whether Goliver’s motion was time
barred.963  Goliver sought to set aside the adoption of her son by
her parents, the McAllisters.  Without conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the superior court found that Goliver’s motion was time-
barred by A.S. 25.23.140(b), which requires that all appeals and
challenges of adoption decrees be brought within one year’s time.
The supreme court found that an unresolved issue of material fact
existed regarding whether the McAllisters had “taken custody” of
the child and if so, whether they took custody more than one year
prior to Goliver’s motion.964  Accordingly, the supreme court va-
cated the superior court’s denial of Goliver’s motion and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing.
In Green v. Green,965 the supreme court upheld the trial court’s
division of the Greens’ marital assets, but required additional
findings on the valuation and distribution of the parties’ cash as-
sets.966  The Greens owned and operated a flight-seeing and air taxi
service during their marriage.  Gary Green asserted that the trial
court erred in including the couple’s cabin site and two airplanes in
the marital estate.  The supreme court affirmed, concluding that
the lower court had not erred in finding that Gary Green had in-
tended to transmute the property he owned prior to the marriage
into marital property.967  The court held that the Greens’ actions,
including the use of property as their residence, the maintenance of
property by both parties, the placement of title in joint ownership
and the use of the non-titled owner’s credit to improve the prop-
959. Id. at 321.
960. Id. at 322.
961. Id.
962. 34 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2001).
963. Id. at 325.
964. Id. at 326.
965. 29 P.3d 854 (Alaska 2001).
966. Id. at 856.
967. Id. at 857-59.
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erty, indicated Gary’s intent to treat the cabin as marital prop-
erty.968  However, the court remanded the issue of valuation of cash
assets because the trial court failed to enter required findings as to
why the Greens’ marital cash assets were valued as of the time of
separation rather than the time of trial.969
In Hanson v. Hanson,970 the supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling that Judges Reese and Hensley did not abuse their
discretion in denying William Hanson’s motion to recuse Judge
Reese.971  During a hearing to modify custody of the Hansons’
daughter, William filed a motion to recuse Judge Reese from the
hearing.  Judge Reese stated to William that “what you have con-
vinced me of is that you really hate women, you’re very judg-
mental, that you’re absolutely insensitive to different cultures.”972
Both Judges Reese and Hensley denied Hanson’s motion.  Judge
Reese decided that the two parties should continue to split custody
of the child with Yelana Hanson maintaining primary physical cus-
tody.  On appeal, the supreme court found that the motion to re-
cuse was properly denied because Judge Reese was still able to give
a fair and impartial decision and because his comments were based
on knowledge and opinion acquired during the proceedings and
were necessary to the completion of the judge’s task.973
In J.H. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,974 the
supreme court affirmed the termination of J.H.’s parental rights
because the record clearly showed that the Department of Health
and Social Services had made reasonable efforts to reunite mother
and child.975  J.H. appealed the termination of her parental rights,
arguing that the State had not made reasonable efforts to reunite
her with her daughter and that State was estopped from terminat-
ing her parental rights because the Department changed its goal
from reunification to termination.  The supreme court held that the
evidence supported the findings that the Department made rea-
sonable efforts to reunify the family and that termination was in
the child’s best interests.976  The court also held that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel did not preclude termination because J.H. failed
to show that she was prejudiced by the Department’s change of po-
968. Id. at 858.
969. Id. at 859.
970. 36 P.3d 1181 (Alaska 2001).
971. Id. at 1188.
972. Id. at 1183.
973. Id. at 1184, 1186.
974. 30 P.3d 79.
975. Id. at 86-87.
976. Id.
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sition and because the public interest would be prejudiced if the
Department’s actions could comprise the child’s best interests.977
As a result, the court held that J.H.’s rights were properly termi-
nated.
In J.J. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,978 the
supreme court held that where a doctor received her information
on the case by reading an incomplete case file and did not meet or
speak with a parent, her children or the parent’s counselors, or
make a substantial inquiry into the parent’s activities, the testimo-
nial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt the pa-
rental unfitness required to terminate parental rights under the In-
dian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA.”)979  After being convicted of
child neglect, J.J.’s social worker from the Division of Family and
Youth Services (“DFYS”) arranged for J.J. to be evaluated at
Alaska North Addictions Recovery Center (“ANARC”) in April
1998, and created a written case plan.  J.J. was admitted to
ANARC again in May 1999, and learned that DFYS had petitioned
to terminate her parental rights.  The superior court terminated
J.J.’s parental rights, finding that she had abandoned her children
and that it was in the children’s best interest to be placed in an
adoptive home.  The supreme court reversed, finding that the ex-
pert testimony did not consider J.J.’s completion of the ANARC
treatment program and her continued sobriety, and that without
supplemental information, “a reasonable fact finder could [not]
conclude without reasonable doubt that placement of the children
with J.J. would likely cause them serious damage.”980  Accordingly,
the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In J.L.P. v. V.L.A.,981 the supreme court upheld the denial of
J.L.P.’s motion for modification of custody.982  The motion was filed
two weeks after the trial court awarded J.L.P. custody of his son,
but left the mother with primary physical custody of their daughter.
The supreme court found that the motion was a de facto motion for
reconsideration of the custody question raised in the initial pro-
ceeding.983  Before granting a motion to modify custody, the non-
custodial parent must demonstrate changed circumstances and the
modification must be in the child’s best interests.984  Because J.L.P.
977. Id. at 88.
978. 38 P.3d 7 (Alaska 2001).
979. Id. at 10-11.
980. Id.
981. 30 P.3d 590 (Alaska 2001).
982. Id. at 594.
983. Id. at 595.
984. Id.
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did not establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, the
denial of his motion without such a hearing was appropriate.985
In J.M.R. v. S.T.R.,986 the supreme court held that a domestic
violence petition is an inappropriate proceeding for a non-parent to
litigate custody and visitation issues.987  The appellant grandmother
alleged that her son and daughter-in-law were unfit parents and
sought custody of her grandchildren.  The supreme court held that
parental rights are better adjudicated in a full-blown custody pro-
ceeding, rather than the expedited process required by a domestic
violence petition.988  The court therefore rejected the appellant’s
claim that the word “petitioner” in A.S. 18.66.100 required the trial
court to allow her to litigate her custody claim in her domestic vio-
lence petition.989
In Maxwell v. Maxwell,990 the supreme court held that the alle-
gations of an abusive environment made by Gary Maxwell were in-
sufficient to modify a custody agreement.991  Gary Maxwell filed a
motion to modify custody claiming that his two children were in an
abusive environment.  His motion was based on two incidents in
which his former wife, Laurie Maxwell, sent one of his children, on
short notice, from her home in Ketchikan to stay with him in An-
chorage for a short period of time.  On review of the superior
court’s denial of Maxwell’s motion, the supreme court held that he
had failed to establish that a change in circumstances had oc-
curred—one of the two conditions to be satisfied before a motion
to modify custody is granted.992  The supreme court also held that
the trial court did not err in preferring a custody investigator’s
findings over Mr. Maxwell’s “factually unsupported speculation.”993
In Meier v. Cloud,994 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint a custody in-
vestigator because the need for a “timely decision” outweighed any
additional benefit that would have been gained through a formal
custody investigation.995  Meier and Cloud were ex-spouses sharing
custody of their son, Tyler, when Cloud moved for a modification
985. Id.
986. 15 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2001).
987. Id. at 257.
988. Id. at 256-57.
989. Id.
990. 37 P.3d 424 (Alaska 2001).
991. Id. at 426.
992. Id. at 425-26.
993. Id. at 426.
994. 34 P.3d 1274  (Alaska 2001).
995. Id. at 1277.
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of the custody arrangement in the hopes of moving Tyler to Seattle
by the start of the upcoming school year.  Meier opposed the mo-
tion and requested a court-appointed child custody investigator,
but the parties were unable to agree on the scope and choice of the
investigator.  The superior court finally ruled that a child custody
report was unnecessary.  After the court awarded primary custody
to Cloud, Meier appealed, arguing that the court erred in declining
to appoint a custody investigator.  The supreme court disagreed,
reasoning that a child custody report is only meant to assist the trial
court and the decision not to appoint an investigator was not an
abuse of discretion because an investigation would have been time
consuming and there was no indication that a report would have
been helpful in this case.996  The court also held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody to
Cloud because its decision was appropriately considered and bal-
anced all relevant statutory factors.997
In M.W. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,998
the supreme court affirmed the termination of Mark W.’s parental
rights to his daughter, Michelle.999  The Department of Health and
Social Services took Michelle from her mother after she was born
with cocaine in her bloodstream.  The Department social worker
met with Mark to discuss Michelle’s care, but his refusal to cooper-
ate led the Department to place Michelle in foster care.  After
Mark failed to follow up on his case plan for receiving custody of
Michelle and failed to set up any visitations with her, the Depart-
ment petitioned to terminate Mark’s parental rights, which the su-
perior court granted.  The supreme court held the lower court had
correctly applied the statutory requirements for parental termina-
tion in finding that (1) Michelle was in need of aid because her par-
ents had abandoned her, were unwilling to provide for her care and
engaged in conduct that placed her at substantial risk of harm; (2)
Mark’s failure to resolve the abandonment within one year was un-
reasonable; (3) the Department’s placement of Michelle in foster
care and repeated attempts to contact Mark, even though he did
not receive a written copy of the case plan, constituted reasonable
efforts provide family services; and (4) it was in Michelle’s best in-
terest to remain in her foster home because she had bonded with
her foster parents.1000
996. Id.
997. Id. at 1278-79.
998. 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
999. Id. at 1142.
1000. Id. at 1144-47 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088(a) (Michie 2000)).
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In Platz v. Aramburo,1001 the supreme court vacated the order
granting custody to Aramburo and remanded the case to the supe-
rior court for an evidentiary hearing on the child’s best interests
pursuant to A.S. 25.24.150(c).1002  Platz and Aramburo had a daugh-
ter, Rebecca, and separated shortly after Rebecca’s birth.  Ac-
cording to Aramburo, Platz did not allow him to have any contact
with Rebecca.  In response, Aramburo filed a petition to attempt to
restore contact and visitation with Rebecca.  Platz did not respond
to Aramburo’s petition or any of Aramburo’s subsequent motions.
After a default hearing, the court awarded custody to Aramburo
and Platz appealed.  The supreme court held that the trial court
had properly asserted jurisdiction and did not err when it did not
dismiss the case on the basis of forum non conveniens because not
enough information showed that Alaska was an inconvenient fo-
rum under A.S. 25.30.060.1003  However, the court held that the trial
court did not properly take into account all the factors required in
determining the child’s best interest under A.S. 25.24.150(c) when
it ordered a change in custody.1004  The supreme court vacated the
order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing as to the
child’s best interests.1005
In Routh v. Andreassen,1006 the supreme court held that a court
may not “impute income to a child support obligor” if the court did
not conduct a hearing when there is a genuine factual dispute as to
the income of the obligor and the obligor did not withhold any fi-
nancial information.1007  Andreassen and Routh divorced and An-
dreassen was granted primary custody of their son.  Andreassen
moved to have Routh document his income in order to modify his
child support payments.  After Routh produced documents, An-
dreassen moved to have her child support increased, and Routh
filed a cross-motion to have it decreased.  The superior court re-
ferred the motion to a standing master, who, after recognizing a
discrepancy in Routh’s documents regarding his income, recom-
mended to the superior court that the support be raised.  The supe-
rior court adopted the standing master’s recommendation, and
Routh appealed.  The supreme court found that because there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to Routh’s exact income, it was
error for the superior court to raise Routh’s child support obliga-
1001. 17 P.3d 65 (Alaska 2001).
1002. Id. at 66.
1003. Id. at 69-70.
1004. Id. at 70-71.
1005. Id. at 71.
1006. 19 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2001).
1007. Id. at 594.
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tion without a hearing when Routh had been forthcoming in pro-
ducing documents regarding his income.1008  Therefore, the supreme
court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In Sloane v. Sloane,1009 the supreme court held that the superior
court’s valuation of certain items in a divorce was not clearly erro-
neous, its division of marital property was not clearly unjust and its
awards of interest and attorney’s fees were legally correct.1010  Sally
Sloane appealed the division of marital property that resulted from
her divorce from George Sloane.  First, the supreme court held the
superior court did not commit clear error in valuing a $25,000 note
payable to George at only ten dollars because it was unlikely the
note would ever be repaid.1011  Second, the court held that the supe-
rior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only fifty-seven
percent of the marital property to Sally because the lower court
had properly considered factors such as the relative age of the par-
ties, the health of the parties and future medical needs.1012  Third,
the court found no statutory basis for Sally’s request to delay the
divorce decree for three years so she could continue health insur-
ance as a spouse under her former husband’s coverage.1013  Fourth,
the court ruled that Sally’s concern about post-judgment interest
was moot because George subsequently paid the amount owned to
Sally as ordered by the superior court.1014  Finally, the court held
that additional awards of attorney’s fees to Sally were not required
because her award of fifty-seven percent of the marital property
put the two parties in comparable economic situations, and it
would not make sense, after leveling the playing field, to hold one
party liable for the other party’s litigation choices and expenses.1015
In Wright v. Wright,1016 the supreme court held that child sup-
port orders can only be modified according to Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 90.3, and that a modification could be effective no ear-
lier than the date of the filing of a motion under that rule.1017  Mark
Wright filed a “Motion to Retroactively Modify Child Support,”
arguing that a previous order was erroneous.  Tracy Wright op-
posed the motion, arguing that retroactive modification of child
1008. Id. at 595-96.
1009. 18 P.3 60 (Alaska 2001).
1010. Id. at 69.
1011. Id. at 65.
1012. Id. at 65-67.
1013. Id. at 67.
1014. Id. at 68.
1015. Id. at 68-69.
1016. 22 P.3d 875 (Alaska 2001).
1017. Id. at 879.
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support is prohibited under Rule 90.3(h) and federal law.  The su-
preme court agreed, and affirmed the lower court’s denial of retro-
active modification.1018  The court also held that the previous child
support order could not be set aside under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) because Mark’s argument for relief was based on
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, and was
proper, but time-barred.1019
INSURANCE LAW
In Shaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,1020
the supreme court held that because there was a material issue of
fact relating to how a truck was used during a shooting, granting
summary judgment in favor of State Farm was erroneous.1021  Shaw
was shot by Murphy, who then shot himself.  Because Shaw’s inju-
ries exceeded the limits of Murphy’s insurance policy, she sued her
insurance company, State Farm, to recover under the unin-
sured/underinsured clause of her policy.  Shaw claimed that Mur-
phy used his truck to block Shaw’s car and keep her from driving
away, while State Farm asserted that Murphy was merely lying in
wait in his truck.  In order for Shaw to be covered under the un-
derinsured portion of her policy, the injuries must have been
caused by an accident that arose out of the use of the truck.  Al-
though the court refused to proffer an exact test for what may be
considered “use” of the truck in the crime, it held that the determi-
nation depends upon the facts of the case.1022  Because those facts
were in dispute, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor
of State Farm and remanded the case for further proceedings.
PROPERTY LAW
In Beaux v. Jacob,1023 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not err in finding that the sellers of a home violated the
Residential Real Property Transfers Act.1024  However, the court
reversed the damage award because it exceeded the cost of putting
the purchaser’s home in the condition represented by the disclo-
sure form.1025  In addition, the court remanded for a recalculation of
1018. Id. at 878.
1019. Id. at 879-80.
1020. 19 P.3d 588 (Alaska 2001).
1021. Id. at 593.
1022. Id. at 590.
1023. 30 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2001).
1024. Id. at 94-95.
1025. Id. at 97-98.
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prejudgment interest, distinguishing between damages for eco-
nomic loss and for harm to property.1026  Beaux sold a home he had
built to the Jacobs.  On the property transfer disclosure form,
Beaux indicated that there were no water problems in the base-
ment but that “Sump Pumps must be maintained and used.”  The
Jacobs used the automatic sump pump but did not use the deep
sump.  Consequently, water infiltrated the Jacob’s basement and
soaked the carpet on multiple occasions.  The supreme court held
that Beaux failed to use reasonable care in answering the disclo-
sure form questions, finding substantial evidence in the record to
support a conclusion that the disclosure form was ambiguous and
did not adequately disclose the need to use the deep sump to avoid
water infiltration.1027  The court reversed the damages award, hold-
ing that the Jacobs should have been awarded the cost of installing
a permanent pump in the deep sump, not the cost of a new perime-
ter drain system, because the Jacobs did not expect to purchase a
house with such a system.1028 Additionally, the court held that pre-
judgment interest must be recalculated because A.S. 09.30.070(b)
applies only to actions for personal injury, death or damages to
property, not to purely economic loss claims.1029
In Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,1030 the supreme court
held that a land classification decision is not a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding and, therefore, the dismissal of Cabana’s appeal was
proper because the court lacked jurisdiction.1031  Cabana challenged
the Borough’s decision to classify a piece of land as “light indus-
trial,” arguing that the Borough failed to comply with various pro-
cedural and statutory requirements.  The supreme court held that
the classification of municipal land involves a legislative rather than
a quasi-judicial proceeding because the classification of public land
does not immediately and directly affect the rights of a particular,
private landowner.1032  Because review by appeal is only allowed for
decisions of legislative bodies where the decision is quasi-judicial,
the superior court correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-
tion.1033
1026. Id. at 100-01.
1027. Id. at 95.
1028. Id. at 97-98.
1029. Id. at 100-01.
1030. 21 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001).
1031. Id. at 836.
1032. Id. at 835-36.
1033. Id.
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In Griswold v. City of Homer,1034 the supreme court affirmed a
grant of summary judgment against Griswold, who had challenged
the legality of a zoning ordinance.1035  In 1998, the City of Homer
passed a zoning ordinance that permitted a certain area to be used
for businesses that sold and repaired automobiles.  In an earlier
case,1036 Griswold successfully challenged the legality of a similar
ordinance, arguing that one of the council members had a conflict
of interest.  After the new ordinance was passed, Griswold filed
suit again, arguing that the ordinance amounted to illegal spot
zoning.  The superior court ruled that Griswold’s spot zoning claim
was precluded by the decision in Griswold I, and granted summary
judgment against him on all of his claims.  The supreme court af-
firmed the decision on Griswold’s spot zoning claim without de-
ciding whether the suit was precluded under the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel because Griswold had failed to demonstrate that
material differences existed between this case and the precedent
established in Griswold I.1037
In John v. United States,1038 the en banc Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in a per curiam
opinion.1039  The district court opinion was the result of a remand
from an earlier Ninth Circuit three judge panel, which had inter-
preted the term “title” to limit federal protection of subsistence
fishing under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(“ANILCA”).1040
In Vezey v. Green,1041 the supreme court held that Green had
adversely possessed the land in question to the north, east and
south areas of the property, but remanded the case to determine
whether Green adversely possessed the land to the west of the
property.1042  Through an unrecorded oral gift, Green received a
parcel of land.  Green built a house on the land, developed certain
parts of it and was the recognized owner by several people.  Over
ten years later, Vezey purchased part of the land, which included
some of the land that Green was supposedly given by gift.  Green
claimed that she owned the land by adverse possession, and the su-
1034. 34 P.3d 1280 (Alaska 2001) (hereinafter Griswold II).
1035. Id. at 1288.
1036. Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996) (hereinafter
Griswold I).
1037. Griswold II, at 1284.
1038. 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001).
1039. Id. at 1033.
1040. Id. at 1034.
1041. 35 P.3d 14 (Alaska 2001).
1042. Id. at 28.
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preme court agreed because Green had adversely possessed the
land for more then ten years, continually and exclusively used the
land as an average owner would, placed the recorded owners on
notice of her adverse possession and possessed the land as hostile
against the recorded owners.1043  However, the court only found
proof that Green adversely possessed the land to the east, north
and south of the property in question and remanded the case to de-
termine if she owned the land to the west through adverse posses-
sion.1044
TORT LAW
In Bierria v. Dickinson Manufacturing Co.,1045 the supreme
court held that the superior court did not err when it excluded evi-
dence about other boat fires and admitted evidence of experimen-
tal tests conducted on the allegedly defective stove.1046  Bierria sued
Dickinson Manufacturing after his boat caught fire and sank, al-
leging that the stove manufactured by Dickinson was defective and
caused the fire.  The jury concluded that the stove was defective,
but that it was not defective when it left Dickinson’s possession.
On appeal, Bierria argued that the trial court erred when it ex-
cluded evidence of other boat fires related to Dickinson stoves and
admitted Dickinson’s expert testimony relating to tests of Dickin-
son’s stoves.  The supreme court held that the causes of the other
fires Bierria wanted to introduce into evidence were different
enough from Bierria’s case and, therefore, the judge did not abuse
his discretion in excluding the evidence.1047  The court also held that
it was not an abuse of discretion to admit Dickinson’s expert testi-
mony because there was no evidence suggesting that the expert’s
tests “were likely to be distorted by the circumstances under which
they were conducted.”1048
In Glamann v. Kirk,1049 the supreme court found no error in the
superior court’s decisions to admit evidence of malingering, give an
aggravating-cause jury instruction, deny the motion for a new trial
and disallow Glamann’s wife’s wage loss claim.1050  Glamann’s
stopped truck was rear-ended by Kirk, causing Glamann’s truck to
collide with another vehicle.  Glamann filed suit against Kirk for
1043. Id. at 21-23.
1044. Id. at 28.
1045. 36 P.3d 654 (Alaska 2001).
1046. Id. at 659.
1047. Id. at 657-58.
1048. Id. at 658-59.
1049. 29 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2001).
1050. Id. at 257.
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her negligent failure to stop.  Although Kirk admitted fault in
causing the accident, she disputed the extent of her liability for the
injuries.  On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling.  First, it held that evidence of malingering was not unfairly
prejudicial, was directly relevant to credibility and causation de-
terminations and was neither confusing nor misleading.1051  Second,
the aggravating-cause jury instruction was not erroneous because it
properly stated and clarified the law and allocated the burden of
proof.1052  Third, Glamann’s motion for a new trial was properly de-
nied because there was sufficient evidentiary support for the ver-
dict and there was no evidence that the special verdict caused
prejudice.1053  Fourth, there was no legal basis to support a claim for
lost wages by Glamann’s wife.1054
In L.C.H. v. T.S.,1055 the supreme court held that T.S.’s testi-
mony of prior sexual abuse was admissible as testimony based on
personal knowledge and that admission of expert testimony on pro-
files of child sexual abuse victims was proper as rebuttal testi-
mony.1056  Tabitha S. filed suit against Lance H., alleging sexual
abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  At trial,
Tabitha testified about a number of instances of inappropriate sex-
ual conduct by Lance and others and referenced four years of dia-
ries detailing her belief that she had been sexually assaulted.  On
appeal, Lance argued that Tabitha’s testimony should not have
been admitted because it was unreliable and that the court erred in
admitting expert testimony about the typical behavior or profile of
victims of childhood sexual abuse.  The supreme court held that the
superior court correctly rejected Lance’s objections to Tabitha’s
testimony on grounds it constituted “recovered memory.”1057  The
court also held that sufficient evidence existed that Tabitha had
personal knowledge of the abuse but did not appreciate the conse-
quences of the actions, and that her testimony was not unfairly
prejudicial.1058  The court also held that the expert testimony on
child sexual abuse profiles satisfied the admissibility requirements
for expert testimony and that the expert testimony was properly
1051. Id. at 260.
1052. Id. at 261-62.
1053. Id. at 262-64.
1054. Id. at 265.
1055. 28 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2001).
1056. Id. at 918.
1057. Id.
1058. Id. at 920-21 (citing State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999)).
YIR_FMT_APPENDIX.DOC 06/04/02  2:07 PM
326 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:1
admitted to rebut Lance’s claim that Tabitha had fabricated the
allegations of abuse.1059
In Loncar v. Gray,1060 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s evidentiary decisions and its denial of a new trial.1061   Lon-
car was involved in a car accident with Gray in which Gray admit-
ted liability, but disputed the damages attributable to the accident.
The jury awarded Loncar only half of the past medical expenses
that she entered into evidence.  On appeal, Loncar first argued that
the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding her prior
medical history.  The supreme court disagreed because Loncar
opened the door to issues surrounding her prior medical history by
asking her neuropsychologist questions about her prior ongoing
symptoms and treatment.1062  Second, Loncar appealed the trial
court’s exclusion of evidence regarding her Medicare and Medicaid
benefits.  The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
exclude the Medicaid evidence as part of pain and suffering dam-
ages because it opened the door to a potentially large body of evi-
dence that would be more confusing to the jury than probative.1063
The supreme court also affirmed the trial court’s decision to ex-
clude the evidence for double recovery purposes because Loncar
did not object to the jury instruction telling the jury to award the
full amount of necessary medical expenses regardless of who actu-
ally paid the bill.1064  Third, the supreme court overruled Loncar’s
claim that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her ex-
husband’s bias from previous divorce proceedings because the trial
court had, in fact, never excluded the evidence.1065  Fourth, the su-
preme court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit all of the
medical records of testifying physicians and the records they relied
upon, reasoning that the records of doctors who did not testify fall
within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and that if
Loncar wished to question the doctors, she could have called them
to the stand.1066  Finally, the denial of Loncar’s motion for a new
trial was affirmed because the jury had an evidentiary basis to
doubt both the causation and the extent of Loncar’s claimed in-
jury.1067
1059. Id. at 923-24.
1060. 28 P.3d 928 (Alaska 2001).
1061. Id. at 935.
1062. Id. at 931.
1063. Id. at 933.
1064. Id.
1065. Id. at 934.
1066. Id. at 934-35.
1067. Id. at 935.
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In Lybrand v. Trask,1068 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Trask’s con-
duct was not “sufficiently ‘outrageous’ to support” a claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.1069  During construction on
the Lybrand home, debris entered the Trask property.  Unable to
resolve the ensuing conflict, Trask painted various biblical passages
and a message to George Lybrand on the roof of her home.
George Lybrand then sought an injunction to have the lettering
removed.  In an amended complaint, Elizabeth Lybrand also
claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress damages.  The
superior court held that although Lybrand had indeed suffered
emotional distress as a result of Trask’s intentional conduct, that
conduct was not outrageous enough to support a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.  The supreme court agreed,
distinguishing the case from cases “involv[ing] multiple, concerted
efforts to seriously damage the well-being and reputation of the
plaintiff.”1070  The court also determined that the alleged violation
of a sign ordinance had no bearing on whether Trask’s conduct was
outrageous.1071
In Lynden, Inc. v. Walker,1072 the supreme court affirmed the
denial of Lynden’s motion for summary judgment because there
was a factual dispute as to whether Lynden breached its duty to
load its materials in a way that permitted them to be unloaded
safely.1073  Walker was permanently injured while unloading pipe
saddles from a truck loaded by Lynden.  Walker sued Lynden for
negligence, claiming that Lynden’s failure to secure the loose pipe
saddles to pallets caused his accident.  The superior court found
that Lynden had a duty to load the pipes safely under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.1074  The supreme court questioned the su-
perior court’s rationale under the Restatement, but found that a
duty was imposed on Lynden after considering the seven factors
used to determine whether a duty should attach to particular con-
duct.1075  Because Walker established a factual dispute as to whether
1068. 31 P.3d 801 (Alaska 2001).
1069. Id. at 802.
1070. Id. at 804.
1071. Id. at 805.
1072. 30 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2001).
1073. Id. at 611.
1074. Id. at 613 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 391-93 (1965)).
1075. Walker, 30 P.3d at 614-16 (citing D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1997)).  The seven factors are: (1) the fore-
seeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf-
fered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
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Lynden breached its duty to load the pipe saddles so that they
could be safely unloaded, the supreme court affirmed the denial of
Lynden’s motions for summary judgment and judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.1076
In Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc.,1077 the supreme court
upheld a grant of summary judgment for Dowell Schlumberger
(“Schlumberger”) because Sopko’s claim was barred by the statute
of limitations.1078  In 1996, Sopko sued his former employer,
Schlumberger, alleging exposure to toxic chemicals.  Schlumberger
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Sopko’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations.  The superior court
granted the motion and, on appeal, Sopko argued that the discov-
ery rule, which provides that the statute of limitations does not be-
gin to run until the prospective plaintiff “discovers, or reasonably
should discover, the existence of all elements of his cause of ac-
tion,” should preclude the entry of summary judgment against
him.1079  The supreme court determined that Sopko reasonably
should have discovered both his injury and its causation no later
than September 20, 1990, nearly six years before he filed suit.1080
The court also rejected Sopko’s contention that his case should be
viewed as a latent injury because Sopko began suffering symptoms
almost immediately.1081  Furthermore, the court held that the statute
of limitations could not be put off until the plaintiff learns the full
extent of his damages.1082
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
In Critell v. Bingo,1083 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s finding that Houssien’s will was invalid, but vacated and
remanded the court’s award of attorneys fees.1084  Houssien died
leaving behind an estate worth approximately $1.59 million.  Crit-
and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct;
(5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the de-
fendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach; and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.
1076. Id. at 617.
1077. 21 P.3d 1265 (Alaska 2001).
1078. Id. at 1267.
1079. Id. at 1270.
1080. Id. at 1271.
1081. Id.
1082. Id. at 1272.
1083. 36 P.3d 634 (Alaska 2001).
1084. Id. at 643-44.
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tell, a friend of Houssien, petitioned the court to appoint him per-
sonal representative of her estate and to accept a will she executed
in 1995 for informal probate.  Houssien’s sisters challenged Crit-
tell’s petition.  At trial, the sisters sought to establish that the will
was a fraud because Houssien lacked testamentary capacity when
she signed the will and because she acted out of undue influence as
a result of Crittell’s and his wife’s fraudulent conduct.  The su-
preme court found that the record supported the conclusion that
Hussien lacked sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature
of her testamentary act.1085  Furthermore, the court held there was
no clear error in the superior court’s finding of undue influence be-
cause the evidence supported the six factors used to determine the
presence of undue influence arising from fraud.1086  On the issue of
attorneys fees, the court found the superior court’s award under
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(b)(2) to be in conflict with the
plain language of the rule and, therefore, in plain error.1087
In Riddell v. Edwards,1088 the supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court’s decision denying a motion for jury trial in a probate
proceeding and affirmed the court’s finding that a decedent’s will
was invalid for lack of testamentary capacity.1089  Lillie M. Rahm-
Riddell (“Lillie”) executed a will in 1992 that gave half of her es-
tate to her brother, Irvin Edwards.  She met Robert Riddell in 1993
and, in the remaining four years of her life, she executed two addi-
tional wills in 1994 and 1997.  Both wills were prepared by Riddell
and the 1997 version, drafted almost eight months before she died,
expressly disinherited her brother, daughter and grandchildren.
During the time that Lillie was married to Riddell, a domestic vio-
lence petition was filed against him on her behalf and he was or-
dered to avoid contact with her.  Notwithstanding the order, Rid-
dell found Lillie in an assisted living home in Washington, removed
her from the home and refused to tell anyone where she was until
her death in 1997.  Edwards and Riddell filed competing requests
to probate the 1992 will and the 1997 will, respectively.  The su-
preme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Riddell’s motion for
jury trial because the Alaska Constitution preserves a jury trial
only for those causes of action which are legal, not equitable, in na-
ture, and probate matters are equitable.1090  The supreme court also
held that the superior court did not err in declaring the 1997 will
1085. Id. at 641.
1086. Id. at 642 (citing Estate of Reddaway, 329 P.2d 886, 891-93 (Or. 1958)).
1087. Id. at 643.
1088. 32 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2001).
1089. Id. at 5.
1090. Id. at 7-8.
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invalid due to a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence
because substantial evidence existed that Lillie was incompetent at
the time she executed the 1997 will.1091
1091. Id. at 10.
